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EAST EUROPE REPORT

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ENERGY UTILIZATION OF CEMA COUNTRIES VIEWED

Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian No 41, 11 Oct 86 p 11

[Article by Kalman Mohacsi: "Energy Utilization in CEMA Countries"]

[Text] Energy utilization continues to be an issue of key importance for the European CEMA countries, with several of them facing energy problems lately. What are the factors that have led to the present critical energy situation in certain countries? How have the individual member countries responded to and how have they tried to adjust to the challenges? What major tendencies have developed in the second half of the 80's?

As their own reserves are sufficient to satisfy only a slight proportion of their needs, the smaller CEMA countries' development is based on significant energy imports with the Soviet Union as the primary supplier. Even Poland, the GDR and Romania are exceptions from this only with respect to certain energy resources, i.e., oil and coal. While following the first oil price explosion, energy consumption hardly increased in the developed capitalist countries which adjusted to the international trends, the socialist countries continued to develop their economies in the energy-intensive way. It was obvious from the beginning of the 70's that the ability of the Soviet partner to increase its energy import to the European member countries would become more and more limited. Between 1981 and 1985, only stagnation could be expected in Soviet energy export. Moreover, according to the Bucharest price principle, prices kept on rising, making it increasingly "harder" to compensate for energy resources.

As the burdens of acquiring energy from within the CEMA gradually increased, all of the energy importing countries responded in different ways, nonetheless, in numerous respects these ways were similar. On the one hand, individual governments' intentions, already expressed in the previous, 1976-1980 plan period, put an ever greater emphasis on the rationalization of energy utilization. These intentions took the form of mostly centrally planned energy rationalization programs that did not rely on the users' interests. On the other hand, the boosting of domestic energy production, which required considerable and not exactly economical investments, became one of the priorities of economic policies. The proportion of energy-related investments jumped. The restructuring of the economy in a more energy-saving direction (the proportion of the "energy-gobbling" industries such as

metallurgy and chemical industry is still very high) and adjustment to the world market trends has proceeded extremely slowly.

As a consequence of a more modest increase, the cutback of energy-intensive industries such as metallurgy and the results of energy conservation, problems between 1981 and 1983 did not become as acute as in the following 2 to 3 years. Energy supply caused tensions grew--not by accident--in 1984 when the smaller CEMA countries set the goal of accelerating the formerly slower growth rate and, at the same time, of maintaining the level of their significant foreign trade surplus with capitalist countries. These tasks weighed heavily on the smaller CEMA countries' energy balance. On the one hand, Western export of energy resources increased while on the other, intentions to invigorate the economy led to a sudden rise in energy consumption. On top of this came the cold winter of 1984-85 and the 1985 draught that incapacitated the hydroelectric plants. It should be recalled that there were power failures in the CEMA's united electrical energy system causing temporary curbs of energy consumption imposed on the population and on economic units.

The results of plan coordination discussions show that contrary to world market tendencies the appreciation of natural energy resources continues in CEMA trading. Beginning at the end of the 80's, the smaller CEMA countries may hope for some reduction in oil prices that presently are still growing for them, but in all probability, factors other than energy import costs will be more important.

The tensions of the Soviet energy sector--especially after the Chernobyl catastrophe--are unlikely to ease. This contributes to the fact that the acquisition of energy resources within the CEMA has become more difficult. In order to preserve the level of Soviet energy source and raw material imports, the small CEMA countries must deliver more and more "hard" goods. For example, Bulgaria and Hungary have to deliver more and more agricultural products among other things, and Czechoslovakia has to deliver more consumer goods. Contributions to investments also grow, for example, the Jamburg construction.

CEMA countries pay special attention to the issue of energy supply in their 1986-1990 Five-Year Plans the same way they did in the past. A reason for this is their ambitions expressed in a number of places to accelerate the growth of the economy. Smaller countries try to maximize import and are willing to take on heavy burdens in return. All of them plan to continue the energy rationalization programs they have started but since these use mostly administrative measures, they have not been productive enough. Special emphasis has been put on the need to change the material and energy intensive production structure. The economic mechanism, however, lacks the necessary conditions and the investment plans also seem to contradict this trend. Development of energetics, considered by quite a few experts as having authoritarian features, often lacking economical points of view and failing to take into account natural and financial barriers, still play an important role in the strained investment projects. The forced development of domestic energy production is

suggested by the fact that the proportion of the energetics investments in the CEMA countries is very high and shows a growing tendency. At present, it has a 40-45 percent share of the industrial investments. If the participation of the smaller member countries in investment projects in the Soviet Union is added, their proportion is even higher.

Production of some energy resources in the European socialist countries

	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Electrical Energy Production (million kilowatt-hours)							
Bulgaria	25.2	34.8	37.0	40.5	42.6	44.7	41.6
Czechoslovakia	59.3	72.7	73.5	74.7	76.3	78.4	80.6
Poland	97.2	121.9	115.0	117.6	125.8	134.8	137.5
Hungary	20.5	23.9	24.3	24.7	25.7	26.2	26.7
GDR	84.5	98.8	100.7	102.9	104.9	110.1	113.8
Romania	53.7	67.5	70.1	68.9	70.3	71.6	71.8
Soviet Union	1038.6	1294.0	1326.0	1367.0	1418.0	1492.0	1545.0
Coal Production (million tons)							
Bulgaria	27.8	30.2	29.2	32.2	32.4	32.4	31.0
Czechoslovakia	114.4	123.1	122.8	124.6	127.4	129.3	126.6
Poland	211.5	230.0	198.6	227.0	233.6	242.0	249.4
Hungary	24.9	27.7	25.9	26.1	25.2	25.0	24.0
GDR	247.2	258.1	266.7	276.0	278.0	296.3	312.0
Romania	27.1	35.2	36.9	37.9	44.5	44.3	46.6
Soviet Union	644.9	652.9	637.8	647.3	641.6	635.2	647.9
Oil Production (million tons)							
Bulgaria	0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Czechoslovakia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Poland	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Hungary	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
GDR	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Romania	14.6	11.5	11.6	11.7	11.6	11.4	10.7
Soviet Union	490.8	603.2	608.8	612.6	616.3	612.7	595.0

Source: Reports of the UN European Economic Council

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REPORT ON FAMILY ENDANGERED BY SHODDY CONSTRUCTION, HOUSING SHORTAGE

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 3 Nov 86 p 5

[Article by Zsolt Varga: "Dangerous to Life"]

[Text] The house at 3, Székely Street in Simontornya was classified as dangerous to life 2 months ago. According to the municipal council's resolution, the residents have to move out immediately because the building could fall down on them in any moment. Nevertheless, the 5 member family still lives in this dangerous house. The question is, how long can the "unmaintainable" be maintained?

The thatched roof of the house has already tilted and is about to fall off the beams. Looking at it one feels that a windstorm could blow it off. The walls have sunk, too, and can hardly hold their weight. I really don't know why I call this edifice a house, since it is rather a family's day-and-night shelter.

The wall collapsed

The wall of the larger room has already collapsed so the 5 members of the family are crowded together in the smaller room. It is perhaps 3 by 4 meters [13 feet by 10 feet], with not enough space to accommodate much more than the beds.

Mr and Mrs István Dobrocsi have 3 children. Balazs is 2, Csaba is 4 years old, Zsolt, the eldest, is a second-grader. When I was visiting them, the 2 younger boys were having their after-lunch rest. They often cough as they sleep. They are sick. The parents say that they are always sick at fall. The bad weather comes into the house, the walls are damp and let the cold through. But this is not the gravest problem.

-We bought this house 2 years ago. Before that we had lived in a sublet at my elder brother's--says the woman.--We spent all our money but we were happy to have a home of our own. At that time, there was no serious problem with the house.

-And then, quite suddenly and to our utmost alarm, the walls cracked--continues the man.--And last year the wall of the larger room simply collapsed.

Fortunately, the children were not at home. Then we noticed that it was not an earthen wall as the sellers had said, but it was of wood thrown together and plastered with mud. I put an enormous amount of work into the house, but I had to realize that it was impossible to repair it. Nothing could be done except some patching and mending. The situation became hopeless, so we submitted a housing application to the council.

The council held an on-the-spot inspection and on August 26, this year, made the above mentioned resolution, that is that the building had to be demolished because it was ruined, unsafe and dangerous to life, and it could not be repaired.

-Three days later, on August 29, we were assigned a one-room apartment without amenities [no bathroom, room with a coal-fired stove]--continues István Dobrócsi.--We applied for a two-room apartment, but they refused to give us one saying that that had not been whitewashed and the doors and windows had not been painted. But I did not mind it. I thought it did not matter where but we would move anywhere from here. The contract was signed. I put down the residence fee and, in turn, I received the key. Only one key because, as they said, the other key was still with the painters since the apartment had been newly painted. However, it looked horrible, I was taken aback as I opened the door. The linoleum cover on the floor had come up, the plaster had peeled off from 20 cms [8 inches] above the floor and there was absolutely no trace of any whitewash. I went back to the council and informed the responsible official, who immediately came out and decided that we could not move in there. At the council we were told to wait. I went there every day to inquire, feeling almost ashamed, but they always said that we had to wait.

It was a warming room

-But what should we wait for?--bursts out the woman hearing the story repeated a thousand times.--For the house to tumble down on us? The council is only a few hundred meters away from the ramshackle house. They know very well that it is about to fall down.

-Measures had to be taken immediately--explains Mrs Ferenc Szeiler, executive officer. An apartment had to be found at all costs. The council's public maintenance department assigned them a one-room apartment without amenities.

-But what was it like?

-I don't know. The public maintenance department can assign only habitable apartments. What is assignable.

-We received a letter from the council--says Mr Gyorgy Csingar, the head of the public maintenance department--ordering us to give an empty apartment.

Immediately. But there are never empty apartments. This one that we gave had been used by the department workers as a warming room. It is not very good, but it is still better than a dangerous building.

-Why didn't you fix up this apartment?

-We did. But a year ago. Nobody lived in it and the winter attacked it. When someone has the roof falling upon his head he shouldn't be concerned with whether the apartment has been newly painted or not.

Unequal rigor

-If only that were the only problem. But the responsible official's opinion is that this apartment is uninhabitable. Istvan Dobrocsi has been asking for it to be repaired for 2 months.

-I don't know about it. Why hasn't he turned to me? I would have helped. But they won't need that one-room apartment any more. Soon they can move into a two-room apartment which we are renovating now. We do everything we can.

So let's hope that after all these vicissitudes, the Dobrocsi family will get a habitable apartment. Let's hope that the sunken house will hold until then and does not collapse at the last moment. Because all this is left to chance. The nerve-breaking waiting has been going on for 2 months, that is, 20 times 3 days. Why do I count in such a strange way? Because the council also uses a measure of 3 days. Quotation from the resolution on August 26:

"The demolition of the building has to be started immediately. If the party in charge of the demolition does not start the demolition immediately, but at the most within 3 days, he can be fined 10,000 forints. The fine can be imposed repeatedly."

So the council is rigorous. And its rigor is justified, since it is to serve the citizens' interest. In this case, however, the authoritative rigor is a little unequal, since for itself--it seems so--the council does not consider its deadlines binding.

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BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION FORCES THROUGHOUT COUNTRY

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 15, 15 Aug 86 pp 23-26

[Article by Nicolae Ionescu, director general, and Alexandru Radocea, director of the Central Directorate for Statistics]

[Text] Development and improvement of the production forces and their balanced distribution throughout the nation are among the most important fields wherein notable progress has been made since the Ninth Party Congress especially. It is to the credit of the party and its secretary general Nicolae Ceausescu that they have applied the well-known Marxist principle of the primary role of the production forces creatively to the particular economic, social and historical facts of socialist construction in Romania.

The RCP has directly associated development of the production forces, the most dynamic factor for social progress, with solution of the problems of socialist construction, further enhancement of material and cultural civilization, leveling of working and living conditions in the various regions and localities, implementation of equality among all Romanian citizens on an economic basis, and consolidation of national independence and sovereignty, as well as approximation and future equation of Romania's general level of development to that of the advanced countries of the world. As Nicolae Ceausescu said at the Plenum of the RCP Central Committee in June 1986, "We must point out the correctness of the RCP policy of rational geographic distribution of the production forces. On that basis, all counties and localities in Romania have been and will go on being intensively developed."

A Heritage of Sad Memory

As we know the old order in Romania was based on a precarious economy with underdeveloped production forces and a prevailing backward agriculture. On the basis of an inadequate technical inventory and an underqualified labor force social labor productivity was at a low ebb, with all its consequences for the national income and the public's living standard.

In addition to this generally unsatisfactory situation, a disjointed structure of the sectors and subsectors of the national economy as well as an improper geographic distribution of the production forces even further aggravated the

nation's socioeconomic backwardness. In 1945 the value of the social product came to only 66 billion lei and the national income to 25 billion lei, averaging 4,200 and 1,550 lei respectively per capita. Industry contributed only about 26 percent of the national income, and the difference of about three fourths was made up by other sectors, especially agriculture. Only 23.6 percent of the population was employed in industry and the other nonagricultural sectors. There were 1.3 million working personnel, or 16.5 percent of the employed population amounting to 83 persons per 1,000 inhabitants. This indicator ranged from 23 salaried persons per 1,000 inhabitants in Olt County to 182 persons in Brasov County, or 8 times more.

Industry, underdeveloped and geographically distributed to serve the interests of the big monopolies, especially in the fields of oil, coal and ore extraction, was concentrated in a few urban centers such as Bucharest, Arad, Brasov, Cluj, Sibiu, Resita and Timisoara. In the other areas and localities industry was represented only by small units that still preserved the characteristics of small-scale manufacturing.

It is indicative of the level and geographic distribution of industry that while the whole country logged a per capita output of 730 lei, that index varied from 86 lei in Ialomita County to 3,288 lei in Hunedoara County. Under those circumstances nine counties together (Arad, Brasov, Cluj, Caras-Severin, Hunedoara, Prahova, Sibiu, Timis and Bucharest municipality) with 27 percent of the national population produced 52 percent of the industrial output, while 32 counties with 73 percent of the total population produced only 48 percent of it.

Romania was considered an "eminently agricultural" country, but it had an underdeveloped agriculture. The tractor park, the chief source of mechanical energy, was far from satisfactory. There were only about 9,000 tractors, and an average of 1,076 hectares of arable land per tractor. There were still great anomalies in their geographic distribution. The Dobrogean counties had one tractor per 2,000 hectares, the Moldavian counties one per 1,822-2,198 hectares, the Wallachian and Oltenian counties one per 855-1,114 hectares, and Transylvania and the west one per 760-1,113 hectares. Note that the entire tractor park was owned by the big landholders and most of the small farmers owning less than 1 hectare and about half of those owning 1-3 hectares did not even have any draft animals. About 0.2 percent of the total arable area was improved for irrigation consisting of small and rudimentary systems installed on the flood plains of inland rivers where mostly vegetables were grown.

The backward state of agriculture was also aggravated by the production relations in that sector, since 54 percent of the total 2.3 million landowners held less than 3 hectares while 7,839 owners held over 50 hectares, including 215 big landowners with more than 1,000 hectares.

There were also great regional discrepancies in the degree of urbanization. Only 22.8 percent of the total population was urban, ranging from 6.1 percent in Gorj County to 34.2 percent in Braila County. About half of the 3.6 million urban dwellers were in Bucharest municipality and Cluj, Constanta, Dolj, Iasi, Prahova and Timis counties.

The underdeveloped production forces and their uneven geographic distribution as well as the limited urbanization also had bad effects upon the qualification and

instruction of the population and also upon health protection and services, which lagged far behind those of the countries in the central and western parts of the continent and were also characterized by major gaps among the various areas and localities and particularly between the rural and urban areas.

A Realistic and Profoundly Scientific View

Ever since it was founded 65 years ago the RCP has entered institution and development of socialism, the most advanced and most just order, on Romanian soil in its operational program as the chief aim of its entire policy, and it has carried on a continuous and sustained activity on the basis of a strategy that has been fully validated by the great progress made throughout a period of more than four decades, during which the two decades following the Ninth Party Congress stand out particularly. The fundamental principle of this strategy is intensive development of the production forces as the chief requirement for consolidating the socialist gains and raising the people's living standard.

The RCP and its secretary general believe that intensive development of the production forces as the most powerful factor for economic growth is directly related to solution of the many far-reaching problems of the whole task of socialist construction.

Attainment of the chief aim of the new order, namely satisfaction of the constantly growing needs and requirements of society and the people, directly depends upon continuous development and improvement of the production forces. In the practice of socialist construction in Romania, the impetus as well as the further development of progress and civilization have been approached from the viewpoint of dialectics and the harmony that must be secured and perpetuated among their structural elements, namely means of labor, objects of labor, manpower and technical-scientific progress.

This exhaustive and scientific treatment of the problems of developing the production forces in the light of the facts of Romania's economy and their interrelations with the international economic facts was determined and scrutinized at the party congresses and national conferences and became a definitive and constant component of the party's strategy for building the new order. Accordingly importance is attached to matters of leveling the population's living conditions in the various regions and localities of the country by consistently promoting the policy of development of production forces and their balanced and harmonious geographic distribution. Moreover, since it is going on in a period wherein technical progress and basic and applied scientific research findings are evolving and being rapidly introduced into economic activity, development of the productive forces as a whole as well as regionally has been and remains under the influence of those factors and of the new technical-scientific revolution, which are becoming indispensable for keeping the economy as a whole efficient and dynamic.

The party secretary general clearly brought out the necessary and unbreakable tie between development of the production forces and technical-scientific progress at the Ninth RCP Congress when he said, "Since it is being done in the period of intensive worldwide technical-scientific revolution, it is vital to industrialize with the most advanced technology, to keep introducing the latest scientific advances into production, and to concentrate on mechanization and automation of the production processes, which are indispensable to a modern industry and economy."

That fundamental principle was one of the guidelines of the whole following period and the transfer of technical progress to all economic and social activities became a characteristic of the Romanian economy graphically reflected in the modernization and steady growth of the production forces and of the national economy's potential for producing a wide assortment of higher quality products necessary on the domestic and export markets.

In the Romanian view of dynamic socioeconomic development science is a basic and essential component of the production forces that not only provides measures to improve economic activity in all productive sectors but also takes up basic, long-range technological problems. Academician Dr Eng Elena Ceausescu said on this subject at the Congress on Science and Education that "Basic, long-range research in all fields of human knowledge must be further developed in order to open up new vistas to applied research and to enhance the contribution of science to general national progress."

The policy of balanced and harmonious regional development of the productive forces has been a very far-reaching and comprehensive process closely integrated in the general concept of planned socioeconomic development and construction of a unified national economy with regional structures in harmony with the sectorial structures. The policy of regional distribution of the production forces was based on fundamental interdependent economic and social criteria rooted in the general priorities of development, such as steady growth of the whole economic potential and especially of the industrial one on the basis of the latest advances of technical-scientific progress in all counties of Romania, geographic allocation of new capacities according to the economic and social requirements, provision for sources of raw materials, energy and fuels, concentration and integration of production, cooperation in production, and a rational structure of the production forces in every county as well as recruitment of a labor force in the necessary structure and with the proper qualifications.

Rationally Distributed Means and Objects of Labor

Allocation of a large part of the national income (regularly about one-third since the Ninth Party Congress) to accumulation made it possible to implement extensive investment programs resulting in fixed assets that now amount to 2.78 trillion lei, about 6 times more than in 1965, so that the supply of labor with fixed assets increased from 106,900 lei per person in 1965 to 363,900 lei per person in 1985, or 3.4 times more. This intensive equipment with fixed assets made major changes in their sectorial structure, so that industry now has over 45 percent of their total compared with 31.8 percent in 1965.

Major changes were made in distribution of the fixed assets among the counties, as indicated by the table below showing two main trends in the equipment of the economy with labor means. The first is the growth of the inventories in all counties, so that in 1985 the counties with the least fixed assets (Bistrita, Salaj, Covasna and Satu Mare counties) had more fixed assets than the best equipped counties in 1945 and as much as some of the best equipped ones in 1965. The second trend is the major gains made in regional leveling along with the general increase in the inventories, inasmuch as 32 counties have fixed assets to the value of 30-100 billion lei. If we also consider the number of inhabitants, the leveling of fixed assets is even more apparent, since the counties with less of them (20-30 billion lei) also have the smallest number of inhabitants.

Another important aspect of equipment with labor means is brought out by the structure of fixed assets according to categories. While in 1970 active fixed assets like power-driven machinery and operating equipment and installations accounted for 38.3 percent of the total fixed assets in the economy and 49.1 percent of those in industry, at the beginning of 1985 they reached 50.6 and 60.2 percent respectively. The higher technical level of the equipment, machinery and installations is indicated by the fact that in the same period the instruments for measurement, control and regulation in industry's inventory were increased by more than 7 times.

Value of Total Fixed Assets	Number of Counties		
	1945	1965	1985
Up to 5 billion lei	32	10	-
5.1-10 " "	8	13	-
10.1-20 " "	1	12	-
20.1-25 " "	-	4	1
25.1-30 " "	-	1	4
30.1-40 " "	-	-	6
40.1-60 " "	-	-	13
60.1-100 " "	-	1	13
Over 100 " "	-	-	4

The distribution of fixed assets according to industrial sectors also shows important changes with directly favorable effects upon the degree of processing and exploitation of the material resources, upon labor productivity, and upon the efficiency and vitality of industry as a whole. The fixed assets in the machine building and metal processing sectors, which amounted to 14.5 percent of the total fixed assets in all industry in 1965, were increased to 23.5 percent in 1985 and those in chemistry were increased from 8.6 to 14 percent. The fact that the highly technical subsectors (electronics, electrical engineering, automation, precision machinery, fine synthesis chemistry, petrochemistry etc.) of the respective sectors were given priority development makes it even clearer that equipment of the economy with fixed assets was intended among other things both to raise technical standards and to create modern industrial structures.

The policy of harmonious regional distribution of the production forces according to requirements of contemporary technical-scientific progress produced a balanced distribution of the industrial sectors throughout the counties through the appearance of new peak industrial sectors in a number of counties. For example the electronics industry is now located in all counties compared with only 12 in 1965, ferrous metallurgy is in 31 counties compared with 11, plastics and synthetic resins are in 15 counties compared with 10, chemical fertilizers are in 12 counties compared with seven, and chemical fibers and threads are in 10 counties compared with four.

According to the provisions of the current five-year plan, in 1990 there will be no county with an industrial output below 20 billion lei or a per capita one below 50,000 lei. As Nicolae Ceausescu said at the Plenum of the RCP Central Committee in June 1986, "This will provide better and better working and living conditions for all Romanian citizens. Full equality of rights for all workers

and all citizens is actually being implemented, because no true equality of rights is assured until the living and working conditions are provided for."

Supply of the objects of labor in the volume, structure and quality required by expanded reproduction and by the technical level of the labor means and of the modern technologies introduced in all sectors of the national economy was and is a major point in the policy of developing the production forces both for the economy as a whole and in the regional-administrative units. The domestic raw material base was expanded in close correlation with the needs of the national economy according to the guidelines set at the party congresses and especially since the Ninth RCP Congress.

One of these guidelines is to expand geologic research to further develop the discovered reserves of useful substances and to start working them. Prospecting and explorations for hydrocarbons have been intensified, with emphasis upon investigating the structures at great depths, enhancing the final factor of recovery of the reserves from deposits, and accelerating investigations on the Black Sea continental platform. Geologic prospecting for coal has been extended to new areas, especially Oltenia and the sub-Carpathian zone in the northwest of Transylvania and the Banat. New areas have been prospected for iron and nonferrous metal ores, including poorer deposits.

Although the regional allocation of the capacities for raw materials and materials is limited by the latter's existence in a natural state and their geographic distribution, the discovery of important deposits has extended their scope to more and more counties. In securing sources of the objects of labor needed for intensive economic development consideration has been given, in addition to the domestic raw material base, to the possibility of meeting some of the needs with imports of crude oil and ores especially and also by recovering and recycling all raw materials and materials resulting from the production process and consumption in proportions reaching 50 percent in some cases and even more. For this purpose suitably equipped specialized enterprises have been organized in all counties for collection, sorting and a certain degree of processing as well.

Complete and Better Use of the Labor Force

Among all the components of the production forces man, who by his creative power and intelligence lends all goods their value and sets the entire socioeconomic mechanism in motion, is not only the main production force but also its most complex component.

There is a multitude of correlations and interrelations among the elements of the production forces (means and objects of labor, science and the labor force) that determine the efficiency and vitality of their development. In that sense it is inconceivable for an economy to have means of labor, however perfected, if the objects of labor are not also secured, just as it can have them both but if it has no labor force able to exploit them they cannot function up to their potential. Meanwhile the labor force is proving to be a much more complex element. Due to its subjective nature it requires a more extensive and careful analysis as well as different methods in order to meet the needs of the national economy.

The problem of the labor force has found its optimal solution in the RCP's strategy of intensive development of the production forces, one in keeping with the

directions, aims and tasks of socioeconomic development and with the sectorial and regional production structures. In the 1950-1985 period the employed population of Romania increased by 26.4 percent and reached 10.6 million persons. But radical changes took place in the evolution and structure of the sectors that reveal the innovations made in Romania's socioeconomic activity. The population employed in industry increased by 3.9 times, amounting to 37.1 percent of the total employed population compared with 12 percent in 1950 and 19.2 percent in 1965. The population employed in construction increased by 4.2 times, that in education by 2.2 times, and that in research by 7.1 times, with corresponding increases in their proportions in the total employed population. In the same period the agricultural population decreased to less than half, and its share in the total employed population dropped from 74.1 percent in 1950 to 28.9 percent at the beginning of 1985.

There were even more important changes in the number of working personnel. In the last 20 years the total number of working personnel in the whole economy increased by 3.6 times, that in industry by 4.3 times, that in construction by 4 times, that in transportation by 4.3 times and that in research by 6.7 times. Regionally, by counties, the number of working personnel shows major changes due to the development of socioeconomic activities, as the following table indicates:

Working Personnel Per 1,000 Inhabitants	Number of Counties		
	1945	1965	1985
Up to 100	31	2	-
101-150	8	8	-
151-200	1	13	-
201-250	1	9	5
251-300	-	5	18
301-350	-	2	11
351-400	-	-	8
Over 400	-	2	4

The data above show two very well defined trends. First, the average number of working personnel in all counties increased so that now only five counties have less than 250 persons per 1,000 inhabitants compared with 32 counties in 1965. Whereas in 1965 the national average was 220 persons per 1,000 inhabitants, it was 337 in 1985, or 1.5 times more. Greater gains were made particularly by Sălaj County (by 2.7 times), Botosani and Buzau counties (by 2.3 times each), Bistrița-Nasaud, Giurgiu and Olt counties (by 2.1 times each), Teleorman, Vaslui and Tulcea counties (by 2 times each).

And second, the gaps among the counties in number of working personnel per 1,000 inhabitants were reduced. While the ratio of the maximum to the minimum number of working personnel per 1,000 inhabitants was 5:1 in 1965, it was down to 2.2 in 1985. Consequently the coefficient of variation of the number of working personnel per 1,000 inhabitants, which was 0.52 in 1945 and 0.38 in 1965, is now down to 0.19.

These changes had important social effects helping to accomplish the major aim of the Romanian socialist system, namely access of all members of society to work

and accordingly to incomes, and the process of leveling the working and living conditions of the inhabitants of all areas and localities in Romania was furthered at the same time.

The policy on the labor force has been aiming not only at growth of the employed population and number of working personnel but also at a structure of the labor force according to sectors, trades and levels of occupational training corresponding to the technical levels of the labor means, technologies and technical progress. Geographic distribution of the labor force has not been a mere increase in the number of personnel but also an extensive process of occupational training, just as distribution of the labor means throughout the country has also been a process of widespread promotion of technical-scientific progress.

Along with the appearance of the new and modern industrial sectors and subsectors on the map of Romania, new professions and trades have appeared and the level of occupational training of working personnel has undergone significant qualitative changes. Romania's whole educational system has been improved and adjusted to the demands of economic development. While the population has increased by about 19 percent in the last 20 years, the school population is up 36 percent, so that now every fourth inhabitant is in the educational system compared with one out of five 20 years ago.

The improved qualification of the labor force is emphatically brought out by the increase in the number of high school pupils by 3.3 times since 1965, that of trade school pupils by 32 percent, and that of students by 27 percent. High schools and trade schools are in all counties and there are 19 university centers compared with 15 in 1965. The proportion of graduates in higher technical education increased from 35.7 percent in the 1965-1966 school year to 66.3 percent in the 1984-1985 school year. Moreover the range of training subjects has been diversified, among which electronics, automation and chemical technology have shown the greatest gains.

At the Congress on Science and Education at the end of 1985 Academician Dr Eng Elena Ceausescu said about the role of education in training personnel essential to the national economy that "Romanian education today is a comprehensive, integrated system of occupational training based on a unified scientific conception in full accord with the requirements of Romanian society's progress. By virtue of its organization, scope and content and its revolutionary basis, education on all levels is meeting the personnel requirement for the national economy and for the other fields of social and cultural activity as well."

Science As an Essential Component of the Production Forces

Science and its discoveries have always been factors with profound implications for the production forces, civilization and progress. But never has its influence run so deep as in the present period, when many discoveries and applications and especially those in electronics, automation, bioengineering, artificial intelligence and robotics have led to rapid technological improvements and radically changed the view of it as a production force. Because of the rapid development of science the technologies in all the economic sectors have been changing, new industrial sectors have been appearing, better use has been made of raw materials and materials, etc. Accordingly the role of science has been accentuated and consolidated as a production force capable of guiding the economy in

new, better and modern channels that are highly competitive and effective. As Nicolae Ceausescu said at the Plenum of the RCP Central Committee in June 1986, "Socialism and communism can succeed solely on the basis of the latest advances of science, technology and human knowledge in general."

The telling role of science in securing the vitality and improvement of the production forces is being enormously advanced along with the shift from extensive development to intensive economic development by widespread application of the latest scientific discoveries and technological innovations making better use of material and human resources, lowering production costs and making all socio-economic activity more efficient.

Under the new technical-scientific revolution and its influence upon all socio-economic activities, the development and modernization of the production forces have been supported by greatly intensified domestic scientific research. In the years since the Ninth Party Congress science and technology have advanced more and more vigorously and have been closely integrated in the gigantic effort to bring Romania up to new levels of progress and civilization. The spread of science to the most varied fields and the noteworthy progress it has made demonstrate with the force of the facts the Romanian people's creative powers and their ability to solve the most complicated technical problems with greater ingenuity, perseverance and efficiency and to apply them to production.

The 215 institutes of scientific research and technological development and about 100 agricultural research and production stations as well as higher education and most of the industrial enterprises are making an effort toward research, innovation and technological improvements that has been effectively integrated in the economy and is making a decisive contribution to the progress of the production forces. In the 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan alone 16,000 new types of machines, equipment, devices and installations with better technical-economic characteristics were assimilated, as well as 2,900 new materials, 2,000 consumer goods and 6,200 new production technologies in all industrial sectors and all counties.

Among the assimilated products the following are noteworthy for their economic importance and technical performances: polybutadiene rubber, semiconductor materials and reagents for microelectronics, selective herbicides, power-driven drilling installations, 1,000-1,500 horsepower diesel-electric locomotives, the Independent 100 minicomputer, pipes and rolled products of hard aluminum alloys, rustproof and refractory steel plates and strips, electrical engineering strips, automation means, new types of lasers, and many others.

The scientific and technological advances have been widely applied in all sectors and subsectors of the economy and regionally as well, which has been facilitated by the regional allocation of the labor means. Whereas in the not very distant past the new scientific and technological advances were applied primarily in the main industrial centers where the big industrial enterprises were, while the technically obsolete technologies and products were transferred to the small centers and enterprises, in the period of intensive development of the production forces, the new production capacities, designed on the basis of the latest technologies, have been located primarily in the formerly underdeveloped counties, with increased efforts to continue their modernization and to keep them on the course of technical progress. This idea has been and is basic to the regional distribution of the production forces in Romania and explains the presence of peak industries in the great majority of the counties of Romania.

The documents of the 13th Party Congress directly connect the permanence of technical-scientific progress with the aims of the 1986-1990 Five-year Plan, with the radical structural changes made by the shift to intensive development of the entire economy, and with the strategic objective of this period, namely that of bringing Romania into the higher stage of an economically medium developed country. This aim requires further consideration of the role of contemporary technical-scientific progress as well as the most prompt and extensive application of the latest scientific research findings to production.

The documents of the 13th RCP Congress define intensive development of the Romanian economy in the 1986-1990 period as a continuation on a higher level of the efforts to modernize the production structures, improve product quality, accentuate specialization and integration of production, make full use of the production capacities, conserve raw materials, materials, fuels and energy, lower production costs, and enhance labor productivity and economic effectiveness.

Combining the requirements of intensive economic growth with those of technical-scientific progress, regional development of the production forces will be one of the major efforts of the party's economic and social policy in the next stage, while the evolution of their components (means and objects of labor, the labor force and science) will continue to be under the influence of the favorable effects of the new technical-scientific revolution.

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PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITY

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[Article by Costin Murgescu, director of the World Economics Institute]

[Text] The RCP and its general secretary Nicolae Ceausescu feel that the success of socialist construction directly depends upon harmonizing the internal effort with extensive international collaboration. During the years of socialist construction and in the last 21 years especially Romania stepped up its participation in the world economic cycle, regarding economic exchanges as an objective necessity and a critical factor for the far-reaching aims of national socioeconomic development. At the same time Romania considers expanded international economic relations highly important, both economically and politically, to promotion of a policy of peace, good will and widespread collaboration among all peoples of the world.

Romania's foreign economic relations are based upon strict observance of national sovereignty and independence, full equality of rights, noninterference in other states' internal affairs, mutual benefit, and abstention from use or threat of force. This uniform set of principles essentially reflects the urgent need of doing away with the age-old relations of force, domination and interference in other states' affairs and expresses all peoples' hopes of promoting a new kind of relations of real sovereign equality among them and of building a new international economic order.

The change from the old to the new kind of international relations is unquestionably a comprehensive historical process involving bitter confrontations in the world arena between the progressive and democratic forces and the conservative and imperialist ones, which confrontations may be said to occur daily in all social activities. Romania has won an unquestionable prestige in this constant confrontation in the world arena for the stand it has consistently taken in the first ranks of the struggle to promote the new kind of relations, which for its part it is tirelessly implementing in its own political practice and in its entire international activity.

Romania's experience conclusively demonstrates the fact that promotion of national independence does not conflict with participation in the objective process

of developing universal interdependences, because it is a matter of two closely united aspects of the nations' activity. Nicolae Ceausescu said, "The more independent a people are the more rapidly they develop and the more actively they can participate in international collaboration, which will not limit but contribute to development of the personality of every nation and people."

In accordance with its main guidelines, Romania has kept expanding its foreign economic relations. Since 23 August 1944 and especially since the Ninth Party Congress, which unleashed the nation's creative energies, the new proportions of Romanian participation in the worldwide circulation of values have been reflected primarily in the growth rate of the volume of foreign trade and in its improved structure. In the 1965-1985 period Romania's foreign trade logged an average annual growth rate of 11.1 percent compared with a 7.6 percent growth rate of the national income. Romania's expanded foreign economic relations have also been characterized by a more rapid growth of exports than that of imports. In the last 20 years Romanian exports have increased at an average annual rate of 11.8 percent compared with a 10.3 percent growth rate of imports. Meanwhile the geographic area of collaboration has been steadily extended and modern and better forms of international cooperation have been promoted, all on the basis of the increased national economic potential, diversification and modernization of the sectors and subsectors of material production, enlargement of the assortment of manufactured products, and improvement of their quality.

Upon totting up the results of Romania's economic development and determining the strategy for Romania's further progress on the path of progress and socialist civilization, the 13th Party Congress set new goals of vital importance in foreign economic exchanges, development of international economic relations, and effective Romanian participation in the world economic cycle.

Recently the high party, state and public authorities (the RCP Central Committee, National Workers Council, Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development and Grand National Assembly) discussed and adopted plans, programs and laws of greatest importance to implementation of the RCP Program and the decisions of the 13th RCP Congress and defined the tasks for Romania's participation in the world circulation of values during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). As indicated by Nicolae Ceausescu's speeches and the documents approved on that occasion, the current five-year plan is chiefly characterized by Romania's increasingly dynamic and more effective participation in the world economic cycle, a greater volume of foreign trade, further expansion of trade exchanges and cooperation with all socialist countries, more intensive economic and technical-scientific collaboration within CEMA, expanded economic relations with the developing countries, and promotion of economic and technical-scientific collaboration with the developed capitalist countries and all states of the world regardless of social systems.

The 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan calls for an increase of 52.7 percent from 1981-1985 in volume of foreign trade, while exports are to be increased by more than 75 percent and accordingly much faster than the national income and the industrial output. Steady priority growth of exports and restriction of imports to the strictly necessary ones are vital to the Romanian economy because they are essential to favorable trade balances, and as we know the latter are the critical source of a favorable balance of payments, liquidation of foreign debt, and

growth of the nation's foreign exchange reserves. Moreover the current five-year plan will make major structural changes in exports by considerably increasing the proportion of the more highly processed products.

In stressing the importance of developing Romania's foreign economic relations and its active and effective participation in the world economic cycle in his speech at the Plenum of the RCP Central Committee*, Nicolae Ceausescu said, "It must be thoroughly understood that the export trade and international economic relations must be constantly emphasized by all party and state organs, all units and the workers. All units must realize that the export trade is their first obligation, and we must make every effort on behalf of the efficiency of that activity."

Under the conditions of the worldwide economic crisis the neocolonial policy of exorbitant prices and interest rates pursued by the great imperialist powers, financial capital and the transnational monopolies seeking to place a large part of the burden of the crisis upon the developing countries is making it very difficult for those countries to conduct their international economic relations normally, to eliminate their underdevelopment, and to accelerate their socioeconomic progress. But the worldwide economic crisis and the difficulties caused by the imperialist neocolonial policy cannot and must not lead to any isolationist policy, to be sure. And the example of Romania, which has taken an active part throughout these years in developing international collaboration, is particularly edifying because in the present stage of the technical-scientific revolution participation in the international division of labor is an urgent necessity. No people can dispense with international collaboration without serious consequences for their own economic and social development.

If the various existing objective difficulties as well as the increasingly numerous artificial protectionist and neoprotectionist obstacles placed in the way of the world market by the main capitalist powers are to be overcome, the small and medium countries especially must pursue a consistent policy of promoting exports by enhancing the competitiveness of their products for foreign markets.

The major changes made in both the macro- and microstructure of Romanian exports are important in this connection. In the last 20 years Romania has pursued a consistent policy of emphasizing export products incorporating more intensive use of its natural resources and manpower, as indicated by the fact that machinery and equipment, chemical products and industrial consumer goods together now amount to 61 percent of Romania's total exports compared with only 7.2 percent in 1950 and 36 percent in 1965. This radical improvement of the export macrostructure in the face of fierce international competition was made possible by uninterrupted socialist industrialization, accelerated development of the production forces, and technical-scientific progress in modernizing the national economy.

Emphasis on improving the export structure is still guiding Romania's foreign economic policy. Reflecting the major changes made in the export structure and the increased contribution of the more highly processed products, the share of machine building in the total Romanian exports will be increased in the current five-year plan and exceed 32 percent in 1990.

*In June 1986.

As the party general secretary specially emphasized at the Plenum of the RCP Central Committee in June 1986 more effective foreign trade, as a vital aspect of the economic mechanism, self-management and self-administration, is a major aim of the five-year plan that we have just begun. As we know, the 13th Party Congress heavily stressed the task of improving the quality of all products for the foreign markets more rapidly.

The scientific-technical revolution is bringing about a rapid renovation of products on the international markets. What could be sold yesterday is no longer salable today and what is sold today will no longer be salable tomorrow or at least will not be salable effectively. Therefore renovation of products in keeping with world technical progress and the ever new and greater demands of the international markets is a critical objective on which no effort can be spared. In performing the tasks assigned by the party administration the technological research and design units and the foreign trade and producer units are required to take joint action with all energy and skill to bring Romanian exports up to the standards of the best comparable products on the foreign markets. As we know, the shift to intensive economic development requires products on higher technical and qualitative levels making Romanian commodities more competitive on foreign markets. The new five-year plan accordingly requires about 95 percent of Romanian products to be up to world standards and 2-5 percent of them to be on higher levels by 1990.

The party and state measures to raise the technical standards of the products and their performances, to improve the quality and marketability of the commodities, to lower the material inputs and to increase labor productivity form a coherent whole intended to permit implementation of the foreign trade plan. It is particularly an urgent matter of exporting new products incorporating specific results of research and development work, as much technical know-how as possible and highly skilled labor. It is only by guiding the process of further improving the export structure in this direction by combining the new and more efficient products, especially in machine building and chemistry, with qualitative improvement of the products on Romania's traditional list and promotion of exports of licenses, know-how and technical aid that the highly important goals set for foreign trade in the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan can be attained.

Nicolae Ceausescu said about these goals in his speech at the Plenum of the National Workers Council and the Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development in June 1986 that "We must make every effort to offer better products on a higher technical and qualitative level than other products on the international markets. Only then can Romanian products come up in the world and be demanded by Romania's foreign partners. Only then can we further expand international collaboration and participate more and more actively in the international division of labor and all fields."

Of course the party's assignments require careful prospecting of the foreign markets in order to determine the current demand and its future trends precisely and to conclude contracts in advance so that the producer units can best prepare for their export output and strictly observe all contractual clauses (quality, delivery date, marketability etc.).

Strict discipline throughout the whole far-reaching foreign trade activity is combined in international practice with great flexibility in adjusting production

to the heavy fluctuation of the international markets, subject as they are to so many factors characteristic of the present instability of the world economy, and in making use of the various commercial methods that can accomplish the purposes of each of the many participants in the world cycle. For example, reciprocal export-import arrangements are expanding under the world economic crisis. Some western writers criticize this trend, considering it a "violation" of the GATT regulations and even a tendency to revert to barter. But they apparently forget that no practice spreads in world trade unless it serves some of the partners' actual needs and the objective economic requirements.

Reciprocal trade is undoubtedly an outcome of the world economic crisis, of the developing countries' rapidly deteriorating exchange ratio, of the obstacles they encounter when they try to penetrate the developed countries' markets with the manufactured products of their young industries, especially machine building, and of their decreasing ability to pay as well.

The objective necessity of reciprocal trade is demonstrated by its current practice by a great many socialist states as well as developed capitalist ones. Some western experts have calculated that about one-third of the total volume of world trade today results from various reciprocal arrangements, and this explains the organization of special departments for such operations in the large transnational industrial or banking firms, as well as many developing countries' efforts to find the organizational structure in keeping with their national characteristics that is absolutely essential to the effectiveness of this form of trade.

Participation in the international auctions held in various countries is becoming more important to promotion of the machine building industry's exports, which account for a constantly growing proportion of the total Romanian exports. These auctions are becoming veritable turntables for exporting machine building products to the developing countries, and the emphasis placed in Romania on the Romanian firms' improved participation in them requires of the design units and the general supplier a persevering effort to get reports with precise information about the actual state of the market and the competition, a vital and very extensive task on behalf of thorough preparation of the offerings, and finally to coordinate all the enterprises engaged in construction and punctual activation of the respective capacity.

The instability and growing competition on the international markets are also increasing the importance of long-term contracts, which are intended to provide a sure basis both for effecting exports and securing raw material imports. Modern methods of transportation and cooperation among states and firms permit accelerated industrial development on the part of states with no raw material resources of their own but with an intensive and varied presence in international economic affairs that makes it easier for them to contract for raw material supplies.

The constantly and rapidly changing realities of the international markets require all workers in foreign trade to work with boldness and initiative and also with the highest sense of responsibility for the use of the modern forms of exchange that can bring about the national objectives in this field of vital importance to Romania's whole socioeconomic development. Moreover the accords and agreements concluded by Nicolae Ceausescu with many chiefs of state on all continents are conclusive examples of the enterprising use of new ways of opening up the broadest possible prospects for Romania's participation in

international economic affairs. Romania was one of the first socialist countries to introduce and promote mixed production companies, blazing a trail taken today by many other countries. Similarly, the founding of a network of mixed trading companies, service stations and storage depots for spare parts in countries receiving Romanian exports as well as mixed banks and insurance companies abroad with Romanian membership and expansion of the international routes traveled by the Romanian Maritime Fleet all reflect the efforts to create progressively favorable conditions for performance of the foreign trade tasks in keeping with their increasing scope. Meanwhile all the actions undertaken clearly add to the responsibilities of those assigned the task of implementing them.

In the course of building the fully developed socialist society and in accordance with its overall foreign policy, Romania has regularly expanded the geographic area of its economic relations with the other countries of the world regardless of their social systems, and it now has commercial and cooperative relations with about 150 states. Expanding economic relations with other states of the world on all continents according to the principles guiding Romania's entire foreign policy is a basic point in the Romanian policy of consolidating peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

Collaboration and cooperation on many levels with all socialist countries are emphasized in Romania's foreign economic relations. As Nicolae Ceausescu said, "Without exception, Romania's relations with the socialist countries make up a single whole based on Romania's firm and consistent fundamental policy of strengthening all socialist countries' unity and the power and influence of socialism in the world."

The long-term agreements at the summit and intergovernmental accords create the structure for increasing the volume of reciprocal trade from one five-year plan to the next. According to the provisions of the new five-year plan, exchanges and cooperation with the socialist countries will take up 50 percent of the volume of Romania's foreign trade in 1990.

The USSR comes first in Romania's foreign economic relations, while Romania's cooperation and trade with all the other socialist countries in Europe are being expanded as well. Trade with the CPR and other socialist countries in Asia and Latin America is growing steadily. Many programs for economic cooperation in science, technology and production with all socialist states have been developed alongside trade for the purpose of placing it on a permanent basis.

In the light of the acquired experience and the objective requirements of common progress, Romania is working with the other socialist countries toward a higher stage of collaboration particularly through lasting, long-term connections in production, cooperative construction of advanced capacities, and more intensive specialization and cooperation on the accepted principles.

The RCP considers it vital to speed up technical-scientific collaboration in developing installations, equipment and technologies on a high technical level that will secure rapid growth of labor productivity and economic effectiveness, mechanization and automation of the production processes, reduction of consumption, and manufacture of products that will be highly competitive on the international markets. To those ends Romania is emphasizing multilateral collaboration under CEMA, of which it is a founding member, while actively promoting bilateral forms of collaboration.

The decisions of the high-level Economic Conference of the CEMA Member States in June 1984 and the General Program for Long-Term Technical-Scientific Progress up to the Year 2000 signed in December 1985 open up new prospects for collaboration among the member states. In stressing the importance of developing relations with the CEMA countries and implementing the provisions in the approved documents, Nicolae Ceausescu said in his speech at the Plenum of the RCP Central Committee in June 1986 that "All of them will provide for every socialist country's intensive development, implementation of the programs that each socialist country has adopted at its party congress, the success of socialist and communist construction, improvement of the peoples' general welfare, and the greater prestige of socialism in the world."

In the light of the RCP administration's directions to take very firm action to develop relations with the CEMA member nations, arrangements were made to coordinate the plans with those countries for the following period in order to increase the volume of exchanges, and measures were adopted to find new ways of increasing reciprocal deliveries above the accepted levels as well, especially through cooperative programs. Emphasis will be placed on cooperation in production, extension of the concluded long-term accords, and improvement of long-term agreements and contracts, which will provide opportunities for sales of Romanian products on the international markets and guarantee the continued supply of imported raw materials.

While participating more and more actively in economic and technical-scientific cooperation under CEMA and with all the other socialist countries as well, Romania is also expanding economic and technical-scientific collaboration with the developing countries and thereby aiding the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism on behalf of peace, disarmament, elimination of underdevelopment and construction of the new international economic order.

Romania is developing economic relations more and more extensively with the developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, whose share in Romanian foreign trade increased from only 6 percent in 1965 to about 20 percent during the last five-year plan. Along with the expanded exchange of goods, Romania is participating (on mutually beneficial terms) further in the industrialization of those countries, wherein major capacities have been built in recent years with Romanian designs, equipment and specialists. The 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan calls for further expansion of exchanges and economic collaboration with the developing countries.

In keeping with its policy of active peaceful coexistence Romania is also expanding collaboration with the capitalist countries in Europe, most of which are trade partners with age-old traditions, and with capitalist states on other continents as well. In 1980-1985 the total commodity exchanges with these countries showed an average annual growth rate of 14 percent. Meanwhile various programs were promoted for cooperation in production and collaboration in marketing Romanian products on the capitalist markets. The current five-year plan specifies further expansion of trade and economic and technical-scientific collaboration between Romania and the developed capitalist states and all states of the world.

Romania's constantly growing participation in the international economic cycle and the emergence of foreign trade as a powerful factor for economic growth have

required Romania to take part in the international economic organizations and also in many international conventions designed to facilitate economic collaboration among nations.

Romania's active participation in the international economic organizations is guided by President Nicolae Ceausescu's revolutionary view of the ways and means of building a new international economic order. Romania has been collaborating within the UN structure with other states in drafting basic documents concerning the ways of instituting a new international economic order and also in adopting important resolutions to that end concerning consolidation of the states' national sovereignty over their natural resources, formation of national cadres, promotion of international scientific and technical cooperation, the developing countries' agricultural and industrial progress, rehabilitation of international trade restricted as it is by the protectionist practices of the great capitalist industrial powers, solution of the contemporary world's financial-foreign exchange problems, and preparation of the international developmental strategy of the decades of the United Nations.

Romania's efforts to point out the bad social and economic effects of the armaments race are well known and widely appreciated, as well as those to adopt specific disarmament measures and especially to divert the major resources now expended on military outlays to economic development. In the same connection, Romania is making determined efforts to start global economic negotiations for the purpose of finding, through an interdependent approach, viable solutions to the great problems facing the world economy, including the serious problem of the developing countries' foreign debts. This whole idea and practical activity are based on Romania's profound conviction that all countries of the world must take more firm action to eliminate underdevelopment, to establish a new international economic order, and to institute equitable collaboration among states so as to stimulate all mankind's economic, technological and social progress.

Romania's intensified economic and technical-scientific collaboration with all countries of the world and its growing participation in the world economic cycle reflect on this level too its dynamic and active international policy and its contribution to new relations among states based on equality and equity and to a new world of peace and collaboration.

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ORDER OF BATTLE ON MILITARY FORCES IN THE GDR

Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

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[Article by Lt Col (Retired) Guenter Lippert: "The GSFG--Four Decades of Soviet Troops in Germany"]

[Text] With a total strength of around 420,000 men--about 380,000 men of the ground forces and about 40,000 air force men--the "Group of Soviet Forces in Germany" (GSFG) or the "Gruppa Sovyetskikh Voysk v Germanii" (GSVG) (Footnote 1) by the original Russian designation, is not only the strongest group of Soviet forces outside the national territory of the USSR, but overall the largest group of forces subordinate to a regional Soviet commander. In none of the 16 military regions of the Soviet Union are so many operational forces deployed, and all the other "groups of forces" in the Western approaches to the USSR, the "Central Group of Forces" (CGF) in the CSSR, the "Northern Group of Forces" (NGF) in Poland and the "Southern Group of Forces" (SGF) in Hungary taken together are only about half as strong as the GSFG. Only at the other end of the Soviet realm, in the Far East Military Region, is there a group of forces of roughly equal strength in deployment, but currently not brought up to full wartime strength. Thus, a "supreme commander" also stands at the top of the GSFG, while the other "groups of forces" and the military regions are under "commanders." The duty position designation of "supreme commander" is otherwise held only by the chiefs of the five service components in the Soviet armed forces.

From Occupation to Stationed Forces

The present GSFG emerged from the "Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany" (GSOFG). The latter was formed in June of 1945 from the headquarters and units of the 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov, which along with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under Marshal Konyev had encircled and occupied Berlin in April/May of 1945. The group at first comprised six armies with a total of 22 divisions. With it remained also the 16th Tactical Air Army (TAA), which along with the 18th TAA had supported the 1st Belorussian Front's attack operations. The Group's official mission is to check on the fulfillment of the conditions of surrender. As the armed component of the Soviet Military Administration (SMA) whose chief is at the same time the

supreme commander of the group, it has the de facto mission of safeguarding the sovietization of the occupation zone. By sealing off the occupation zone's western border, it is supposed to eliminate all influences from the democratic West and prevent Germans who have been put under Soviet sovereignty from fleeing into the free part of their country. At the same time the Group is to safeguard the buildup and consolidation of an East German state and power apparatus which is obedient to Moscow.

When the "German Democratic Republic" (GDR) was formed out of the Soviet occupation zone in early October of 1949, the USSR relinquished the administrative functions undertaken up to that time by the SMA and transferred them to the newly formed GDR government without changing the status of their occupation forces at first. When on 17 June 1953 the populace in East Berlin and numerous spots of the GDR rose up against the rulers set up by Moscow, the occupation power declared a state of emergency, sealed off the eastern part of the former German capital, which was under the control of the four powers, and had the uprising put down. In its original tone, Eastern historiography today says this about it: "In the spirit of proletarian internationalism, units and troop components of the GSFG supported the armed forces of the GDR in quelling the fascist putsch attempt." The "Group of Soviet Occupation Forces" was renamed the "Group of Soviet Forces" in March of 1954--after the Soviet Union again had the occupation area firmly under control--in conjunction with the "granting of sovereignty to the GDR" by the Soviet government. (Footnote 2) Although the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR have now come into being and--according to Soviet assertion--Germany has ceased to exist as a whole, the supplementary expression "in Germany" is still preserved today. (Footnote 3)

But the GSFG, which was now only to have the mission of "protecting socialist achievements in the GDR and safeguarding peace in Europe," further obtained--according to the inter-Allied agreement--the right to check the transiting of members of the armed forces of the USA, Great Britain and France to West Berlin, as well as "other control functions stemming from the Potsdam Declaration of 1945." However, it still took until March of 1957 till a formal agreement on the "temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the GDR" was concluded between the Soviet Union and the GDR. The agreement stresses that the "sovereignty of the GDR will not be impaired by the temporary stationing of Soviet troops on its territory" and that they "will not interfere in the internal affairs of the GDR and in the social life of the country;" but at the same time the Soviets reserve the unrestricted right, in "the event of threat to the security of the Soviet troops, to take measures to remove such a threat." The supreme command of the GSFG has merely to consult the GDR government on this, as are also "questions of the change of strength and the distribution of garrisons of the Soviet troops" on the territory of the GDR merely a "subject of consultations" between the governments. The GDR is not provided any opportunity of codetermination or dissent. The question of GSFG troop movements outside their garrisons and exercise areas is addressed just as little in the agreement as the type and amount of any stationing costs, which the Soviet Union has supposedly relinquished since early 1959. (Footnote 4)

Further Development of the GSFG

Even before the agreement, the strength of the GSFG was also diminished within the course of a general reduction of the strength of the Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men, implemented by Khrushchev, which occurred not least in view of the buildup of the new "Strategic Rocket Forces" military component: Within the course of 1956, an army headquarters and two divisions, as well as army troops at a total strength of 33,500 men, were withdrawn from the GDR and later the corps headquarters still present disbanded. (Footnote 5) The reduction was in the meantime more than compensated by the far advanced buildup of the GDR's "National People's Army" (NVA), for which the Soviet Union provided armament aid and the GSFG training assistance. Even after this reduction, the GSFG remained the strongest regional group of forces of the Soviet armed forces inside and outside the territory of the USSR. From this time on it comprised five armies (three "general" armies and two armored armies) with a total of 10 motorized rifle divisions and 10 armored divisions, as well as an artillery division. The 16th Tactical Air Army, which consists of two mixed air corps and numerous independent air regiments, is also subordinate to the Group. (Footnote 6)

The GSFG, which of course also safeguarded the construction of the Berlin Wall in August of 1961 with its units, stayed almost unchanged in this composition until 1979. Nothing in its strength changed either when, after the Soviet intervention in the CSSR in August of 1968, in which two GSFG armies were involved, the "Central Group of Forces" (CGF)--comprising five divisions--remained in the neighboring country, thus considerably raising the strength of Soviet troops in the approaches to the USSR.

A change in the composition of the GSFG was not introduced until 1979. In October of that year, then chief of state and party boss Brezhnev announced the withdrawal of 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks from the GDR. The troop reduction, which was greatly emphasized for propaganda purposes, concretely led to the 6th Guards Armored Division--which had up to that time been deployed in the Wittenberg-Lutherstadt area--of the 1st Guards Armored Army and possibly some of the smaller units directly subordinate to the Group and the Army being withdrawn from the GDR by April of 1980. (Footnote 7) It then later turned out that the vociferously announced unilateral troop reduction had not even diminished the personnel strength, let alone the combat capability, of the GSFG: They were at best a compensation for personnel increases that had come about in the course of structural changes in the organization of the forces, which considerably improved the combat capability of the GSFG units. Among the most important of these structural changes, the realization of which can only roughly be laid down to the period of the second half of the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's, are:

- Reinforcing the 34th Artillery Division by subordinating additional regiments and expanding all its regiments into artillery brigades.
- Incorporating airborne assault units and SPETSNAZ (commando) units (Footnote 8) at group and army level.
- Expanding the artillery regiments and A.A. [antiaircraft] regiments of the armies into artillery brigades and A.A. brigades.

- Reinforcing the army troops by an independent armored regiment with around 150 battle tanks.
- Reinforcing the division troops of the motorized rifle divisions by an independent armored battalion with around 50 battle tanks.
- Incorporating one motorized rifle battalion each into the armored regiments of the armored divisions.
- Generally reinforcing the firepower of the cannon and rocket artillery units by converting from the three-gun/system structuring of the firing platoons to four-gun/system structuring, i.e. to batteries with eight guns or weapon systems.
- Setting up one attack helicopter regiment each for air support for each of the five GSFG armies.
- Setting up mixed attack/transport helicopter squadrons for each GSFG combat division.

Among the structural changes apparently triggered directly by the withdrawal of the 6th Guards Armored Division was the reorganization of the 14th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (Jueterbog) of the 20th Guards Army into an armored division (32nd Guards Armored Division), by which the number of the GSFG armored divisions was again raised to 10, as well as the change of operational control of five divisions, through which the armies were organized in a manner more suitable for operations. Finally, in the course of 1985, the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Guards Army, which had up to then been stationed in Bernau near Berlin, was replaced by the 90th Guards Armored Division of the "Northern Group of Forces" (NGF), which had up to that time been stationed at the Gross Born (Borne) training area in the former German eastern regions; so the number of GSFG armored divisions now increased even to 11 and the 20th Guards Army was given the structure of an armored army. Furthermore, the 16th Tactical Air Army was renamed "Air Force of the GSFG" in the course of a general reorganization of the Soviet "Air Forces" and "Air Defense Troops" components. (Footnote 9)

An announced reinforcement of the GSFG first started around the end of 1983 and early 1984: In response to the implementation of NATO's decision on retrofitting, the GDR and USSR press declared with hitherto unaccustomed candor that "operational-tactical missiles of great range" had been moved into the territory of the GDR--as well as the CSSR. More detailed statements were of course not made on the type of missiles, their number and their deployment areas; photographs were not published. It could only be concluded from the reports that ground-to-ground guided missile systems of the modernized SS-12/22 SCALEBOARD type had been moved forward into the Western approaches to the Soviet Union. According to Western findings, brigades equipped with these systems--range about 1,000 km--were already part of the nuclear delivery systems of a Soviet front. However, they were supposed to be added to the "groups of forces" forming the nucleus of such fronts only in the event of war or immediately prior to that. Therefore NATO did not see any cause for additional retrofitting measures because of the forward stationing of this weapon system, as well as the modernization of the nuclear delivery systems--frequently confused with that system, but initiated independently of the retrofitting decision--of the divisions and armies by [the introduction of] the FROG successor, SS-21/SCARAB, and the SCUD successor, SS-23/SPIDER. (Footnote 10)

A weapon system forming part of the armament of the Soviet "Air Defense Troops" component--a system which up to that time had not been deployed in the frontal area--was said to have been also deployed on the territory of the GDR (as well as in Bulgaria, the CSSR and Hungary) for the first time in 1984. This involves the SA-5/GAMMON (Footnote 11) long-range A.A. [i.e. surface-to-air] guided missile system, for which positions were reportedly at least built in the area of Rostock as well as two areas in the central GDR. The forward stationing of this A.A. guided missile system is evidently connected with the commissioning of the NATO AWACS early warning system, which was activated in 1982.

Development of GSFG Armament and Equipment

When the units of the 1st Belorussian Front attacked Berlin and after the war assumed their mission as occupation troops, they--like all units of the Red Army at that time--presented a confused picture in armament and equipment. The masses of tanks and self-propelled guns were followed by the infantry on trucks which came mostly from U.S. deliveries and on foot, and supplies were largely brought up with rickety horse-drawn wagons. The picture began to change quickly after the end of the war. The following can be gleaned from the scanty WP [Warsaw Pact] statements on the history of the GSFG and GSFG:

- Summer of 1947: Start of complete motorization and mechanization of the GSFG; restructuring of the rifle divisions into mechanized divisions; setting up the first motorized rifle regiments; introducing amphibious armored reconnaissance vehicles (BTR-40P); introducing the Kalashnikov assault rifle and other new small arms; introducing the first jet airplanes.
- Late 1948: Conclusion of the mechanization of GSFG divisions.
- 1955/56: "As vanguard of the Soviet armed forces" (original Eastern wording), the GSFG received new arms and equipment such as T-55 battle tanks, helicopters, amphibious armored personnel carriers (BTR-50P), antitank guided missiles, multiple rocket launchers, recoilless rifles as well as supersonic aircraft.
- 1957: Reorganizing the rifle and mechanized divisions into motorized rifle divisions; reorganizing the armored divisions; deactivating the corps; setting up antitank missile units.

The following can be gleaned as "highlights" from the reports of Western observers:

- From 1962: Supplying the units of the 1st Guards Armored Army and the 8th Guards Army with the T-62 battle tank; introducing the BTR-60 armored personnel carrier.
- From 1964: Converting the multiple rocket launcher units to the BM-21 40-tube launcher.
- From 1973: Providing the Mi-24/HIND attack helicopter for the attack helicopter regiments being built up.
- From the mid-1970's: Mechanizing the artillery by providing 2S1 122-mm and 2S3 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, as well as modern artillery armored command and observation vehicles.
- From 1976: Converting the armored units of the 3rd Assault Army, the 2nd

Guards Army and the 20th Guards Army to the T-64A battle tank.

- From 1980: Introduction of the 2S5 SF [probable expansion: self-propelled] 152-mm cannon, the BM-27 220-mm heavy multiple rocket launcher and the SA-8b/GECKO A.A. guided missile system.

- From 1981: Converting the rocket artillery from the FROG-7 ground-to-ground missile system to the SS-21/SCARAB ground-to-ground guided missile system; introduction of the SA-13/GOPHER A.A. guided missile system.

- Mid-1982: Start of the conversion of a part of the "fighter bomber air regiments" (NVA German!) of the GSFG air force to the Su-24/FENCER.

- January 1984: Delivery of the first T-80 battle tanks to the regiments of the 1st Guards Armored Army and the 8th Guards Army.


- Late 1984: Supplying the rest of the GSFG armies with the T-64B.

- Autumn of 1985: Arrival of the first Su-25/FROGFOOT-type ground-attack aircraft for the GSFG air force.

- Early 1986: Supplying the GSFG air force with the first MiG-29/FULCRUM-type fighter planes.

It was initially assumed in the West that the units of the "Groups of Forces," but in particular the GSFG, had priority over all other Soviet units in being outfitted with new weapons and equipment. It has in the meantime been shown that this is not the case with the ground forces. Presumably for reasons of secrecy, new weapons and equipment are as a rule delivered first to the army units deployed in the Western military regions of the Soviet Union. Only after they have been issued them--often with a delay of several years--are they delivered to the units in the approaches to the USSR, whereby the GSFG then, though, does have absolute priority.

Figure 6: Deployment of Major Units of the GSFG Ground Forces



The Present Organization and Equipment of the GSFG Ground Forces

The following outline shows the present order of battle of the GSFG ground forces; Figure 6 the deployment of the most important major units. All the Group's combat and combat support troops belong to category 1; i.e. they are brought up to full wartime strength in personnel and materiel.

Order of Battle of GSFG Ground Forces

2. Guards Army	Fuerstenberg/Havel
16th Guards Armored Division	Neustrelitz
21st Motorized Rifle Division	Perleberg
94th Guards Motorized Rifle Division	Schwerin
207th Motorized Rifle Division	Stendal
3rd Assault Army	Magdeburg
7th Guards Armored Division	Dessau-Rosslau
10th Guards Armored Division	Altengrabow
12th Guards Armored Division	Neuruppin
47th Guards Armored Division	Hillersleben/Altmark
20th Guards Army	Eberswalde
25th Armored Division	Vogelsang
32nd Guards Armored Division	Jueterbog
90th Guards Armored Division	Bernau bei Berlin
35th Motorized Rifle Division	Doeberitz bei Potsdam
8th Guards Army	Weimar-Nohra
79th Guards Armored Division	Jena
27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division	Halle/Saale
39th Guards Motorized Rifle Division	Ohrdruf
57th Guards Motorized Rifle Division	Naumburg
1st Guards Armored Army	Dresden
9th Armored Division	Riesa
11th Guards Armored Division	Dresden-Klotzsche
20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division	Grimma
Directly subordinate to the Group:	
34th Artillery Division	Potsdam
u/i airborne assault brigade	Cottbus
u/i SPETSNAZ brigade	Fuerstenberg-Neuruppin- Neustrelitz area
u/i ground-to-ground guided missile brigade (SS-12/22)	Mirow area (1)
u/i ground-to-ground guided missile brigade (SS-12/22)	Bernsdorf area (2)
(1) training area Waren/Speck	
(2) training area Koenigsbrueck	

The Group's supreme command is headquartered in Wunsdorf near Zossen, where it is partly accommodated in the buildings of the former "Army Supreme Command"


(OKH) of the Wehrmacht. Further command, combat support and logistics troops are directly subordinate to the Group in addition to the combat and combat support units portrayed in the order of battle. A pipeline construction brigade, a railway engineer regiment (Annaburg/Bez. [Bezirk] Leipzig) and at least two other engineer regiments are also among them, besides communications, communications/ELINT, maintenance and supply components. The Group maintains its own honor guard company, a headquarters military band, a song-and-dance ensemble, the "Volga" military radio station and the "Sovetskaya Armiya" ("Soviet Army") military magazine for representational purposes and for entertainment of the troops. Several training regiments and an "warrant officer" school (see under "personnel and training") are also subordinate to the Group.

The 34th Artillery Division, stationed in Potsdam, represents the Group's most important instrument as regards concentration. According to current data, the roughly 7,000-man artillery division is organized into three artillery brigades with three artillery battalions each and an artillery reconnaissance battalion as well as a rocket artillery brigade with four rocket artillery battalions and a rocket artillery reconnaissance battalion. A fifth brigade seems to be in the process of being formed. The existing brigades are:

- a cannon howitzer brigade, equipped with 72 D-20 152-mm cannon howitzers;
- a self-propelled howitzer brigade, equipped with 72 2S3 152-mm self-propelled howitzers;
- a mixed gun brigade, equipped with the M [Model?] 1976 152-mm field gun and the 2S7 SF [self-propelled?] (up to now M 1975) 203-mm cannon, which was also confirmed in the CSSR (a total of 72 guns of both types);
- a multiple rocket launcher brigade, equipped with 72 BM-27 220-mm multiple rocket launchers.

On the basis of usual Soviet equipment systematology, the 2S4 (up to now M 1975) 240-mm SF [v.s.] mortar, previously known only through U.S. sketches, is expected to be supplied in the near future.

Figure 7: Organization and Equipment of a GSFG Armored Division



[1]

328 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks
228 BMP-1/2 APC's [armored personnel carriers]
19 BRM/BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles
29 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles
48 2S3 152-mm self-propelled howitzers
96 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzers
24 BM-21 122-mm multiple rocket launchers
4 SS-21 ground-to-ground guided missile systems

20 SA-8b or SA-6 A.A. [antiaircraft] guided missile systems
16 SA-13 A.A. guided missile systems
16 ZSU-23-4 self-propelled armored A.A. guns
9 AT-5 antitank guided missile systems
6 Mi-2/HOPLITE
8 Mi-8/HIP C/H and DIG [sic - v.i. No. 7]
6 Mi-24/HIND E

= 11,150 men

[2]

6 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks
3 BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles
13 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles
12 BMP-1/2 APC's

[3]

40 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks
87 BMP-1/2 APC's
4 BRM/BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles
4 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles
24 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzers
4 SA-13 A.A. guided missile systems
4 ZSU-23-4 self-propelled armored A.A. guns
9 AT-5 antitank guided missile systems

[4]

94 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks each
43 BMP-1/2 APC's each
4 BRM/BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles each
4 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles each
24 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzers each
4 SA-13 A.A. guided missile systems each
4 ZSU-23-4 self-propelled armored A.A. guns each

[5]

48 2S3 152-mm self-propelled howitzers
24 BM-21 122-mm multiple rocket launchers

[6]

4 SS-21 ground-to-ground guided missile systems

[7]


Attack Helicopters

6 Mi-2/HOPLITE
8 Mi-8/HIP C/H and D/G [sic - v.s. No. 1]
8 Mi-24/HIND E

[8]

20 SA-8b or SA-6 A.A. guided missile systems

Figure 8: Organization and Equipment of a GSFG Motorized Rifle Division



[1]

271 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks
142 BMP-1/2 APC's
290 BTR-60/70/80 APC's
19 BRM/BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles
29 BROM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles

72 2S3 152-mm self-propelled howitzers
96 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzers
24 BM-21 122-mm multiple rocket launchers
4 SS-21 ground-to-ground guided missile systems

20 SA-8b or SA-6 A.A. guided missile systems
16 SA-13 A.A. guided missile systems
16 ZSU-23-4 self-propelled armored A.A. guns
39 AT-5 antitank guided missile systems
12 MT-12 100-mm antitank guns
6 Mi-2/HOPLITE
8 Mi-8/HIP C/H and D/G
6 Mi-24/HIND E

= 13,800 men

[2]

6 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks
3 BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles
13 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles
12 BMP-1/2 APC's

[3]

51 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks

[4]

12 MT-12 100-mm antitank guns
12 AT-5 antitank guided missile systems

[5]

Attack Helicopters

6 Mi-2/HOPLITE
8 Mi-8/HIP C/H and D/G
6 Mi-24/HIND E

[6]

40 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks
130 BMP-1/2 APC's
4 BRM/BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles
4 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles
24 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzers
4 SA-13 A.A. guided missile systems
4 ZSU-23-4 self-propelled armored A.A. guns
9 AT-5 antitank guided missile systems

[7]

40 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks each
145 BTR-60/70/80 APC's each
4 BRM/BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles each
4 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles each
24 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzers each
4 SA-13 A.A. guided missile systems each
4 ZSU-23-4 self-propelled armored A.A. guns each
9 AT-5 antitank guided missile systems each

[8]

94 T-64 B/T-80 battle tanks
4 BRM/BRM-1 armored reconnaissance vehicles
4 BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles
24 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzers
4 SA-13 A.A. guided missile systems
4 ZSU-23-4 self-propelled armored A.A. guns

[9]

72 2S3 152-mm self-propelled howitzers
24 BM-21 122-mm multiple rocket launchers

[10]

4 SS-21 ground-to-ground guided missile systems

[11]

20 SA-8b or SA-6 A.A. guided missile systems

Remark: Some motorized rifle divisions have two BMP motorized rifle regiments and only one BTR motorized rifle regiment.

Performance Data on Battle Tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers of the GSFG Land Forces

(1) Daten	(2) Typ	(3) T-64B ⁽¹⁾	(4) BMP-1	(5) BMP-2	(6) BTR-60P	(7) BTR-70	(8) BTR-80	
Gefechts-gewicht (5)	1	30	40	13,6	14,2	10,2	11,5	
Motor (6)	(7)	5-Zyl.-Gegenkolben-2 Takt-Diesel	Gas-Turbine (8)	6 Zyl. V-Viertakt Diesel (9)	6-Zyl. V-Viertakt Diesel (10)	2 x 6 Zyl. Viertakt Otto (11)	2 x 8 Zyl. Viertakt Diesel (12)	
Motorleistung (14)	kW	515	750	213	225-300	2 x 65	2 x 84	
Leistungs-gewicht (15)	kW/t	13,55	18,75	15,66	16-20	12,8	14,6	
Geschwindigkeit, max (16)	km/h	75	75	70	65	80	80	
Fahrbereich (ohne Zusatzfasser) (17)	km	500	400	500	500	500	500	
Bewaffnung (18)	(19)	BK 125 mm mit PzAbwLFK-System AT-8, Turm-MG 7,62 mm, FlaMG 12,7 mm	(20)	BK 73 mm, PzAbwLFK-Sys AT-3, Turm-MG 7,62 mm	(21)	BK 30 mm, PzAbwLFK-Sys AT-5, Turm-MG 7,62 mm	(22)	Turm-MG 14,5 mm, Turm-MG 7,62 mm, MG nicht flafähig, MG flafähig

[Note: Please refer to top of original p. 628 for numbers keyed to translation. Translation is made often only once for same terms appearing more than once in table; words or abbreviations similar in both languages are for the most part left untranslated. Read down for "Data" and across for "Type" in original.]

[1] Data [2] Type [3] T-64B (1) [i.e see footnote] battle tank [4] APC
 [5] Combat weight
 [6] Engine [7] five-cylinder counter-piston, two-cycle diesel [8] gas turbine [9] six-cylinder V four-cycle diesel [10] six-cylinder four-cycle diesel [11] two by six-cylinder four-cycle Otto [i.e. internal combustion] [12] two x eight-cylinder four-cycle Otto [13] eight-cylinder V four-cycle diesel, supercharged
 [14] Engine output
 [15] Performance weight [power-to-weight ratio]
 [16] Speed, max.
 [17] Operating range (without auxiliary drums)
 [18] Armament [19] 125-mm main gun with AT-8 antitank guided missile, 7.62-mm turret machine gun, 12.7-mm antiaircraft machine gun [20] 73-mm main gun, AT-3 antitank guided missile system, 7.62-mm turret machine gun [21] 30-mm automatic cannon, AT-5 antitank guided missile system, 7.62-mm turret machine gun [22] 14.5-mm turret machine gun 7.62-mm turret machine gun -- machine gun not capable of antiaircraft operations -- machine gun capable of antiaircraft operations

(1) partially prepared for mounting reactive armor!

Performance Data on the Self-Propelled Howitzers and Guns of the GSFG Ground Forces

Daten (1)	(2) Typ	(3) PzH 122 mm 2 S 1	(4) PzH 152 mm 2 S 3	(5) Kanone 152 mm SF 2 S 5	(6) Kanone 203 mm SF 2 S 7	(7) Mörser 240 mm SF 2 S 4
Gefechtsgewicht (8)	t	ca. 16	27,5	(9) unbek.	ca 40	ca 25
Motorleistung (10)	kW	220	382	382	(11) unbek.	382
Leistungsgewicht (12)	kW/t	ca. 14	13,9	(13) unbek.	(14) unbek.	ca 15
Geschwindigkeit, max. (15)	km/h	60	62	50	50	64
Fahrbereich (16)	km	500	500	500	500	500
Schußentfernung, max. (17)	m	15 300	17 400	30 000	35 000	9 700
Feuergeschwindigkeit (18)	Schuß/min.	5 - 6	4	4	1	3
Kampfbelastung (19)	Schuß Art	40 HE, HEAT-SS/FS Nebel, Leucht (20)	46 HE, HEAT, APC-T CP, Nebel (21)	25 HE, CP, nukleartfähig (22)	unbek HE, CP, nukleartfähig (23)	unbek HE, ICM, nukleartfähig (24)
Zusatzbewaffnung (25)			(26) MG 7,62 mm			

[1] Data [2] Type [3] 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzer [4] 2S3 152-mm self-propelled howitzer [5] 2S5 self-propelled 152-mm gun [6] 2S7 self-propelled 203-mm gun [7] 2S4 (1) [i.e. see footnote] self-propelled 240-mm mortar

[8] Combat weight [9] unknown

[10] Engine output [11] unknown

[12] Performance weight [13] unknown [14] unknown

[15] Speed, max.

[16] Operating range

[17] Range of fire, max.

[18] Rate of fire rounds per minute

[19] Combat load rounds type [20] [artificial] smoke illuminating [21] smoke [22] capable of nuclear operations [23] unknown capable of nuclear operations [24] unknown capable of nuclear operations

[25] Additional armament [26] 7.62-mm antiaircraft machine gun

(1) expected to be delivered to GSFG

The five armies of the GSFG are organized differently: One armored division and three motorized rifle divisions each are subordinate to the two "general" armies, the 2nd Guards Army and the 8th Guards Army, deployed in the northwestern and southwestern area of the GDR, and three armored divisions and one motorized rifle division are subordinate to the 20th Guards Army deployed in the area around Berlin. The 3rd Assault Army (Footnote 12), deployed in the western area of the GDR, is a plain armored army with four armored divisions, while only two armored divisions and one motorized rifle division

are subordinate to the 1st Guards Armored Army deployed in the southern area of the GDR.

In addition to the combat divisions, the following combat and combat support troops are subordinate to each of the five armies:

- a self-contained armored regiment with originally around 150 battle tanks, which is on the agenda to be restructured into an armored regiment of the "armored regiment of the armored division" type.
- an airborne assault battalion and a SPETSNAZ (commando) unit 8);
- a tank destroyer battalion equipped with 12 MT-12 100-mm antitank guns and 12 AT-5/SPANDREL antitank guided missile systems on modified BRDM-2;
- an artillery brigade equipped with 48 2S5 SF [possible expansion: self-propelled] 152-mm guns, 24 D-20 152-mm cannon howitzers and 24 M 1976 152-mm field guns;
- a ground-to-ground guided missile brigade equipped with 12 SS-1c/SCUD B;
- an A.A. rocket brigade equipped with 27 SA-4/GANEF
- a bridge-building engineer regiment equipped with PMP collapsible floating bridges, TMM collapsible bridges and PTS-M tracked amphibious vehicles;
- an amphibious engineer battalion equipped with PTS-M tracked amphibious vehicles and GSP tracked self-propelled ferries, and
- an NBC [nuclear-biological-chemical] defense battalion.

Added to these are communications and communications intelligence units as well as logistics components.

An attack helicopter regiment of the GSFG air forces stands by for air support to each army. The regiments are equipped with about 40 Mi-24/HIND E attack helicopters and about 30 Mi-8/HIP E attack helicopters.

Figure 7 shows the basic organization and equipment of the GSFG armored divisions, and Figure 8 those of the motorized rifle divisions.

Performance Data on the Artillery Rocket Systems of the GSFG Ground Forces

(1) Daten	(2) Typ	(3) MIRAK-Werfer 122 mm BM-21	(4) MIRAK-Werfer 122 mm M 1975	(5) TAK-100 220 mm BM-27
Gefechtsgewicht (6)	t	13,7	ca. 4	22,7
Trägersfahrzeug (7)		Lkw URAL-375 D (8)	Lkw GAZ-66 B (9)	Lkw ZIL-130 (10)
Rohrzahl (11)		40	12	16
Schußentfernung, max. (12)	km	20,5	20,5	ca. 40
Feuergeschwindigkeit (13)		40 Schuß/20 s (14)	12 Schuß/6 s (15)	1 Schuß/2 bis 5 s (16)
Nachladezeit (17) min		10	(18) 5 bis 10	(19) 15 bis 20
Munitionsarten (20)		(21) Splitterspreng. Sprengbrand, Streuminen, Nebel, C-Kampfstoff (?)		(22) Splitterspreng. Bomblets, Streuminen, C-Kampfstoff (?)

[NOTE: Please refer to table at top left of original p. 630 for numbers keyed to translation -- read across for "Type" and down for "Data."]

[1] Data [2] Type [3] BM-21 122-mm multiple rocket launcher [4] M 1975 (1) 122-mm multiple rocket launcher [5] BM-27 220-mm multiple rocket launcher [6] Combat weight [7] Carrier vehicle [8] URAL-375 D truck [9] GAZ-66 B truck [10] ZIL-135 truck [11] Number of tubes [12] Range of fire, max. km [13] Rate of fire [14] 40 rounds/20 s [15] 12 rounds/6 s [16] 1 round/2 to 5 s [i.e. rounds per so many seconds] [17] Reloading time min [18] 5 to 10 [19] 15 to 20 [20] Types of ammunition [21] fragmentation explosive, explosive incendiary, scatter mines, smoke, chemical warfare agent (?) [22] fragmentation explosive, bomblets, scatter mines, chemical warfare agent (?)

(1) only in the case of airborne assault brigade

Performance Data on the Ground-to-Ground Guided Missile Systems of the GSFG Ground Forces

(1) Daten	(2) Typ	SS-21 SCAHAB	SS-1c/ SCUD B ⁽¹⁾	SS-12/22 SCALEBOARD A B
	(3) Gefechts-gewicht t	ca 16	32,5	36,3
(4) Trägerfahrzeug		Rad-Transporter BAZ 5937 (5)	Lkw MAZ-543 (modifiziert) (6)	
(7) Länge Lenkflugkörper m		ca. 6,50	11,50	11,00
(8) Gewicht LKF/GefKopf t		ca. 2/ca. 0,7	5,9/1,0	9,7/1,0
(9) Reichweite, max. km		100	300	900
(10) Gefechtskopffarten		(11) Atomsprengkörper Splitterspreng konventionelle Submunition C-Kampfstoff		

[1] Data [2] Type [3] Combat weight [4] Carrier vehicle [5] BAZ-5937 wheeled transporter [6] MAZ-543 truck (modified) [7] Length of guided missile m [in meters] [8] Weight [of guided missile]/[and] warhead t [in tons] [9] Range, max. km [10] Types of warheads [11] nuclear explosive fragmentation explosive conventional submunition chemical warfare agent

(1) [footnote on SS-1c/SCUD B reads:] The SS-23/SPIDER (range 500 km) ground-to-ground guided missile system is expected as a successor model.

Performance Data on the A.A. Guided Missile Systems of the GSFG Ground Forces

Daten (1)	(2) Typ	(3) Fliegerfaust SA-7b/GRAIL (1)	(4) FlüFKSystem SA-13/GOPHER	(5) FlüFKSystem SA-6/GAINFUL	(6) FlüFKSystem SA-8b/GECKO	(7) FlüFKSystem SA-4b/GANEF	(8) FlüFKSystem SA-5/GAMMON
Trägerfahrzeug (9)		Ein-Mann-Waffe (10)	modifizierter TPz MT-LB (11)	modifiziertes PT-76- Fahrwerk (12)	Rad-Transporter BAZ-5937 (13)	Kettenfahrwerk (14)	nicht mobil (15)
Zahl der Lenkflugkörper (16)		1	4	3	6	2	Einzelstarter (17)
Gewicht LFK/GefKopf kg (18)		10,2/1,18	42,0/3,7	580/56	130/19	2500/150	unbekannt (19)
Kampftentfernung, min./max m (20)		300/3700	800/5000	3000/ca. 24 000	1500/10 000	9000/55 000	6000 - 8000/250 000
Wirksame Höhe, min./max (21) m		50/3000	20/3500	30/ca. 15 000	50/5000	100/25 000	ca. 300/30 000

[1] Data [2] Type [3] SA-7b/GRAIL (1) portable A.A. missile launcher [4] SA-13 GOPHER A.A. guided missile system [5] SA-6 GAINFUL A.A. guided missile system [6] SA-8b/GECKO A.A. guided missile system [7] SA-4b/GANEF A.A. guided missile system [8] SA-5/GAMMON A.A. guided missile system [9] Carrier vehicle [10] one-man weapon [11] modified MT-LB TPz [Note: expansion of "T" here unknown -- "Pz" normally = armored vehicle or tank.] [12] modified PT-76 chassis [13] BAZ-5937 wheeled transporter [14] tracked chassis [15] not mobile [16] Number of guided missiles [17] single launcher [18] Weight of guided missile/warhead kg [19] unknown [20] Combat range, min./max. m [meters] [21] Effective altitude, min./max. m

(1) Being replaced by the SA-14/GREMLIN portable A.A. missile launcher!

Performance Data on GSFG Attack and Transport Helicopters

(1) Daten	(2) Typ	(3) Kampfhubschrauber Mi-8/HIP E	(4) Kampfhubschrauber Mi-24/HIND E	(5) mittlerer Transport- hubschrauber Mi-8/HIP C/H	(6) schwerer Transport- hubschrauber Mi-6/HOOK A	(7) schwerer Transport- hubschrauber Mi-26/HALO A ¹⁾
(8) Startgewicht	t	12,0	12,0	12,0/13,0	42,5	56,0
(9) Nutzlast	t oder Mann	2,5 24	2,5 8	4,0 24	12,0 65	20,0 100
(11) Geschwindigkeit, Reise/max.	km/h	215/230	305/315	215/230	250/300	255/295
(12) Kampf-/Einsatzradius ²⁾ (ohne Verweildauer)	km	190 - 230	230 - 250	130 - 220	100 - 315	370 - 430
(13) Bewaffnung		(14) 1 MG 12,7 mm 4 PzAbwLFKSys AT-2C/SWATTER C, 6 x 32 L/B-Raketen 57 mm oder 2 x 20 L/B-Raketen 80 mm oder bis 1000 kg Bomben versch. Art	(15) 1 Gatling MG 12,7 mm (4rohr.) ³⁾ 4 PzAbwLFKSys AT-6/SPIRAL, 4 x 32 L/B-Raketen 57 mm oder 2 x 20 L/B-Rake- ten 80 mm oder bis 1000 kg Bomben versch. Art	(16) 4 x 16 L/B-Raketen 57 mm oder 2 x 20 L/B-Raketen 80 mm oder bis 1000 kg Bomben versch. Art	(17) 1 MG 12,7 mm im Bug	(18) keine

[1] Data [2] Type [3] Mi-8/HIP E attack helicopter [4] Mi-24/HIND E attack helicopter [5] Mi-8/HIP C/H medium transport helicopter [6] Mi-6/HOOK A heavy transport helicopter [7] Mi-6/HALO A (1) heavy transport helicopter

[8] Takeoff weight t [tons]

[9] Payload t [10] or men

[11] Speed, cruising/max. km/h

[12] Combat/operational radius (2) [excluding stopping time] km

[13] Armament [14] 1 12.7-mm machine gun 4 AT-2C/SWATTER C antitank guided missile systems, 6 x 32 57-mm air-to-ground rockets or 2 x 20 80-mm air-to-ground rockets or up to 1,000 kg of bombs of various types [15] 1 12.7-mm Gatling machine gun (4-barrel) (3) 4 AT-6 SPIRAL antitank guided missile systems, 4 x 32 57-mm air-to-ground rockets or 2 x 20 80-mm air-to-ground rockets or up to 1,000 kg of bombs of various types [16] 4 x 16 57-mm air-to-ground rockets or 2 x 20 80-mm air-to-ground rockets or up to 1,000 kg of bombs of various types [17] 1 12,7-mm machine gun in the bow [18] none

1) The Mi-26/HALO A supersedes the Mi-6/HOOK. 2) depending on payload and type of operation 3) or fixed 30-mm twin-barrel automatic cannons

The Organization and Structure of the GSFG Air Forces

The GSFG air forces which emerged from the 16th Tactical Air Army represent, with their more than 700 combat planes, over 350 attack helicopters and about 300 other aircraft and helicopters, the strongest concentration of air forces under one commander in the Warsaw Pact area. The data published in the West on organization, strength and inventory of the GSFG air forces are vague and contradictory, although--in spite of operational sites frequently being located in exercise areas and prohibited zones--their flight operations cannot be hidden either from the GDR populace and visitors to the GDR or from Western radar gear. Older publications on the 16th Tactical Air Army say that it was organized into:

- The NORTH Air Corps with a fighter and fighter bomber division respectively (each with three regiments),
 - The SOUTH Air Corps with two fighter and a fighter bomber division (each with three regiments);
- as well as into:
- an independent bomber division with three regiments,
 - three independent reconnaissance air regiments and
 - three independent transport air regiments.

This structure seems to have changed in essential points. The following changes can be regarded as certain:

- There has not been an independent "bomber division," once equipped with the IL-28/BEAGLE light bomber, for a long time. The fighter bomber regiments rearmed with the Su-24/FENCER fighter bomber have appeared in its place.
- At least two of the former fighter regiments in the area of the SOUTH Air Corps, the regiments at Altenburg and Zerbst, were converted into fighter bomber regiments, thus strengthening the air strike component of the GSFG air forces.
- Five attack helicopter regiments were added to the previous combat air units starting in 1973. These are organizationally a part of the air forces, but for operational purposes are assigned to the five GSFG armies.
- There are indications that the NORTH and SOUTH Air Corps headquarters are no longer existing in their previous form and under their previous designation.

In view of the above-mentioned changes and on the basis of the evaluation of all available overt reports, it can be assumed that the GSFG air forces today comprise:


- five air divisions with a total of seven fighter regiments and at least eight fighter bomber regiments (including two Su-24/FENCER regiments) and
 - at least 10 independent regiments (three reconnaissance air regiments, two transport air regiments and five attack helicopter regiments);
- thus a total of at least 25 regiments. The fighter and fighter bomber regiments are equipped with 40 planes (in three squadrons), plus for each regiment up to five training planes which are also employable as combat aircraft. The attack helicopter regiments have about 70 craft each.

The following summary shows the order of battle which can be assumed today for the GSFG air forces, while Figure 27 shows their deployment.

Order of Battle of the GSFG Air Forces

Fighter Division	Puetnitz
with fighter regiment	Puetnitz
fighter regiment	Wittstock
fighter regiment	u/i deployment
Fighter Bomber Division	Rechlin-Laerz
with fighter bomber regiment	Rechlin-Laerz
fighter bomber regiment	Neuruppin
fighter bomber regiment	u/i deployment
Fighter/Fighter Bomber Division	Zerbst
with fighter regiment	Koethen
fighter regiment	Jueterbog
fighter bomber regiment	Zerbst
Fighter/Fighter Bomber Division	Merseburg
with fighter regiment	Merseburg
fighter regiment	Alt-Loennowitz
fighter bomber regiment	Altenburg
Fighter Bomber Division	Grossenhain
with fighter bomber regiment	Grossenhain
fighter bomber regiment	Brand-Briesen
fighter bomber regiment	Finsterwalde
Independent Regiments	
attack helicopter regiment	Parchim
attack helicopter regiment	Stendal
attack helicopter regiment	Mahlwinkel
attack helicopter regiment	Brandis
attack helicopter regiment	Weimar-Nohra
reconnaissance air regiment	Welzow
reconnaissance air regiment	u/i deployment
reconnaissance air regiment	u/i deployment
transport air regiment	Oranienburg
transport air regiment	Sperenburg

Figure 27: Deployment of GSFG Air Forces



Inventory

The fighter regiments of the GSFG air forces are predominantly equipped with the MiG-23/FLOGGER B/G. The MiG-29/FULCRUM has started to be supplied since early 1986, and two squadrons of them were identified at the Wittstock base.

The fighter bomber regiments are equipped with fighter bombers of the MiG-27/FLOGGER D/J, Su-17/FITTER D/H, Su-24/FENCER and Su-25/FROGFOOT types.

The MiG-25/FOXBAT B/D is used especially as reconnaissance aircraft and the YAK-28/BREWER E as EW [electronic warfare] aircraft.

The transport air units have medium transport aircraft of various types, multiple-purpose helicopters of the Mi-8/HIP C type and transport helicopters of the Mi-6/HOOK type.

The attack helicopter regiments are equipped with about 40 Mi-24/HIND D/E's and 30 Mi-8/HIP E's.

The summary on [original] page 635 shows the most important performance data on combat aircraft in service with the GSFG air forces.

Infrastructure

The GSFG air forces and the NVA air forces have at least 27 large and 13 medium fully constructed airfields (see Figure 28) on the GDR's territory, and the majority of them are equipped with hardened parking areas. They are supplemented by a multitude of makeshift airfields as well as prepared takeoff and landing lanes on the GDR's autobahn routes, and permit frequent moving of the units as well as the rapid forward transfer of aircraft and helicopter units from Poland and the Soviet Union.

"Ready-Alert System"


Within the framework of a standby service designated as the "Ready-Alert System," alert squadrons of the fighter units of the GSFG air forces form--together with radar and A.A. missile sites of the troop air defense of the GSFG ground forces--the earliest warning and defense zone in the WP countries' air defense system, which is controlled centrally from Moscow and is in constant operational readiness even in peacetime. The appropriate forces of the GDR's NVA air forces/air defense are also integrated into this earliest warning and defense zone.

Personnel and Training in the GSFG

The flying and technical personnel of the GSFG air forces are made up almost exclusively of professional officers and long-term military men of the "Faenriche" career track, which was introduced in 1972 and is roughly equivalent to the "warrant officers" of the American and British armed forces. The officers and warrant officers receive their training in the USSR and are later given further training in the GSFG's operational units. In addition to them, long-term rank-and-file men and noncommissioned officers, so-called "military men of over-term service" are also employed for a relatively small number of less professional special uses in the sphere of maintenance and supply. Draftees, on the other hand, are used only for guard and auxiliary duties in the air forces.

In the case of the GSFG ground forces, however, draftees--who make up just under 75 percent--provide the bulk of the enlisted men and noncommissioned officers, as in the Soviet ground forces overall. Since a professional and long-term noncommissioned officer corps is lacking, the professional officers--representing almost 25 percent--provide the bulk of the command personnel from the platoon level up and the bulk of the technical and other specialized personnel. They are also supplemented and--due to an apparently insufficient new generation of officers--partly replaced by "warrant officers" in the GSFG

Figure 28: Militarily Used Airfields in the GDT



- [1] Concrete runway over 2,400 meters [2] Concrete runway 1,800-2,400 meters
 [3] Other important fields, state of improvement not known

Performance Data on GSFG Air Forces Fighter Aircraft

(1) Daten	(2) Typ	Jagd- MIG-23/ FLOGGER D/G	Jagd- MIG-29/ FUR CRUM	Jabo- Su-17 FITTER D/H	Jabo- MIG-27 FLOGGER D/J	Jabo- Su-24 FENCER	Erdkampffl- SU-25 FROGFOOT
Geschwindigkeit (Mach) (3)		2.3	2.3	2.1	1.7	2.0	0.8
Kampfradius (km) (4)		1150	1150	550	600	1300	300
Bewaffnung/Zuladung (kg) (5)		6 L/L-LFK	6 L/L-LFK	3000	3000	3000	2000
"look-down-shoot-down"-Fähigkeit (6)	(7) begrenzt	ja	—				

- [1] Data [2] Type [3] Speed [4] Combat radius (km) [5] Armament/
 Disposable load (kg) [6] "Look-down-shoot down" Capability [7] Limited

Data from Soviet Military Power, 1986

ground forces. These "warrant officers"--period of commitment at least five years, with opportunity for further commitment up to age 45--are employed for technical and other specialized uses, such as, for example, company sergeant major, motor sergeant, maintenance or supply platoon leader and similar things; in exceptional cases also as leaders of components of combat and combat support troops. Soldiers of "over-term service" also occupy a small number of less professional specialized duty posts in the ground forces.

While the new generation of officers for the GSFG ground forces is also trained exclusively at officers training schools in the Soviet Union, at least a part of the future "warrant officers" of the GSFG ground forces receives its training at their own GSFG warrant officers school. This school in particular trains warrant officer candidates from the troops in six-month courses; i.e. GSFG draftees who have qualified and applied for this career after completing a year's service.

Draftees who on the basis of their aptitude, occupational training, premilitary training and their political activities appear suitable for noncommissioned officer and special uses are already selected from the mass of draftees provided for the GSFG by special selection committees in the USSR in the course of induction. These selected draftees receive their six-month basic and special training in special training components and are employed in this capacity in operational units from the first half of the second year of their service, while the bulk of the "ordinary" draftees--including drivers (wheeled vehicles)--receive their basic and special training in the operational units themselves. The GSFG maintains three armored training regiments, a motorized rifle training regiment and an engineer training regiment for training part of its requirement for noncommissioned officers and "specialists," as well as for their advanced training. In particular, tank commanders, squad leaders and APC commanders, tank and APC gunners, drivers (tracked vehicles), as well as other noncommissioned officer and specialized personnel of armored, motorized rifle and engineer troops are given training and advanced training in these regiments. However, the greatest part of the future noncommissioned officers and "specialists" intended for the GSFG, in particular those of the rocket troops and artillery as well as of command and logistics units, are trained in training regiments within the USSR before they are transferred to the GSFG.

Replacement of Personnel

The bringing in of new draftees and transporting out of those who have served their time and are about to be discharged has, since the introduction of the 24-month military service period in 1968, been effected within the course of the semiannual replacement of personnel, which takes place in the months of March/April and October/November. About 100,000 draftees are brought into the GDR from the USSR for the purpose of replenishing the operational units and training components and the equivalent number taken back to the homeland for discharge. While replacement of personnel was initially done by shuttle trains, it has since the early/mid 1970's been carried out for the most part by air transports, in order to minimize losses in training time on military duty and work time in the economy. The time needed for replacing personnel was reduced still more by using modern large-capacity passenger planes of the

state airline "Aeroflot." While two to three weeks were still initially required for effecting this exchange of personnel with the Tu-134/CHRUSTY [sic] (84 passengers) and Tu-154/CARELESS (164 passengers), which were employed almost exclusively starting in the spring of 1980, the exchange time was reduced to 10 to 14 days by use of the IL-86/CAMBER Soviet "Airbus," which can accommodate 350 persons, for the first time in April/May 1985.


After arriving at the operational units, the recruits who are not coming from or to training components first receive their basic training, while the noncommissioned officers and "specialists" coming from training components take over their units or functions. The remaining draftees who have served their time are trained for secondary uses during this period. After completing basic training, the new entrants receive special training in their squads and crews and take part in their functions in the subsequent unit training. The replacement every half year of around a quarter of the draftees and the training rhythm conditioned by that results in the combat effectiveness of the GSFG units dropping slightly after the exchange, to then reach a high point toward the end of the half-year period, thus in spring and fall.

Training Grounds, Firing Ranges and Prohibited Areas

In comparison with the conditions inside the Soviet Union, the training opportunities for the GSFG, especially combat training with full troops within the framework of large units, is limited by the size and number of training grounds on hand, as well as the restriction--presumably practiced for security reasons--of exercises to the area of these grounds. But all the same, there are 19 large and medium-sized training areas available to the roughly 380,000 troops of the GSFG ground forces and the roughly 125,000 troops of the NVA ground forces on the territory of the GDR. These are the training areas and firing ranges (from north to south) (cf Figure 38):

- Jaegersbrueck, south of Eggesin, Bez. [Bezirk] Neubrandenburg, ca 130 square km;
- Waren/Speck, east of Mueritzsee [lake], Bez. Neubrandenburg, ca 60 square km;
- Luebtheen, Bez. Schwerin, ca 60 square km;
- Wittstocker Heide, north of Neuruppin, Bez. Potsdam, ca 220 square km;
- Templin, Bez. Potsdam, ca 100 square km;
- Kietz, Bez. Magdeburg, ca 80 square km;
- Letzlinger Heide, Bez. Magdeburg, ca 350 square km;
- Altengrabow, Bez. Magdeburg, ca 100 square km;
- Verlorenwasser, Bez. Potsdam, ca 80 square km;
- Lehnin, southeast of Brandenburg, Bez. Potsdam, ca 100 square km;
- Jueterbog, Bez. Potsdam, ca 300 square km;
- Lieberose, Bez. Frankfurt/Oder, ca 150 square km;
- Annaburger Heide, north of Torgau, Bez. Cottbus, ca 100 square km;
- Zeithain near Riesa, Bez. Dresden, ca 75 square km;
- Koenigsbrueck, Bez. Dresden, ca 100 square km;
- Weisswasser, Bez. Cottbus, ca 270 square km;
- Lossa, Bez. Halle, ca 50 square km;
- Kindel/Eisenach, Bez. Erfurt, ca 50 square km;
- Ohrdruf, Bez. Erfurt, ca 75 square km.

Figure 38: Training Areas and Firing Ranges in the GDR



Added to these 19 areas, with a total surface of about 2,450 square km (Footnote 13), are the large water training areas located on the Elbe, such as:

- Gnevsdorf, in the Elbe sector south of Wittenberge;
- Elbe-North, in the Elbe sector between Stendal and Burg;
- Elbe-South, in the Elbe sector between Aken and Dressau;
- Appolensdorf and Elster/Gallin west and east of the Luther town of Wittenberg and
- Kreinitz/Muehlberg, adjacent to the Zeithain training area.

They are supplemented by a series of smaller water training areas on the Saale, Havel and Oder. The water training areas are used for engineer training and for training combat troops in the crossing of bodies of water.

In addition, there are special firing ranges, such as Kuehlungsborn on Mecklenburg Bay, firing ranges for the air forces, such as Zingst and Peenemuende on the Baltic Sea or Belgern near Zeithain, large garrison training areas, such as Prenzlau, Doeberitz or the "Plessberg" near Bad

Salzungen, as well as separate training areas in the vicinity of the border for the "Border Troops of the GDR" (see [original] p. 662 for this).

These training areas, which are closed to the military missions of France, Great Britain and the United States, are supplemented by "Permanent Prohibited Areas" which may likewise not be entered by the Allied military missions in the GDR. The deployment areas and operational airfields of the GSFG and NVA, as well as the area around their training grounds, are screened off by these prohibited zones, which still covered around 40 percent of the GDR's territory up to mid-1986 and the size of which has since then been reduced to around 25 percent of the GDR's territory. While they also extended along all the GDR's land and sea frontiers before the reduction, parts of the border areas with the CSSR and Poland recently became accessible to the military missions. But still prohibited are the areas around the railway crossing points on the Polish border, the harbor area of Rostock and parts of the island of Ruegen, thus all the areas in which shipments of personnel and materiel arrive from the USSR and are transshipped.

By declaring "Temporary Prohibited Areas," the training areas and "Permanent Prohibited Areas" are connected before and during large exercises in such a way that there are large areas in which any observation activity by Allied missions is eliminated.

Exercises

Common to all of the GSFG's exercises is the fact that--apart from the approach phase and purely marching exercises--they are carried out on training grounds. Exercises in "free terrain"--thus outside of the prohibited training areas--do not take place except in the Soviet Union. This is not out of consideration to the GDR's populace, but for security reasons and for keeping their own troops away from the public of the country where they are stationed.

A review exercise is compulsory for each battalion in the training half-year for checking the status of training. All regiments carry out an exercise with a full complement of troops once a year. Each division still carried out a unit exercise with a full complement every other year up to the late 1970's/early 1980's. Since then, only the staffs have been involved 100 percent in such divisional exercises, while the participation of the troops has been reduced to about 50 to 60 percent.

The large exercises carried out at the army and group level are a mixture of an exercise within the staff framework and a troop exercise: An extensive exercise scenario, in which primarily the command organs of several levels are actively involved in full complement, are combined with combat exercise phases which are acted out by relatively small fully complemented portions of the divisions and armies involved--sometimes only in battalion strength--at various training areas and with different exercise themes. Not only all command levels of the GSFG, but, moreover, higher command staffs in Poland and the Soviet Union, up to the general staff of the armed forces in Moscow, take part in the bigger exercises of this type. The last big exercise of this type, which probably (not announced) carried the name ZAPAD (West) 84, took place in the GDR, CSSR and Poland in June/July of 1984 with the mass

participation of all parts and levels of the GSFG. Units from the western military districts of the Soviet Union also took part in this exercise--the Soviet armed forces' biggest in that frontal area since 1945--and forces of an airborne division were flown in from the USSR in order to conduct an exercise section as a full complement after being dropped on the Jueterbog training area. Apart from the already mentioned secrecy and keeping their own troops away from the public, the advantage of this form of exercise lies in the intensive training of the commanding officers and staffs and the drill-type practice of command procedures at a simultaneously minimum expenditure of personnel and materiel.

Besides their national exercises, which serve exclusively for training, the GSFG--as well as the other "groups of forces"--also participate in the so-called "friendship exercises" which are directed by the armed forces of the host garrison country and in which the armed forces of a neighboring WP country also frequently take part. As a rule, from 20,000 to 25,000 men of the ground and air forces are involved in such exercises. An example of them is the "YUG 84" exercise, which took place in the central and southern part of the GDR in March of 1984 under the direction of the NVA and with the participation of the GSFG and Polish People's Army. Ranking above these "friendship exercises" are the large exercises conducted under the direction of the WP organization; they take place alternately on the territory of a WP country (but not on Soviet territory!). Contingents of all WP armies take part in these exercises in addition to elements of the "Group of Forces" involved. (Footnote 14) The strength of the participating units of the ground and air forces as a rule is around 60,000 men. The latest of these WP exercises on the GDR's territory--and thus with the participation of the GSFG--was the "Comradeship-in-Arms 80" exercise.

A common feature of the "Friendship" and WP exercises is that tightly organized, media-effective propaganda events, like "friendship meetings," honoring the dead, multinational bivouacs and final parades take up a big space in order to give prominence to friendship and "comradeship-in-arms." Show demonstrations by the exercise troops in front of WP party and military VIP's is the rule in the actual exercise phase, which again takes place with the exclusion of the public.

The starting position of all the types of exercises always follows the same pattern: The other side, thus the West, attacks; the WP troops bring the attack to a stop--and then the actual exercise starts: Counterattack and crushing the enemy on his own territory. It is again and again drummed into the troops that defense is only one--temporally limited--transitional phase; it merely serves to prepare for carrying forth the attack. Because of the usually small portion of fully complemented troops, the GSFG's national exercises seldom require announcement according to the provisions of the Helsinki CSCE charter ["Schlusskarte"]. That also holds true for most of the "friendship exercises." The GSFG's big exercises like "ZAPAD 84" and WP exercises like "Comradeship-in-Arms 80" were indeed announced, but there never was any invitation of CSCE observers to the GDR. Independently of any announcement, however, the Western stationed forces are made aware of all larger exercises in the GDR by the fact that the Soviets inform them of "areas temporarily prohibited" to their military missions. But in so doing, some

nonaffected areas are usually blocked off temporarily and the periods of restriction manipulated for purposes of concealment.

In addition to the exercises jointly carried out by ground and air forces, special exercises of the air forces, special communications and logistics exercises as well as alert exercises regularly take place; the higher special staffs of the Soviet armed forces participate in these.

The GSFG and its Environment

According to the official announcements of the GDR press, the Soviet soldiers are the "liberators" who are in the GDR to protect "socialist achievements." For the soldiers of the GDR's "National People's Army," they are the "comrades in arms" according to official party language regulation. The NVA soldiers are constantly required to learn from the "glorious Soviet army" and to take the "regiment next door," with which competitions and exchange of information are carried out, as an example. Friendship and cooperation "from the top down" are ordered and regulated by "Weeks of Comradeship-in-Arms," organized every year since 1970, by joint political events and military matches which are set down in comprehensive yearly plans. The Soviet soldiers should thus be fully integrated into their environment. But in practice things look differently: For one thing, the GSFG's draftees--like their comrades in the USSR--are not only allowed no regular recreational or weekend leave during their period of service, they are moreover completely cut off from the civilian environment in the GDR. They are permitted to "go out" only rarely, and exclusively in a close-knit group under the supervision of an officer. There are rare contacts with the populace of the GDR for some few chosen ones only within the scope of official events. The contacts with the NVA are purely of an official nature and do not lead to any long-lasting, uncontrolled personal relationships. Language barriers alone prevent that, especially as there are already considerable communication difficulties within the Soviet army, which is composed of soldiers of many nationalities. Above and beyond that, such relationships are not wanted, because they are difficult for the leaders of both sides: The NVA soldiers serve a shorter time, are better provided for, accommodated and paid than the Soviet soldiers, who are accommodated in overcrowded former Wehrmacht barracks and hutments with 60- to 100-man dormitories, have to get by on a monthly salary of 3.80 rubles (about DM11) and do not have any support from family or friends.

These social differences and being shut off from the world around them also apply in slightly mitigated form to the GSFG's "warrant officers" and officers, who are accommodated in isolated housing settlements and dorms and whose contact is strictly monitored by superior officers, political officers and KGB representatives. Frustration, shady dealings, abuse of alcohol and breaches of discipline are the results of this isolation, especially in the case of draftees, "warrant officers" and young officers.

Summary and Assessment

The "Group of Soviet Forces in Germany," which the Eastern press in a strongly trivializing manner likes to call the "vanguard of Soviet forces," represents

the largest and most combat-effective group of the Soviet armed forces, with its roughly

- 7,000 battle tanks of the most modern design,
- 6,500 armored personnel carriers (wheeled and tracked, excluding command/radio armored vehicles],
- 1,400 armored reconnaissance vehicles,
- 3,500 guns over 100 mm,
- 500 multiple rocket launchers,
- 220 ground-to-ground guided missile systems,
- 800 A.A. guided missile systems (excluding portable A.A. missile launchers),
- over 700 combat planes and
- over 350 attack helicopters.

More than twice as strong and more modernly equipped than its host garrison country's armed forces, the "National People's Army" of the GDR, it has made certain--along with the Soviet troops stationed in the CSSR, Poland and Hungary--for more than four decades that the outlying countries acquired by the Soviet Union in the course of the Second World War remain politically, militarily and economically under Moscow's hegemony and that the communist regimes established in this forward area stay inviolable, whatever the populace may think of them. Even in the security thinking of a Soviet leadership not concerned with military expansion, the GSFG represents the cornerstone of a broad advance security zone which, on the basis of historical experiences--from the Tartars to Hitler--is considered the best and virtually indispensable protection of their heartland. Moreover, this strong concentration of forces in East Germany and the special rights in Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany (military missions in all three of the former Western occupation zones) handed down to its supreme command from the occupation period symbolize the Soviet claim to a right to a say in matters in all of Germany.

If the Soviet Union should decide to attack Western Europe, the GSFG would form the spearhead of this attack. It is assumed in the West that the GSFG's armies--reinforced by the forces of the "Northern Group of Forces" and including the NVA and parts of the Polish People's Army -- would then form the nucleus of two fronts, a "northern front" and a "western front" which, along with a "southwestern front" formed from the "Central Group of Forces" and elements of the Czechoslovakian People's Army and supported by the Baltic Fleet and the USSR's strategic air forces, would take up the attack as a "First Strategic Echelon." Their targets of attack could be the Danish Straits, the North Sea ports and the Rhine crossings. The ground forces of the GSFG, with their heavily armored, highly mobile combat troops, their artillery with heavy firepower, their dense, mobile antiaircraft screen and the extensive river-crossing resources of their engineers, are optimally structured and equipped for this mission. The logistical difficulties resulting from their long, vulnerable supply lines are compensated for by a multitude of advance dumps. Through them the GSFG's units have a period of logistical extension of about two months.

The GSFG's air forces, which--depending on the situation--could be reinforced by tactical units from Poland and the Soviet Union, as well as forces of strategic aircraft, are sufficiently strong to protect both their own combat

troops and their rear areas, as well as their assaults, by direct and indirect air attack operations deep into the NATO area. Their qualitative inferiority, which has so far been compensated for by quantity, is at the same time being reduced more and more by the adoption of Western technologies.

[FOOTNOTES]

(1) In the GDR the Group has been called the "Group of Soviet Armed Forces in Germany" (GSSD) [i.e. German abbreviation] since the 1970's. No particular significance can be attributed to this change of designation, since the original Soviet designation has remained unchanged since 1954. The Russian word "Voyska," which underlies the designation, is predominantly translated as "troops" [tr note: and in English also as "forces" in this case] (cf "Air Defense Troops [forces]," "Strategic Rocket Troops [missile forces]," and many others; but it can also be translated as "armed forces."

(2) The "Military Encyclopedic Dictionary" of the USSR Defense Ministry (Moscow, 1983) dates the renaming with regard to the "founding of the GDR state" back to the year 1949 and thus contradicts all other--including Eastern--sources.

(3) The GDR party and military press launched the attempt to introduce the designation "Group of Soviet Armed Forces in the GDR" in April of 1985, but only a few days later was corrected by the Soviet side (see issue 6/85, p. 369).

(4) "Agreement between the government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on questions which are connected with the temporary stationing of Soviet armed forces on the territory of the German Democratic Republic" of 12 March 1957.

(5) This involved the 18th Guards Armored Army, whose headquarters was at Forst in Lower Lusatia.

(6) The 16th Tactical Air Army was for many years erroneously identified in the West as the 24th Tactical Air Army.

(7) See issue 2/80, p.80.

(8) The abbreviation SPETSNAZ is derived from the Soviet (cover) term "Voyska Spetsnialnogo Naznachenya," i.e. "Troops for Special Application [Assignment]." These troops are roughly equivalent to the "Special Forces" and Commando units of the American and British armed forces. The Soviet SPETSNAZ forces are to be deployed in small, well-camouflaged groups in the enemy's rear areas and here support the conventional forces' attack by destroying, immobilizing and reconnoitering. It is assumed that a SPETSNAZ brigade can deploy up to 80 squads, a SPETSNAZ company up to 10 squads.

(9) See issue 1/85, p. 26.

(10) According to data of the U.S. Department of Defense in "Soviet Military Power 1986," a Soviet ground-to-ground guided missile brigade in the military district of Belorussia was first equipped with operationally capable SS-23/SPIDER's (range about 500 km) in 1985. The introduction of the SS-23/SPIDER in the GSFG and other "groups of forces" is not expected until the rearmament is completed in the western military districts of the USSR.

(11) See issue 5/86, p. 256.

(12) "Assault army" [tr note: "Shock Army" is possibly a better translation for the original German "Stossarmee," which in turn is probably translation of the Russian "Udarnaya Armiya"] is a traditional designation. It was applied in the Second World War to five especially well-equipped armies which were deployed at main points of attack. The 3rd Assault Army, which was formed in December of 1941, took part in the attack on Berlin in 1945 and has since then remained under this designation in the GDR. According to type, it is an armored army. The addition of "Guards" before the unit designations is also a war tradition. The title is not bestowed in peacetime.

(13) By way of contrast, the Bundeswehr and Allied armed forces have only 17 training sites with a total area of 1,450 square kilometers in the Federal Republic of Germany. As a comparison: The U.S. training site at Grafenwoehr in the Upper Palatinate, the second largest in the Federal Republic, has a size of 234 square kilometers.

(14) An exception is Romania, which does not allow any exercises on its territory and sends only officer delegations to the WP exercises.

The National People's Army

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 11 Nov 86 pp 640-667

[Article by Lt Col (Retired) Guenter Lippert: "30 Years of the National People's Army. Four Decades of the GDR's 'Armed Organs'"]

[Text] No debate on rearmament took place either in public or in the people's representative body. No trade unionists took to the streets and no delegate of the opposition called the head of government a satrap of the occupation power. On the contrary: The people's representatives "arose from their seats with heavy applause as the speaker of parliament called for a vote. The bill on the creation of the National People's Army [NVA] had been adopted unanimously and took effect upon its promulgation." Delegate Karl Wuensche of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD) had even previously declared that the army also protects the vital interests of the middle classes. This is what occurred in the GDR People's Chamber on 18 January 1956, and this could be read in the LDPD newspaper DER MORGEN of 18/19 January 1986.

A debate in the People's Chamber, votes against the bill and demonstration marches against rearmament would also have been unrealistic, for that which was so pseudodemocratically passed there had in reality already existed for a

long time. The infant who was supposedly raised from the baptismal font was soon already standing for confirmation and had only been rebaptized! In reality, about 110,000 men were already under arms in the GDR and the most important main administrations of the ministry had already been at work for a long time when the "bill on the creation of the National People's Army and the Ministry for National Defense" (MfNV) was passed. And the one who justified the draft bill before the People's Chamber did so quite insolently in the uniform of a colonel general. It was Willi Stoph, at that time minister of the interior and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, who subsequently became the first minister for national defense, and who up to then had been the chief of the "rechristened infant," the so-called "Billeted People's Police" (KVP).

The buildup of communist German armed forces had actually already started around a decade before the "unanimous" resolution in the People's Chamber. The Soviet Union, which proclaimed at the top of its voice that it--and only it--was strictly adhering to the Potsdam Resolutions on the demilitarization of Germany, was de facto doing just the opposite. Soviets and German communists in exile in the "League of German Officers" and the "National Committee of Free Germany" had already picked out from among the German soldiers who had been taken prisoners of war by the Soviets those whom they considered suitable to be useful to them in building up such armed forces. Among them were, inter alia, former Wehrmacht generals Martin Lattmann, Arno von Lenski, Vinzenz Mueller and Hans Wulz, who then collaborated vigorously in building up the NVA. Also among them were those young former Wehrmacht officers who, in the second half of 1949 returned from the Soviet camps as "students with experience of life" and at the Frankfurt/Oder transit camp were already quite unabashedly approached and asked whether--instead of lying around the streets unemployed and ostracized--they wanted to utilize their Wehrmacht experiences as officers in the People's Police.

The first step for the buildup of communist armed forces was the order of the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) of 31 December 1946 on forming German border police units as auxiliary organs of the SMAD. The present "Border Troops of the GDR"--renamed and reassigned several times--emerge from them (see also [original] p. 662). The first billeted police alert units, as well as combat training and officers' schools, were set up starting in the summer of 1948 under the then "German Administration of the Interior" as the first forerunners of the actual "National People's Army." They at first came under a "Main Department of Border Police and Alert Units," whose director and "chief inspector" was later NVA General Hermann Rentsch. In 1949 the billeted alert units and schools were assigned to their own "Administration for Training," and the border police to their own "Main Administration of Border Police." Wilhelm Zaisser, the minister for state security who later fell out of favor, now took over the post of chief inspector, Heinz Hoffmann became his deputy. The strength of the "armed organs" in the allegedly so thoroughly demilitarized Soviet occupation zone was now about 50,000 men.

The "Training Administration" was expanded and renamed "Main Administration for Training" (HVA) after the founding of the GDR state in October of 1949. The HVA was officially assigned the task "of training cadres for protecting the workers' and peasants' power." The People's Police (VP) Alert Units thus

had a double mission: They were to train noncommissioned officers for further expanding the army's predecessor as well as being available as operational alert units. The officers training, however, was done at the VP Schools and advanced officers training at the Higher VP Schools. The Soviets were always present: "At the request of the GDR state leadership, Soviet advisers stood by the side of the HVA's leadership cadres in order to support them in all questions on the buildup of the VP Alert Units and schools." (Footnote 1)

Heinz Hoffmann, Wilhelm Zaisser's former deputy, succeeded him as director of the HVA and inspector general of the VP in April of 1950. The organizational structure of the HVA already corresponded to that of the later MfNV. Several "chief inspectors," such as the chief of staff (ex-Wehrmacht general) Vinzenz Mueller, the director of the "Polit-Culture" Department and the directors of the "cadre" (personnel), inspections and supply departments were under the inspector general.

While Heinz Hoffmann continued to devote himself to building up the ground forces, the veteran communist Waldemar Verner was already assigned by the GDR government in early 1950 to build up a "sea police," thus the future naval forces. The "Main Administration for Sea Police" was officially founded on 15 June 1950 after the first minesweepers were delivered by the Soviets. Shortly thereafter, on 1 July 1950, an "ad hoc department" within the HVA commenced the works on building up an "air police." Their first training facilities were concealed as "aero-clubs."

In early 1951, thus half a year before the start of the buildup of the Federal Border Guard in the Federal Republic of Germany, the People's Police units and schools under the HVA had a strength of about 78,000 men; and together with the sea police, border police and the transportation police, who were sometimes also billeted, about 88,000 men were under arms in the GDR.

In 1952--Willi Stoph had in the meantime become minister of the interior--the SED's 2nd Party Conference decided to "develop the VP formations into the Billeted People's Police (KVP)" (Footnote 2), which no doubt was supposed to mean that training and outfitting this "police" was to be organized even more heavily according to military requirements. The members of the force, officially designated as KVP as of 1 July 1952, also wore military ranks starting in October of 1952 and now received olive-colored uniforms in place of their former blue police uniforms. And in these uniforms they opened the "Demonstration of the Working People on the 3rd Anniversary of the GDR" in East Berlin, which was in violation of the city's status. Even before that, on 7 August 1952, a government resolution had founded the "Society for Sports and Technology" (GST), which was to attract young people for the new armed forces and conduct their premilitary training. The "Sea Police," which were renamed the "VP-Sea" yet in 1952, were incorporated into the KVP.

The popular uprising of 17 June 1953 led to a setback for the further expansion of the KVP. The Soviets evidently doubted the reliability of the new ally and put down the uprising with their own troops. The KVP had to stay in their barracks, and 12,000 men were dismissed from its ranks in the subsequent purges. The KVP's expansion was further continued in 1954/55, its armament and equipment improved and "the training brought more heavily closer

to military interests." (Footnote 3) Organizationally, the composition of the KVP units, already structured into regiments, was carried on into divisions.

By a constitutional amendment passed in September of 1955, "service for the protection of socialist achievements" was declared "the honorable duty of all citizens of the GDR" and in September/October of 1955 the KVP carried out its first big maneuver, concealed as a "review exercise," in the area of Cottbus, right on the eastern edge of the GDR. Shortly afterwards, the SED and the mass organizations directed by it organized a "people's initiative" based on the tried and tested communist model. According to the official GDR account, "in the first half of January, over 1,600 written declarations of will from collectives and a further 1,700 telegrams and telexes demanding the creation of national armed forces reached the People's Chamber of the GDR." (Footnote 4) Small wonder that the government, urged by the "people" to such an extent, could not resist the demand "of the masses" and by statute of 18 January 1956 now converted its 110,000 men, who had already been placed under arms as a precautionary measure in anticipation of the people's will, into the "National People's Army." As could be later read in the "Chronological Table on the Military History of the GDR," things now also happened one after the other thanks to good preparation:

- Minister of the Interior Willi Stoph took over the post of defense minister just a day after the statute was passed, and on 10 February 1956 issued "MfNV Order 1/56," the organizational order for the NVA.

- The MfNV, the staffs of the air and naval forces as well as the of the North (V) and South (III) Military Districts started their activity already on 1 March 1956.

- The activation of the 1st Mechanized Division was concluded in Potsdam on 30 April 1956, the division swore its oath, and on 1 May 1956 the NVA paraded for the first time with BTR-152 armored personnel carriers and PPSH-41 submachine guns from Soviet "fraternal aid" in East Berlin.

- The 4th and 8th Infantry Divisions were activated in June of 1956, and in August/September 1956 the 7th and 9th Armored Divisions, which were at first mainly equipped with T-34/85 battle tanks.

- They were followed by the activation of the 6th and 11th Motorized Rifle Divisions in October to December 1956. The 1st Mechanized Division as well as the 4th and 8th Infantry Divisions were at the same time renamed motorized rifle divisions and reequipped.

Furthermore, 16 NVA officers schools were set up in late 1956, according to official GDR statements. (Footnote 5)

After a whole seven divisions (Footnote 6) and schools for new personnel had been conjured up with such uncanny speed within barely a year, the "Chronological Table on the Military History of the GDR" was able to announce with complete cynicism that the KVP was disbanded in late 1956. Minister Willi Stoph had already in early October of the same year confirmed in an order of the day that the NVA was activated. But, besides the name, only the

uniform is new: It is again field gray, and so--even in its cut--actually again the old one, namely that of the Wehrmacht, including sleeve patches on the dress coat, silver "piston rings" for company sergeants major, parade belts, honor daggers and riding pants for officers, as well as red trouser stripes for the "comrade generals." Even the steel helmet is not as new as it seems and not at all taken over from the Soviets, as many think: It was developed as early as 1944 as Model B/ii by the Wehrmacht's Army Ordnance Office, but was rejected by Hitler. (Footnote 7) With its appearance image, it also hardly prevents the youngest of the people's armies from arousing bad memories among the eastern neighbors. The rest is then routine:

- In August of 1957 the NVA carried out its first joint exercise with the GSFG, involving about 11,000 men, predominantly from the 1st Motorized Rifle Division.
- In May of 1958 the "Political Advisory Committee" of the WP organization decided to include the NVA in the Unified Armed Forces of the WP, by which the GDR defense minister became one of the representatives of the WP supreme command.
- The first macabre test for the NVA followed in August of 1961: together with Soviet troops it secured the construction of the Berlin Wall in "2nd echelon" behind the "combat groups of the workers' class" and the alert police (the 1st Motorized Rifle Division from Potsdam and the 8th Motorized Rifle division from Schwerin were involved in this).
- In January of 1962--after wall and strengthened border security made escape from the GDR almost impossible--universal military service was introduced (period of service 18 months).
- In August of 1962 the Soviet army handed over its garrison headquarters in East Berlin to the NVA, which now sets up a "City Commandant of the Capital of the GDR."
- In October of 1964 the NVA, in the parade on the day to celebrate the founding of the state, showed for the first time that it is also equipped with delivery means for nuclear weapons: it presented the FROG-1 and SCUD A ground-to-ground missile systems in East Berlin; its parade, the largest up to that time, already lasted 45 minutes.
- The second macabre test for the NVA followed in October of 1968: The 7th Armored Division from Dresden and the 11th Motorized Rifle Division from Halle marched along with GSFG units into the CSSR and stifled the attempt to build up a democratic socialism there--30 years after Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia.

After so much proof of its reliability, the NVA was also then allowed to assume a proxy role for Moscow in the countries of the Third World. Since the early 1970's, GDR military delegations have been regularly travelling around the countries of Africa, the Near East and Far East which are supported by the Soviet Union and arranging for aid in equipment and training. According to data of the "Military Balance," there were about 2,500 NVA advisers and

trainers in such countries in 1985, the bulk of them in Angola, Ethiopia and Libya.

The "Little Differences"

Outwardly, the "National People's Army" is an army like any other: modernly equipped, structured according to operational criteria, hierarchically organized and subject to the principle of command and obedience. It is even snappier and more disciplined, harder drilled and "more soldierly" than many others in the East and West, which in the East earned it the reputation of a "model boy" and in the West the designation "the red Prussians." Before we go into these "hard facts," two important peculiarities which distinguish the NVA --as well as the Soviet army and the other "people's" armies--quite fundamentally from Western armies must be stressed.

The "Army of the People" is the Army of the Party

While traditional and in particular Western armies are committed to a constitution, a ruling house or the elected government, and not to a world philosophy or party, this is completely different in the case of the NVA, in spite of the compulsory military service which is in effect for all citizens of the GDR. As is already shown by the fact that all soldiers are addressed by the party title "comrade," the NVA is not the army of all the people, but the army of a party which claims that it is the "vanguard and leader of a class, the workers' class." Proceeding from Lenin's principle of the "leadership of the armed forces by the party," the communist party of Germany (Footnote 8), operating under the misleading designation "Socialist Unity Party of Germany," saw to it from the very beginning that all "armed organs" of the state--the name they also always bear or bore--are subject to constant political control by the party and that all its members, including the conscripts, are incessantly indoctrinated in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. The first personnel measure for carrying through this leadership claim of the SED was having all crucial positions of leadership in the VP and KVP already held by veteran communists, and having middle- and low-level positions occupied--through massive recruitment and "party order"--by members of the SED and the FDJ communist youth organization.

The structure of the NVA's political monitoring and educational system organizationally corresponds exactly to the Soviet model and is a specific feature of all communist armies. The NVA and other non-Soviet WP armies were only spared the system of "double leadership," i.e. the double command authority of commanding officer and political commissar (see issue 11/85, p. 678), which was not definitively abolished until the Second World War. The system is based on two pillars:

- the so-called "politorgans" [political organs] set up at all leadership levels according to position plan, and
- the organizations of the SED and FDJ members, existing independently of them at all leadership levels.

Included in the politorgans are the "deputy chiefs/commanders in political affairs" (political deputies) at the company/battery, battalion and regimental level, the political departments at the division level, the political

administrations at the level of the military districts and service component commands and finally the NVA's Political Main Administration in the MfNV, which has the status of a department of the CC [Central Committee] of the SED. These politorgans are not elected, but appointed. The political deputies and chiefs of the political departments/administrations are superiors of all military men of the leadership level in question. They are on the one hand subordinate to the military superior officer, but at the same time "technically"--and with their own chain of command and channel of reporting--also to the superior politorgan.

The SED and FDJ organizations are formed by the party and FDJ members serving in the units and on the staffs. The secretaries, i.e. the chairmen of the base organizations, are "elected" on the recommendation of the superior party body according to the principles of "democratic centralism." The base organizations send their delegates to the conferences of delegates at the divisional, military district and service component level, to the "conference of delegates of the party organizations of the SED and/or FDJ in the NVA" and finally--hand-picked--to the SED party congresses. In this way a separate "official party channel"--in addition to the military channel and the "technical channel"--arises via through the party secretaries of the various organizations. All three channels run converge in the person of the general secretary of the SED--at the same time chairman of the Council of State and chairman of the National Defense Council.

The other parties formally allowed in the GDR, which lead a phantom existence, such as, for example, the (East) CDU and the NDPD, typically do not maintain any separate party organizations in the NVA, let alone possessing their own politorgans.

The 14 January 1958 "Resolution of the Politburo of the SED CC" on the "role of the party in the National People's Army," a resolution which is still authoritative today, says on the one hand:

"Every commanding officer, every superior must be aware that he is primarily a political functionary and carries out his work by order of the party of the working class."

But, on the other hand, according to this resolution:

"Separate management in the army, the unity of political and military leadership through the collective consultation of all important political and military measures of the commanding officers with the party managements and in the military councils is to be guaranteed."

And the politorgans are "to direct particular attention to the improvement of the content of the political and ideological education of the army members."

But at the same time also:

"The party organizations have the right at party meetings to critically assess the results of the education and training, the state of operational alertness

and the professional activity of all officers, as well as to make recommendations for improving the work."

Although the commanding officers, who are almost exclusively SED members or candidates, thus are to regard themselves primarily as political functionaries, they are to consult with the politorgans and have to let themselves be critically judged at meetings of the party organizations. The question is therefore brought up about the efficiency of party work in the NVA. The still requisite "control of the controllers" suggests that the party propaganda can indeed be "prayed back" formally by anyone, but has not brought about any real motivation. It should not be overlooked, though, that through their control function, through the lasting organization of competition as well as by bringing about "voluntary self-commitment" of individual soldiers and self-contained troop units, political officers and party functionaries also contribute to improving the status of training and thereby raising the combat effectiveness of the troops. At the same time, to be able to "sell" the "socialist ideals" with a minimum of credibility, they have to act against deficiencies, injustices and harassments, and thereby also make use of the soldiers to a certain extent.

The "Armed Organs" in Party and State

The position of the NVA and the other "armed organs" in party and state is also fundamentally different from conventional, in particular, Western armies. Conforming to Soviet custom, the top duty positions in the NVA are coupled with corresponding positions in the party bodies. Army General Heinz Kessler, the defense minister, is now a member -- as was Heinz Hoffmann formerly -- of the highest and crucial body, the Politburo of the SED, although he was not even a candidate of the Politburo before his rise to minister. However, Kessler has been a member of the 150-person Central Committee (CC) and the former SED Party Executive since 1946. The following from the ranks of the NVA generals also have seats on the Central Committee: (Footnote 9)

- Lieutenant General Horst Bruenner, Chief of the Polit-HV [Political Main Administration];
- Admiral Wilhelm Ehm, chief of the NVA People's Navy;
- Colonel General Horst Stechbart, chief of the NVA ground forces; and
- Colonel General Fritz Strelitz, chief of the Main Staff of the NVA and secretary of the National Defense Council. (Footnote 10)

The following belong to the CC as candidates who are not entitled to vote:

- Lieutenant General Klaus-Dieter Baumgarten, chief of the Border Troops; and
- Colonel General Wolfgang Reinhold, chief of the NVA Air Force/Air Defense.

The military is also represented in the "Central Party Control Commission" and the "Central Revision Commission." Lieutenant General Martin Pahnke is a candidate of the former and Major General Wolfgang Conrad a member of the latter. Soldiers of lower ranks of the "People's Army" are not represented in the leadership bodies of the SED, which leads the "first German workers' and peasants' state."

But the NVA is not only represented in the party bodies, but also in the state apparatus:

- Lieutenant General Wolfgang Neidhardt sits as deputy chairman on the State Planning Commission,
- Major General Gerhard Schoenherr as deputy minister in the Ministry for Foreign Trade,
- Lieutenant General Fritz Ludwig as deputy minister in the Ministry for Construction Industry,
- Lieutenant General Dr. Klaus Henkes as deputy minister in the Ministry for Transportation and general director of the state airline company INTERFLUG,
- Major General Lothar Penndorf in the GDR's [ministry of] Justice as vice president of the Supreme Court of the GDR and Lieutenant General Alfred Leiber and Major General Ernst Kirke as military chief prosecutor and deputy.

But the NVA is only one--even though the largest--of the "armed organs" of the GDR. The following are also military men:

- the minister of the interior and chief of the German People's Police, Army General Fritz Dickel, born 1913 (!) and his deputies, Lieutenant Generals Guenter Giel, Werner Reuther and Karl-Heinz Wagner, as well as Major Generals Hartwig Mueller, Karl-Heinz Schmalfuss and Lothar Ahrendt;
- the minister for state security, army general Erich Mielke, born 1907 (!) and his deputies, Colonel General Marcus Wolf and Lieutenant Generals Rudolf Mittig and Gerhard Neiber.

"Comrade Army General" Mielke of the "VEB [People's Own Enterprise] Listen, Look and Grab" (GDR nickname for the MfS) also represents state security in the Politburo; Lieutenant General Mittig and a Major General Dr Horst Felber represent it in the CC, of which Army General Dickel is also a member.

It goes without saying that the above-mentioned names show only the "tip of the iceberg," for the military's influence reaches much further. Finally, Willi Stoph, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, is also an NVA army general, even though he no longer carries this rank today. There is an estimated total of over 150 men in the GDR general officers corps.

The Army Without a Nation

But one thing distinguishes the NVA not only from Western armies, but also from the other WP armies: The "National People's Army"--unlike the Bulgarian, Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian people's armies and even unlike the army of the multiethnic state of the Soviet Union, which is primarily still a Russian army--lacks the nation whose existence the internationalist SED does not want to admit. The army of the SED state therefore does not bear the ethnic adjective "German" and cannot use it either, because two thirds of the German people do not serve in its ranks and because a large part of the third of the German people who must serve in it perform this service only unwillingly. The GDR is desperately trying to compensate for this lack. Intellectually it usurps all the parts of German history that can be fit into the Marxist historical picture: from the peasant wars of the 16th century through the wars of liberation against Napoleon and the Prussian army reforms up to the resistance against Hitler, insofar as it came from the left. At

the same time it tries to convey the impression that sins of German history are to be represented only by the other Germans.

In appearance and manner, as well as by its interconnection with party and state, the NVA and other "armed organs" of the GDR personify in a virtually exemplary way that militarism that they profess to be fighting. With Prussian goose step, resounding mountings of the guard and martial parades, with an inestimable flood of decorations for performance, medals, orders and honorary banners, with innumerable titles, honorary names and battle slogans, they overshadow everything which has gone before. The "Dictionary on German Military History," published at the GDR's military publishing house, very accurately explains that "militarism is as a matter of priority based on military force, permeates all spheres of social life and subordinates all of society to its goals."

The Top Leadership

The "National Defense Council" is the supreme state organ of leadership for national defense and thereby for the National People's Army and the Border Troops of the GDR. This body, which has existed since 1960, is responsible for the central management of all defense and security measures. The chairman of the National Defense Council is elected formally by the People's Chamber, its at least 12 members are appointed by the Council of State. The chairman's post belongs de facto to the general secretary of the SED and chairman of the Council of State and accordingly has been held by Erich Honecker, who thus is in practice also the supreme commander of the NVA, since 1971, when he succeeded Walter Ulbricht. It has so far never been announced who the 12 appointed members are. It is certain that they include the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph, the secretary of the Politburo responsible for security issues, Egon Krenz, as well as the ministers for national defense, state security and the interior. The secretary of the Defense Council is Fritz Streletz, who at the same time is deputy minister for national defense and chief of staff of the NVA.

Ministry for National Defense

The Ministry for National Defense is the supreme military organ of leadership for the NVA and the Border Troops of the GDR. Army General Heinz Hoffmann headed it 25 years, from 1960 until his death in 1985. The veteran communist Hoffmann, who had acquired his military experience as a battalion commander and commissar in the "International Brigades" during the Spanish civil war, was decisively involved in building up the NVA as "inspector general of the VP" and chief of the "HV [Main Administration] for Training," but first left the ministerial office to Willi Stoph and had to content himself with the post of the "chief of the main staff." When in 1982 the GDR introduced the rank of a "field marshal of the GDR," which can be bestowed "in a state of defense or for extraordinary accomplishments," it was generally assumed that Hoffmann would bear this title right away. But this honor remained denied to him even on his 75th birthday. Evidently the agitator Hoffmann did not fit so wholly into state and party chief Honecker's concept which was aimed at reducing tensions instead. Army General Heinz Kessler has been at the head of the NVA since Hoffmann's death. Kessler, born in 1920, deserted to the Red Army as a

Wehrmacht soldier in 1941, was cofounder of the "National Committee of Free Germany" and its "front representative." He began his NVA career as chief of the VP-Air and NVA Air Force/Air Defense respectively. He was later Hoffmann's successor as chief of the Main Staff and finally chief of the Political Main Administration of the NVA. The over 66-year old trained mechanic will probably be the last veteran communist at the head of the NVA.

The "chiefs" of the four main administrations of the Ministry for National Defense, the "chiefs" of the NVA's three service components and the "chief" of the Border Troops of the GDR bear the title of "deputy ministers for national defense." The director of the "Main Administration for Civil Defense," which is assigned to the Ministry for National Defense, does not bear this title. The GDR no longer uses the differentiation between "first deputy" minister and simple "deputy," which is customary in the Soviet Union. (Footnote 11)

The Ministry for National Defense is organized along the Soviet pattern into the following four "main administrations" (HV):

- Main Staff
- Political Main Administration
- Main Administration for Technology and Armament
- Main Administration for Rear Services

Added to these are a multitude of independent "administrations" and "departments."

Main Staff

The general staff of the NVA, modestly called the "Main Staff," is the militarily most important main department of the ministry. It is responsible for overall operational planning and deployment, operational readiness and military communications within the framework of the directives of the supreme commander of the Unified Forces of the WP. It is furthermore responsible for organization, recruiting and replacement and other tasks overlapping the armed forces service components, such as military transportation and communications. The chief of the Main Staff has since early 1979 been Colonel General Fritz Streletz, born 1926, who went into the FDJ after returning from Soviet captivity as a prisoner of war, and who joined the People's Police as a sergeant in 1948. Streletz is a graduate of the "Academy of the General Staff" of the Soviet armed forces.

Political Main Administration [Polit-HV]

The Polit-HV is doubtlessly the most influential main administration of the Ministry for National Defense. It guides and monitors the NVA's political orientation and is responsible for the training and education of NVA members within the context of Marxism-Leninism. It controls all spheres of the armed forces in two special channels and has decisive influence on the filling of leadership positions via the "deputy commanders for political affairs," who are selected by it and trained under its direction, and the SED and FDJ organizations--subordinate to it in its capacity as party agency--at all headquarters and troop units of the NVA. Lieutenant General Horst Bruenner, born 1929, is the first chief at the top of this main administration to come

out of the SED after Heinz Kessler's rise to minister. Bruenner, a trained industrial manager, joined the People's Police in 1948. He was trained as a political officer, "rebaptized" as an NVA officer and in the mid-1960's was director of the political administration of the then NVA border troops. As a major general, he was director of the political administration of Military District III (Leipzig) in 1971/72 and from 1972 deputy chief for organizational work in the Political Main Administration of the Ministry for National Defense. Bruenner has already been a candidate of the SED CC since 1976.

Main Administration for Rear Services

The Main Administration for Rear Services plans and organizes support for the NVA's component forces and is responsible for training the logistics troops, thus the "services." At the head of it until recently was Lieutenant General Joachim Goldbach, who was promoted to colonel general in March of 1986 and now has taken over the post of the chief of the "Main Administration for Technology and Armament," Colonel General Werner Fleissner, who died in late 1985. Lieutenant General Manfred Graetz, who formerly commanded Military District III, became Goldbach's successor as chief of the Main Administration for Rear Services.

Main Administration for Technology and Armament

The Main Administration for Technology and Armament, now headed by Colonel General Joachim Goldbach, born 1929, a graduate of the Soviet Academy of Armored Troops and the Academy of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, is responsible for the procurement and development of weapons and equipment. Through its representative in the State Planning Commission, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Neidhardt, inter alia, it sees to it that major items of equipment planned for the civilian sphere, such as, for example, motor vehicles, ships and construction machinery, are developed in such a manner that they can also be utilized militarily in case of war. The Main Administration for Technology and Armament also directs the so-called "Neuerer Movement," with whose assistance military materiel is supposed to be developed or improved in a cost-effective manner.

Main Inspectorate

A "Main Inspectorate" is also a part of the Ministry for National Defense, in a manner similar to the defense ministry of the USSR. Lieutenant General Heinz Handke, former chief of Military District III, Leipzig, is currently main inspector of the NVA. While yet a "group of inspector generals" is established under Army General Govorov in the Soviet Armed Forces, equivalent NVA inspectors have so far not been known. Apparently also in the case of the NVA, this post (or these posts?) involves a way of "pushing aside" deserving, but no longer fully usable, generals, rather than involving active inspectors as in the Bundeswehr.

The Troops of the Ministry for National Defense and the NVA's Central Installations

The Ministry for National Defense has directly under it a number of units which deal with tasks overlapping the component services or which directly support the Ministry for National Defense. Among them are:

- the "Fritz Grosse" Communications Brigade (NVA: Intelligence Brigade ["Nachrichtenbrigade"]) stationed at Niederlehme near Berlin;
- the Communications Intelligence Battalion (NVA: [special-purpose] Radio Technical Battalion ["Funktechnisches Aufklaerungsbataillon"] in Dessau;
- the "Bruno Schramm" and "Erich Steinfurth" Railway/Bridge-Building Engineer Regiments stationed in the Doberlug-Kirchhain/Luckau area in Lower Lusatia;
- the "Robert Siewert" Road-Building Engineer Regiment stationed at Neu-Seddin near Beelitz (south of Potsdam);
- the "Hugo Eberlein" Guard Regiment of the Ministry for National Defense, stationed at Eggersdorf;
- the "Theodor Winter" Motor Vehicle Battalion of the Ministry for National Defense, stationed at Strausberg, as well as
- the "Augustin Sandter," "Peter Lambertz" and "Rudolf Axen" Construction Engineer Components (NVA: Engineer Construction Components), which involve special units for carrying out military building projects, as, for instance, the expansion of the Mukran ferry port on the island of Ruegen, or state construction projects of particular urgency.

Also directly under the Ministry for National Defense is the "Berlin City Garrison Headquarters" with the "Friedrich Engels" Berlin Guard Regiment, which every week celebrates the "mounting of the guard" at the Neue Wache--built by Schinkel in 1818--in East Berlin, which has been transformed into a "memorial of the sacrifice to fascism and militarism."

The following are subordinate to the Ministry for National Defense as joint service component military educational establishments:

- the "Friedrich Engels" Military Academy in Dresden, which, as the GDR's highest military educational establishment, has the task of training the middle and higher officers corps of all service components of the NVA and the Border Troops of the GDR in assignment-oriented and advanced training courses, and which at the same time is supposed to be the center for military science research;
- the "Wilhelm Pieck" Politico-Military Affairs College in Berlin-Gruenau, at which the political officers and party officials of all service components of the NVA as well as of the Border Troops and Civil Defense of the GDR are given advanced training and at which also the officers earmarked for highest military uses can acquire their "Marxist-Leninist qualification," thus receive the finishing touch;
- the Military Medical Academy in Bad Saarow;
- the Military Medical Section at the Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University in Greifswald, and
- the Section for Military Transportation and Communications at the "Friedrich List" College for Transport and Communications in Dresden.

Most important central establishments of the Ministry for National Defense and the NVA are:

- the "Central Orchestra of the NVA,"
- the "Central Military Hospital of the NVA" in Bad Saarow,
- the Military History Institute of the GDR in Potsdam,
- the Military Publishing House of the GDR in East Berlin,
- the Army Film Studio on Berlin-Biesdorf.

The "Herbert Jensch" Military Technical School in Frankfurt/Oder, which originated in September of 1984 out of the "Communications Training Center" of the same name, is probably also a training establishment of all the armed forces. The school has the task of training student warrant officers of all service components in two-year courses and enabling professional noncommissioned officers of the signal corps to enter the warrant officer career track after a one-year course.

The NVA Ground Forces

The NVA Ground Forces currently have a strength of around 125,000 men. They thus have a quarter larger size of personnel than the Reichswehr of the undivided German Reich according to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty! The ground forces, which were originally managed directly by the Ministry for National Defense, have since December of 1972 been under the "Ground Forces Command"--newly formed at that time--in Potsdam-Geltow. This command is responsible for training and equipment. The chief of the Command and deputy minister for national defense has since 1972 been Colonel General Horst Stechbarth, born 1925, who voluntarily went into the People's Police as an FDJ member in 1949 and first appeared in 1956 as deputy commander of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division. The following are directly under the Command:

- the "Willi Saenger" Paratroop Battalion, which has been stationed at Lehmen near Potsdam since 1984 (previously Prora on Ruegen), and which is mainly equipped and trained for commando operations in the enemy's rear;
- the "Artur Woelk" Guard Battalion of the Ground Forces Command in Potsdam-Geltow, and
- the Headquarters Music Corps of the Ground Forces Command.

The higher command staffs subordinate to the Command are Military District ["Militaerbezirk"] Command III and Military District Command V. These military district commands are in peacetime the territorial command authorities for the NVA's troop units, offices and installations located in their area. Under them are also the NVA's 15 military district ["Wehrbezirk"] and 219 military area ["Wehrbereich"] commands responsible for recruitment and replacement. In the case of big exercises and in wartime they each eliminate--while retaining their territorial tasks--an army staff for the operational leadership of the ground forces components under them. These then each form an NVA army within the framework of the "fronts" (army groups) under Soviet leadership.

Military District (MB [for "Militaerbezirk"]) III, headquartered at Leipzig, includes the GDR's seven southern Bezirke [political districts]. It forms the

3rd (NVA) Army, which probably becomes subordinated to the Soviet "West Front" (see [original] p. 639). Included in MB III or 3rd (NVA) Army are:

- the 7th Armored Division in Dresden,
- the 4th Motorized Rifle Division in Erfurt and
- the 11th Motorized Rifle Division in Halle.

Subordinate to MB III or the 3rd (NVA) Army as combat support units are:

- Ground-to-Ground Guided Missile Brigade 3 ("Bruno Leuschner") in Hermsdorf, equipped with the SCUD-B;
- Artillery Regiment 3 ("Alfred Frank") in Leipzig, equipped with M-46 130-mm field guns and D-20 152-mm cannon howitzers;
- A.A. [antiaircraft] Rocket [i.e. missile] Brigade 3 ("Kurt Kresse"), equipped with the SA-4/GANEF A.A. guided missile system;
- Bridge-Building Engineer Regiment 3 ("Johann Philipp Becker") in Dessau, equipped with PMP collapsible floating bridges.

The "Ferdinand von Schill" Attack Helicopter Squadron in Cottbus is also operationally assigned to the 3rd (NVA) Army.

Military District V [MB 5], headquartered at Neubrandenburg, includes the seven northern Bezirks of the GDR. It forms the 5th (NVA) Army, which probably gets assigned to the Soviet "North Front" (see [original] p. 639). Included in MB V or the 5th (NVA) Army are:

- the 9th Armored Division ("Heinz Hoffmann") in Eggesin,
- the 1st Motorized Rifle Division in Potsdam and
- the 8th Motorized Rifle Division in Schwerin.


Subordinate to MB V or the 5th (NVA) Army as combat support units are:

- Ground-to-Ground Guided Missile Brigade 5 ("Bruno Leuschner") in Demen, equipped with the SCUD-B;
- Artillery Regiment 5 ("Paul Sasnowski") in Dabel, equipped with M-46 130-mm field guns and D-20 152-mm cannon howitzers;
- A.A. Rocket Brigade 5 ("Bernhard Baestlein") in Basepohl, equipped with the SA-4/GANEF A.A. guided missile system;
- Bridge-Building Engineer Regiment 5 ("Kurt Roemling") in Havelberg, equipped with PMP collapsible floating bridges.

The "Adolf von Luetzow" Attack Helicopter Regiment in Basepohl is also operationally assigned to the 5th (NVA) Army.

In addition to the units listed above, every MB [military district] or every NVA army has at its disposal an independent armored reconnaissance, tank destroyer, communications and transport battalion each, as well as an amphibian engineer battalion.

Figure 22: Disposition of the NVA Ground Forces



Major Mobilization Formations

According to Western estimates, the NVA ground forces are in the event of war capable of activating on a short-term basis at least four further combat divisions from the permanent and trainee personnel of their officers and noncommissioned officers schools, the personnel of the recruitment and replacement system and with called-up reservists. These can be equipped with arms and gear of older design, which were stockpiled in the course of the years after their replacement by more modern models. These arms and gear are still considered modern in the the NVA's understanding. The operational forces of the NVA's ground forces nearly double after an activation of these reserves: they increase from currently six to at least 10 divisions.

Structure

A distinction is made in the NVA ground forces among armed branches, special troops and services according to the pattern of the Soviet army.

Included in the armed branches are:

- the Motorized Rifle Troops (armored infantrymen), branch color: white;
- the Armored Troops, branch color: pink;
- the Airborne Troops, branch color: orange;
- the Rocket Troops and Artillery, branch color: brick red;
- the Troop Air Defense, branch color: brick red;

Special troops and services of the ground forces are:

- the Engineer Troops, branch color: black;
- the Signal Troops (communications troops), branch color: yellow;
- the Chemical Service (NBC defense force), branch color: black;
- the Rear Services (logistics troops), branch color: green;

The branch colors--as also many other features of the uniform--correspond basically to those of the Wehrmacht. The structure of the units and large formations of the NVA ground forces, on the other hand, corresponds with minor deviations to the structure of the Soviet units (see p. 627). However, the independent armored battalion is still lacking in the motorized rifle divisions, and the motorized rifle battalion (BMP) in the armored regiments of the armored divisions. The independent armored regiment is so far lacking at the army level. The combat troop units of the NVA ground forces all belong to Category I, and are thus operational in personnel and materiel at full wartime strength. Their overall strength is somewhat less than that of the Soviet units, but their manpower level higher.

Order of Battle of the NVA Ground Forces

NVA Ground Forces Command	Potsdam/Geltow
"Willi Saenger" Paratroop Battalion (6 Oct 1960)	Lehnhin/Bezirk Potsdam
"Arthur Woelk" NVA Ground Forces Command Guard Battalion (7 Dec 1971)	Potsdam/Geltow
Headquarters Music Corps of the NVA Ground Forces Command	Potsdam/Geltow
Military District III (3rd NVA Army)	Leipzig
"Otto Schwab" Ground-to-Ground Guided Missile Brigade (1 Mar 1980)	Hermsdorf
"Alfred Frank" Artillery Regiment (Oct 1968)	Leipzig
"Kurt Kresse" A.A. Rocket Brigade (unknown)	Leipzig
"Johann Philipp Becker" Bridge-Building Engineer Regiment (1 Mar 1967)	Dessau
7th Armored Division	Dresden
"Karol Swierczewski" Armored Regiment (2 Apr 1963)	Spremberg
"Paul Hornick" Armored Regiment (7 Oct 1971)	Cottbus
"Leo Jogiches" Armored Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Grossenhain
"Max Roscher" Motorized Rifle Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Marienber/Erz Mts.
Artillery regiment (name unknown)	u/i deployment

4th Motorized Rifle Division	Erfurt
"Thomas Muentzer" Motorized Rifle Regiment (unknown)	Muehlhausen
"Anton Saefkow" Motorized Rifle Regiment (7 Oct 1971)	Bad Salzungen
"John Scheer" Motorized Rifle Regiment (1 Mar 1967)	Erfurt
"August Bebel" Armored Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Gotha
"Willi Bredel" Artillery Regiment (Feb 1966)	Erfurt
11th Motorized Rifle Division	Halle
"Robert Uhrig" Motorized Rifle Regiment (1 Mar 1970?)	Bad Frankenhausen
"Fritz Weineck" Motorized Rifle Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Halle
"Otto Schlag" Motorized Rifle Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Weissenfels
"Otto Buchwitz" Armored Regiment (7 Oct 1967)	Sondershausen
Artillery regiment (name unknown)	Wolfen
Military District V (5th NVA Army)	Neubrandenburg
"Bruno Leuschner" Ground-to-Ground Guided Missile Brigade (26 Feb 1971)	Demen
"Paul Sasnowski" Artillery Regiment (1 Mar 1975)	Dabel
"Bernhard Baestlein" A.A. Rocket Brigade (28 Feb 1978)	Basepohl
"Kurt Roemling" Bridge-Building Engineer Regiment (1 Mar 1975)	Hevelberg
"Heinz Hoffmann" 9th Armored Division (24 Feb 1986)	Eggesin
"Walter Empacher" Armored Regiment (1 Mar 1972)	Eggesin/Torgelow
"Julian Marchlewski" Armored Regiment (3 Jun 1966)	Stallberg
"Soja Kosmodemjanskaja" Armored Regiment (27 Feb 1973)	Torgelow
"Rudolf Renner" Motorized Rifle Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Torgelow
"Hans Fischer" Artillery Regiment (28 Feb 1974)	Eggesin
1st Motorized Rifle Division	Potsdam
"Dr. Richard Sorge" Reconnaissance Battalion (6 Oct 1969)	Beelitz
"Paul Hegenbarth" Motorized Rifle Regiment (1 Mar 1976)	Brandenburg
"Arthur Ladwig" Motorized Rifle Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Stahnsdorf
"Hans Beimler" Motorized Rifle Regiment (Feb 1966)	Oranienburg
"Friedrich Wolf" Armored Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Beelitz
"Rudolf Gyptner" Artillery Regiment (1 Mar 1967)	Lehnitz near Oranienburg
8th Motorized Rifle Division	Schwerin
"Wilhelm Florin" Motorized Rifle Regiment (26 Feb 1971)	Rostock
"Ernst Moritz Arndt" Motorized Rifle Regiment (1 Mar 1976)	Hagenow
"Hans Kahle" Motorized Rifle Regiment (7 Oct 1975)	Buchholz near Rostock
"Artur Becker" Armored Regiment (26 Feb 1971)	Goldberg
"Erich Muehsam" Artillery Regiment (6 Oct 1969)	Rostock

Remark: The dates in parentheses indicate the date when the "honorary name," which is used publicly (without indicating location) in place of the unit number, was bestowed.

Command and Operational Principles

The command and operational principles correspond without exception to those of the Soviet army, whose command regulations were adopted. The almost slavish imitation of the big "brother-in-arms," from whom they want to "learn to be victorious," even includes the terminology, which to a great extent portrays more a stereotyped literal than conceptual rendering of Russian terms into German and is therefore often hard to understand. So, for example, the troops in a certain section "act," instead of fighting or being deployed there; radio stations are "deployed" instead of set up and the terrain is "activated" instead of radioactive. Even terms which the Russians have adopted from foreign languages are--whenever possible--used unchanged; like, for example, the "field meeting." They fall back on Wehrmacht terms only when there is no other way, as in the case of "Funkmessgeraet" (radar) and "Nachrichtentruppen" (signal troops).

Equipment

Weapons and major equipment of the NVA ground forces stem almost exclusively from Soviet production. Only some few weapons and equipment were procured from the CSSR (e.g. RM-70, TATRA-truck multiple rocket launchers) or from Poland (e.g. SL-34 wheeled loader ["Radlader"]). Domestic products of GDR industry are a number of wheeled vehicles and some special implements, in particular optical instruments and NBC information collection gear. Moreover, there are some special vehicles based on Soviet chained vehicles. Among these are the BIG-60 armored bridge-laying vehicle (NVA: bridge-laying apparatus) and the T-55TK crane tank [i.e. armored vehicle with crane]. A GDR variant of the Kalashnikov assault rifle is produced merely under Soviet license.

As for the modernness of the equipment, the NVA clearly ranks behind the Soviet army. It is thus not distinguished from the Czechoslovakian and Polish people's armies, which, however, have the advantage of independence in the case of some types of weapons because of their domestic armament industries. It is generally becoming apparent that, due to increased Soviet armament capacities, the time gap between innovations in the Soviet army and their follow-up in the NVA is getting shorter and shorter. The NVA ground forces today already have most of the modern weapons introduced into the Soviet army. Among others, they include:

- the T-72 (T-72 and T-72M versions) battle tank, about 300 of which have replaced the T-55 in the 9th Armored Division, especially in its armored regiments, and which will presumably also be supplied to the 7th Armored Division in the near future;
- the SS-21/SCARAB ground-to-ground guided missile system, with which at least the 9th Armored Division was equipped;
- the BMP-2 tracked armored personnel carrier;
- the BTR-70 wheeled armored personnel carrier;
- the 2S1 122-mm and 2S3 152-mm armored howitzers [also translatable as "self-propelled howitzers"];
- the M [model] 1974 artillery command and observation tank [i.e. armored reconnaissance vehicle];

- the SA-8b/GECKO and SA-13/GOPHER mobile A.A. guided missile systems;
- the AT-4/SPIGOT and AT-5/SPANDREL antitank guided missile systems.

Only a number of the most modern or especially secret weapon systems of the Soviet ground forces, such as the 2S5 152-mm and 2S7 (up to now M 1975) 203-mm artillery SF [expansion uncertain; possibly "self-propelled vehicle."], the 2S4 (up to now M 1975) 240-mm SF [v.s.] mortar, the M 1975 152-mm field gun and the BM-27 220-mm multiple rocket launcher, as well as the modern (ABS-T and ABS-W) river-crossing device and engineer machinery, have so far not been identified in the NVA.

Personnel and Training

The training of the conscripts, who are drafted early each May and early November, takes place in the individual troop components based on the premilitary career training in the "Society for Sports and Technology" (GST), which is detailed separately (see p. 666). It starts with four-week basic training, in the course of which the swearing-in also takes place. Three training half-years follow the general basic training. The material imparted in the first half-year is in essence repeated in the two following half-years, although with higher demands and the addition of new training areas. Conscripts can as an exception also be used for noncommissioned officers' slots when there is a lack of noncommissioned officers. They then receive an extra allowance to their military pay. But, differing from the Soviet army, the NVA as a rule does not use any conscripts in noncommissioned officers' slots, but recruits the bulk of its junior noncommissioned officers from regular volunteers with a minimum commitment time of three years. These volunteers are used not only for noncommissioned officers' slots, but also for other skilled slots, such as, for example, driver and gunner of armored tracked combat vehicles. The senior noncommissioned officer ranks [i.e. staff sergeant and up] are as a rule professional noncommissioned officers with a minimum commitment time of 10 years.

Entry into the warrant officer career track, which was inserted between the noncommissioned officer and officer career track in January of 1974 and now comprises four warrant officer ranks, is possible for professional noncommissioned officers from staff sergeant up as well as for direct applicants after training equivalent to completion of technical school.

There are four noncommissioned officers' schools available for training volunteer and professional noncommissioned officers ("Rudolf Egelhofer" in Weisswasser, "Kurt Bennewitz" in Delitzsch near Leipzig, "Max Matern" in Eggesin and "Paul Froehlich" in Zwickau), as well as the "Erich Habersaath" Military Technical School (Prora on Ruegen). The last-mentioned is intended in particular for professional noncommissioned officers and warrant officers.

The training as officers is carried out at the "Ernst Thaelmann" Ground Forces Officers' College at Loebau. Separate training detachments (NVA: sections) are available for the various armed branches, special troops and services of the ground forces, as well as for their political officers (including recently also women). The training lasts four years and concludes with the appointment as lieutenant and the bestowal of an academic degree corresponding to the

field of assignment. Volunteer soldiers with a commitment time of three years have also been trained as officers at the school since early 1973. They are appointed as second lieutenants after one year's training time and then perform another two years of service in the forces.

Assessment

The NVA ground forces form two armies which, within the framework of Soviet fronts, can be deployed without delay for independent offensive operations in the 1st Strategic Echelon. The operational units are well trained and are tightly led. Their equipment is increasingly adapted to the newest state of Soviet arms development, in which economic constraints often allow only a moderate pace of conversion. In the event of mobilization the NVA ground forces can nearly double their forces on a short-term basis with the help of a large reserve of leaders, a high number of trained reservists and stockpiled weapons.

The NVA Air Force/Air Defense

Two air divisions and an A.A. [antiaircraft] division were activated in March of 1956, at first under the independent administrations for "air force" and "air defense", from the forerunners of the current NVA Air Force/Air Defense (NVA-LSK/LV) which were concealed as aeroclubs and as air police or VP-Air. The air divisions were initially outfitted with the Soviet Yak-11/MOOSE and Yak-18A/MAX propeller fighter and training planes, which were already followed in October 1956 by the first TL [expansion unknown] fighters of the MiG-15/FAGOT type and in the summer of 1957 the first TL planes of the MiG-17 F/FRESCO C type. As regards the outfitting of the A.A. regiments, the two heavy battalions of the regiments had the M-44 85-mm A.A. gun, the light battalion the M-39 37-mm A.A. gun and the ZPU 14.5-mm A.A. machine gun. The M-49 100-mm A.A. gun and S-60 57-mm A.A. gun soon followed them.

The air divisions and A.A. divisions were combined under the NVA-LSK/LV [v.s.] Command in Strausberg-Eggersdorf in early 1957. The buildup of transport and liaison air components was started at the same time; they were outfitted with IL-14/CRATE and An-2/COLT transport planes, as well as helicopters of the Mi-4/HOUND type.

The command facilities and individual units of the NVA-LSK/LV were incorporated into the air defense system of the WP countries as early as mid-1958. In that and the following year the fighter units also received their first MiG-17 PF (Footnote 12)/FRESCO all-weather interceptors, MiG-19 S/FARMER D multipurpose combat planes and MiG-19 PM/FARMER E supersonic fighters with air-to-air guided missiles. The first A.A. units were converted to A.A. guided missile systems.

The NVA-LSK/LV took part in joint air defense exercises of the WP countries for the first time in the spring and autumn of 1961. The former air and A.A. divisions were reorganized into two mixed air defense divisions in late 1961. Each of these air defense divisions has since then comprised several fighter

wings and A.A. rocket regiments as well as a radar regiment (NVA: [special-purpose] radio technical regiment). After this reorganization, the NVA-LSK/LV was fully incorporated into the air defense system of the WP countries starting in the spring of 1962.

Order of Battle of the NVA Air Force/Air Defense

NVA Air Force/Air Defense Command	Eggersdorf
Fighter Bomber Wing 31 ("Klement Gottwald")	Drewitz
Fighter Bomber Wing 32	Laage (?)
Attack Helicopter Wing ("Adolf von Luetzow")	Basepohl
Attack Helicopter Wing ("Ferdinand von Schill")	Cottbus
Reconnaissance Squadron	u/i location
Transport Air Wing 27 ("Arthur Pieck")	Dresden
Transport Helicopter Wing ("Werner Seelenbinder")	Brandenburg-Briest
Fighter Training Wing ("Heinz Kapelle")	Bautzen
Communications Regiment	Eggersdorf
 1st Air Defense Division	 Cottbus
Fighter Wing 1 ("Fritz Schmenkel")	Cottbus
Fighter Wing 3 ("Heinrich Rau")	Preschen
Fighter Wing 7 ("Wilhelm Pieck")	Drewitz
Fighter Wing 8	Marxwalde
A.A. Rocket Regiment 14	Strassgraebchen
A.A. Rocket Regiment 16	Ladeburg near Bernau
A.A. Rocket Regiment (1)	u/i location
Radar Regiment	Cottbus
 3rd Air Defense Division	 Neubrandenburg
Fighter Wing 2	Neubrandenburg
Fighter Wing 9	Peenemuende
A.A. Rocket Regiment 13	Parchim
A.A. Rocket Regiment 15 (?)	Trollenhagen
A.A. Rocket Regiment 17	Uhlenkrug
A.A. Rocket Regiment 18	Sanitz
Radar Regiment	u/i location


(1) assignment uncertain!

Remark --

A number of the above-cited wings/regiments could not be assigned the name bestowed on them. They are:

- the "Juri Gagarin," "Hermann Matern" and "Wladimir Komarov" Fighter Wings;
- the "Ektar Andre," "Herbert Baum," "Rudolf Breitscheid," "Jaroslaw Dambrowski," "Hermann Duncker," "Werner Lamberz" and "Erich Weinert" A.A. Rocket Regiments;
- the "Konrad Wolf" and "Harro Schulze-Boysen" Communications or Radar Regiments.

Figure 49: Disposition of the NVA-LSK/LV [National People's Army -- Air Force and Air Defense



The air wings received the MiG-21 F13/FISHBED E starting in 1962, later the MiG-21 PF/FISHBED D and MiG-21 MF/FISHBED J versions. They were supplied the first MiG-23 MF/FLOGGER B fighters, as well as the first attack helicopters of the Mi-8 TB/HIP F and Mi-24/HIND D types in the 1970's. The MiG-23/FLOGGER G fighter version and the MiG-23 BM/FLOGGER F fighter bomber version were added in the early 1980's. The NVA-LSK/LV has had the first fighter bombers of the Su-22/FITTER K type since 1984/85 at the latest.

Structure and Equipment Today

The flying units of the NVA-LSK/LV today comprise a total of 12 wings and at least one independent squadron. The following are directly under the NVA-LSK/LV Command:

- two fighter bomber wings (NVA designation) with three squadrons of 10 to 12 planes each;
- two attack helicopter wings with about 35 craft each, each one of which in the event of war would presumably be put under the 3rd and 5th NVA Armies;
- a reconnaissance squadron with about 18 planes;
- a transport air wing with three squadrons and a total of about 40 planes;
- a transport helicopter wing with three squadrons of 15 craft;

A total of six fighter wings are under the two air defense divisions of the NVA-LSK/LV. The wings are organized into three squadrons of 15 planes each, plus some training planes which are also usable for combat operations. The Order of Battle shows how the fighter wings are split up into the air defense divisions. The total inventory of the flying units of the NVA-LSK/LV includes about 380 combat planes, about 70 attack helicopters, about 40 transport planes and about 45 transport helicopters.

The types of aircraft and helicopters used have changed a number of times in the last years. Existing basic types were replaced by more modern versions and completely new types were introduced as well. The following are currently in operation:

- about 300 fighter planes, mainly of the MiG-21/FISHBED type (predominantly of the MiG-21 PF/FISHBED D and MiG-21 MF/FISHBED J versions), as well as an increasing number of fighter planes of the MiG-23/FLOGGER type (predominantly of the MiG-23 MF/FLOGGER B version, but also the more modern FLOGGER G version);
- about 25 fighter bombers of the MiG-23 BM/FLOGGER F type;
- about 20 fighter bombers of the Su-22/FITTER K type;
- possible a remaining inventory of obsolete fighter bombers of the MiG-17 F/FRESCO C type;
- about 18 reconnaissance planes of the MiG-21 R/FISHBED type;
- a total of about 40 transport planes of the An-26/CURL, Tu-134/CRUSTY (VIP travel planes) and L-410 UVP types, the last-mentioned of Czechoslovakian production;
- about 36 Mi-8 TB/HIP F attack helicopters;
- about 30 Mi-24/HIND D attack helicopters;

- about 45 Mi-8/HIP C multipurpose helicopters, as well as
- training planes of the L-39 "Albatros" type and liaison aircraft of the Zlin Z-43 type, both of Czechoslovakian production.

The at least seven A.A. NVA-LSK/LV rocket regiments assigned to the air defense versions--regiments which possibly at least sometimes were built up to A.A. rocket brigades--are equipped with the SA-2/GUIDELINE and SA-3/GOA A.A. guided missile systems, which have been modernized several times. They have around 200 SA-2 and SA-3 launching devices deployed at about 30 positions. The SA-3/GOA's, already employable against air targets at very low altitudes (from about 50 meters) thus supplement the long-range, SA-2/GUIDELINE's, which are principally effective against air targets at great altitudes (up to about 27,000 meters).

Personnel and Training

The total strength of the NVA-LSK/LV is about 39,000 men, including about 15,000 men who are conscripts. The latter are mainly used in the A.A. rocket, radar and communications components and as guard and auxiliary personnel in the flying units. Colonel General Wolfgang Reinhold, born 1923, has been chief of the NVA-LSK/LV and deputy minister for national defense since 1972. Reinhold attended an antifa [probable expansion: "antifascist"] school in the Soviet Union while he was a prisoner of war, was active in the FDJ and joined the KVP in 1952. After attending a Soviet military academy he soon became commanding officer of an air division. He was later director of the department for "training of flying personnel" at the LSK/LV Command and finally deputy chief of staff and chief of staff of the Command.

The officer candidates for the NVA-LSK/LV are trained at the "Franz Mehring" Officers' College at Kamenz (Bezirk Dresden). The following are here distinguished as fields of application:

- political officers of the LSK/LV,
- military aviators,
- officers of the A.A. rocket troops,
- officers of the Air Engineer Service ["Fliegeringenieurdienst"],
- officers of the Radio Technical Troops [v.s.] of the LSK/LV,
- officers of the command organs of the LSK/LV.

The practical flying training of the future flying officers takes place in the "Heinz Kapelle" training wing in Bautzen. The officers' training lasts four years and concludes with the appointment as lieutenant and the bestowal of an academic degree determined by the field of application (flying officers, for example, "college engineers"). Female applicants have also been accepted for training as political officers of the LSK/LV since 1985. Soldiers of the warrant officer career track have recently also been trained as "2nd helicopter pilots" at the "Franz Mehring" Officers' College. The professional and volunteer noncommissioned officers as well as warrant officers (excepting 2nd helicopter pilots) of the NVA-LSK/LV are trained at the "Harry Kuhn" Military Technical School at Bad Dueben (Bezirk Leipzig).

Assessment

The NVA-LSK/LV has remarkably modernly equipped air units at its disposal. The majority of them are primarily intended for air defense and together with the A.A. rocket units form an important link in the foremost air defense zone of the WP countries. In addition, an air attack capability for the direct and indirect support of the ground forces has also been built up in recent years. This makes it possible to support both the NVA armies with fighter bombers and attack helicopters of national subordination, thus without the aid of Soviet forces.

The NVA People's Navy

With a strength of about 17 men, the NVA People's Navy, which emerged from the "Sea Police" or "VP-Sea," is the smallest service component of the NVA. Its beginnings were modest: it started--as the sea police--with six minesweepers of the former German navy which in May of 1950 were given back by the Soviets from their war booty. While the forerunners of the other service components of the NVA received their equipment exclusively from Soviet stocks, the domestic shipyards contributed to equipping the GDR's maritime armed forces from the start. It supplied coastal defense boats, minesweepers and minelayers to the VP-Sea, which first got the designation NVA Naval Forces when it was "rechristened" in 1956. The long-term preparations and supplying of the "people's own" state shipyards made it possible for cooperation with the Soviet "Baltic Fleet" to be able to start soon. The first joint exercise, in which 75 boats and ships of the NVA naval forces participated, took place as early as July of 1956. The following year another joint exercise took place, in which forces of the Polish navy now also participated. Such joint exercises of all three WP baltic fleets, as well as joint command post exercises, became the rule in subsequent years.

The NVA naval forces received their first "hefty ships" from the USSR even before the end of 1956: two frigates of the Soviet RIGA Class, which got the toned-down designation of "coastal defense ships" in the GDR (Footnote 13). In the following years the Soviet Union delivered two more of these frigates, the first torpedo patrol boats as well as antisubmarine boats, while the GDR shipyards supplied further minelayers and minesweepers.

On 3 November 1960 the NVA naval forces were given the "honorary name" of People's Navy [VM] on the occasion of the 42nd anniversary of the Kiel seamen's uprising of 1918. In the following years the NVA-VM was supplied the first small and medium landing boats, small torpedo patrol boats and antisubmarine craft from domestic shipyards. The first rocket weapons came from the Soviet Union in late 1962: missile patrol boats of the OSA-1 Class and coastal missile systems of the SSC-2b/SAMLET (NVA designation: "Sopka") type.

The building up of the NVA-VM was essentially concluded with the expansion of its "flight of helicopters" to an antisubmarine squadron in 1963/64. The following years serve to improve the quality of the vessels and training. Milestones of further development are:

- The most recent development--identified with certainty for the present--in the NVA People's Navy is the reactivation of a naval air wing in Laage south of Rostock, which has been going on since late 1985, giving the VM an air attack capability of new quality.

The map illustrates the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea for German U-boat operations. Key locations and symbols include:

- Hamburg**: A major port and base of operations, marked with a circle.
- Stockholm**: A city on the Swedish coast, marked with a circle.
- Kühlungsborn**: A U-boat base on the German coast, marked with a circle.
- Laage**: A U-boat base on the German coast, marked with a circle.
- Rügen**: A U-boat base on the German coast, marked with a circle.
- Szczecin (Stettin)**: A U-boat base on the Polish coast, marked with a circle.
- U-boat bases**: Indicated by 'X' and 'U' symbols, showing the locations of various U-boat bases and operations.
- Operations**: Marked with '1' and '2', indicating the locations of U-boat operations.

Structure Today

The NVA-People's Navy Command, which has been stationed at Rostock-Gehlsdorf since 1954, today has under it as major maritime formations the three flotillas of the VM, each with a different structure and different inventory of vessels.

The 1st Flotilla, headquartered at Peenemuende, is organized into

- a landing vessel detachment,
- an antisub detachment,
- a minesweeper detachment and
- an auxiliary vessel detachment.

The 4th Flotilla, headquartered at Rostock-Warnemuende, is organized into

- a "coastal defense ship" (missile frigate) detachment,
- an antisub detachment,
- a minesweeper detachment and
- an auxiliary vessel detachment.

The 6th Flotilla, headquartered at Dranske on Ruegen, comprises the so-called "strike forces;" thus the amphibious offensive capability of the VM is organized into

- a missile patrol boat brigade,
- a torpedo patrol boat brigade,
- two small torpedo patrol boat brigades ("Fritz Globig" and "Kurt Baier") and
- an auxiliary vessel detachment.

The three flotillas also have A.A. batteries, guard units and a music corps each under them.

The following are command, combat and combat support units which are directly under the NVA-People's Navy Command:

- the "Johann Weselok" Naval Communications Regiment in Rostock (?),
- the coastal rocket artillery regiment, probably stationed in the prohibited area west of Wismar Bay,
- Naval Air Wing [or: Squadron] 28 in Laage,
- the "Kurt Barthel" Naval Helicopter Wing [idem] in Parow,
- the Combat Swimmer [roughly: "frogman"] Company in Kuehlungsborn,
- the Naval Engineer Battalion in Stralsund,
- the Headquarters Music Corps of the VM Command in Rostock and
- the ships' permanent detachments ["Schiffsstammabteilungen"] in Rostock, Stralsund and Wolgast.

Other installations under the Command are the Marine Hydrographic Service, Rostock, the Naval Test Center, Wolgast, and the Central Naval Hospital, Rostock/Stralsund.

The COAST Border Brigade of the Border Troops of the GDR was also operationally subordinated to the VM Command in 1961. The COAST Border Brigade was disengaged from this subordinate relationship within the course of 1985. It is now again subordinate to the Border Troops Command in every respect.

Naval Infantry

While the Baltic Fleet, like every fleet of the Soviet navy, maintains its own naval infantry brigade, and the ground forces of the Polish People's Army include a naval landing division, the NVA has so far contented itself with training a motorized rifle regiment of its 8th Motorized Rifle Division, which is located near the coast, in naval landing operations. Motorized Rifle Regiment 29 ("Ernst Moritz Arndt"), which was stationed at Prora on Ruegen at the time, was initially called on for this purpose, and after it transferred to Hagenow, Motorized Rifle Regiment 28 ("Wilhelm Florin") was brought up from Rostock. This "second role training" as naval landing troops seems to be have been discontinued. There are indications, however, that the NVA-VM is in the process of setting up a separate naval infantry unit. An initial exercise of this unit, which is probably stationed on the island of Ruegen, partly closed to Western military missions, is said to have already taken place. Only conjectures are possible concerning the planned size of this unit. A regiment-size unit can be expected, based on the current landing vessel capacity of the NVA People's Navy (see Inventory of Vessels).

Inventory of Vessels and Aircraft

The inventory of the NVA-VM, which has been going through a second modernization process since the mid-1970's, currently comprises over 130 combat vessels and about 30 auxiliary vessels.

The following surface combat vessels are in service:

- three missile frigates of the KONI Class ("Berlin," Rostock" and "Halle"),
- four missile corvettes of the TARANTUL-I Class ("Albin Koebis," "Rudolf Egelhofer" and two others),
- 16 sub chasers of the PARCHIM Class,
- six sub chasers of the HAI-III Class (remaining inventory which is being replaced by PARCHIM Class sub chasers that are being delivered),
- 15 missile patrol boats of the OSA-I Class (being replaced by missile corvettes of the TARANTUL-I Class),
- 18 torpedo patrol boats of the SHERSHEN Class,
- 31 small torpedo patrol boats of the LIBELLE Class,
- 27 minesweepers of the KONDOR-II Class and
- 12 landing craft of the FROSCH-I Class.

Among the most important auxiliary vessels are two "combat supply vessels" ["Gefechstversorger"] of the FROSCH-II Class, six "High-Seas Combat Supply Vessels" ["Hochsee-Gefechstversorger"] of the DARSS Class and the training ship "Wilhelm Pieck" of the (Polish) WODNIK Class.

A special category of vessels of the NVA-VM are the ELINT [electronic intelligence] vessels which operate in Kiel Bay and the Danish Straits. They involve two boats of the KONDOR-I Class ("Komet" and "Meteor") which have been converted for this purpose, and recently a variant of the DARRS-Class supply vessel, the JASMUND.

The "Kurt Barthels" naval helicopter wing has 13 Mi-8T/HIP C multipurpose helicopters and eight Mi-14PL/HAZE A antisub and mine-detecting helicopters, as well as some Mi-2/HOPLITE liaison helicopters.

Naval Air Wing [or: Squadron] 28 is outfitted with the Su-22/FITTER K fighter bomber, the so far most modern version of the FITTER design series.

Personnel and Training

The NVA People's Navy currently has a strength of about 17,000 men. The portion of conscripts, who are employed predominantly in the land units and to a small extent also on board, especially on auxiliary vessels, is around 8,000 men.

Admiral and deputy minister for national defense Dr Wilhelm Ehm, born 1918, has been at the head of the People's Navy since August of 1959. Ehm was a petty officer in the former [i.e. 2nd World War] navy. He became active in the SED after returning from Soviet prisoner-of-war captivity and was taken on as an officer when the Sea Police were activated. He attended the Soviet Naval Academy from 1961 to 1962.

The officer candidates for the People's Navy are trained at the "Karl Liebknecht" Officers' College in Stralsund. There is training for the following fields of application in the various "sections" of the school:

- political officers
- naval officers and
- ships' machinist officers.

As in the other armed service components, the training of the professional officers lasts four years and concludes with the appointment as ensign and the bestowal of an academic degree corresponding to the field of application (e.g. graduate sociologist for the political officers).

The training of the professional and volunteer petty officers as well as warrant officers of the People's Navy is done at the "Walter Steffens" Naval School in Parow. The rank-and-file men who have been taken on for nautical and technical careers and who have committed themselves to a period of three years of service, also receive their basic and special training there.

Warship Construction

The center of warship construction for the NVA People's Navy and its forerunners, as well as for the COAST Border Brigade, has from the very beginning been the Peene Shipyard in Wolgast, which was built up in 1948 at the order of the Soviet Military Administration (SMA) in order to supply reparations vessels to the Soviet Union. In addition, various smaller shipyards were involved in the construction of guard vessels and minesweepers during the years of buildup. Today the Peene Shipyard is practically the only one responsible for the GDR's domestic warship construction and shipyard overhauling of the vessels of the People's Navy. In addition, it still builds certain special vessels for the Soviet Union. Besides the Peene Shipyard, only the Rostock Neptun Shipyard is still involved in outfitting the People's

Navy. It supplied the "High-Seas Combat Supply Vessels" of the DARSS Class, for the construction of which it was especially suited because of its experience in building modern freighters.

It should be pointed out, however, that the GDR's share in warship construction is limited to the actual ship engineering and that most of the propulsion machinery, a large part of the electronics and all of the armament are supplied from the Soviet Union. Moreover, only lower-level classes of ships and boats are built in the GDR, while the most important surface combat vessels, such as missile frigates, missile corvettes and missile patrol boats, as well as the large torpedo patrol boats, are of Soviet origin. But of course, the Peene Shipyard, with its KONDOR-II Class minesweepers which are capable of ocean-going application and which introduced the generation change in the outfitting of the People's Navy, as well as with its PARCHIM Class subchasers, thus far the most combat-effective vessels of domestic production, has proved the GDR's ability for building modern warships.

Assessment

The assessment of the NVA-VM can be briefly summarized with the words "small but fine." After the modernization of its offensive capability was started in the fall of 1984 by replacing the OSA-I Class missile patrol boats with TARANIUL-I Class missile corvettes, and it now also has its own air attack forces and the buildup of a separate naval infantry force is looming, it has finally grown from a "coastal defense navy" to a naval force which can operate in the whole Baltic Sea area. It thus forms--along with the Polish naval war fleet--a considerable supplement and combat-effective vanguard for the Soviet Navy's Baltic Fleet. The Soviets attach appropriate importance to it.

The "Border Troops of the GDR"

The Border Troops emerged from the border police first set up at the "land" [tr's quotes; roughly = state] level on the order of the SMAD [Soviet Military Administration (Germany)]. The force, billeted and militarily trained since 1948, was centralized in 1951 and changed its designation and subordination several times in the course of the years. Until May of 1952, the year in which the prohibited zone was set up with its protective and control strips, it was the "German Border Police" (DGP), a part of the People's Police and thus subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. In the following years up to 1961 its subordination changed back and forth a number of times between the Ministry for State Security and the Ministry of the Interior. In this period, as a result of the GDR's full sovereignty regained in the 20 September 1955 "treaty on the relations between the GDR and the USSR," the DGP took over the sole safeguarding and control of the internal German border and the sector borders in and around Berlin with the exception of checking Western garrison troops. When, as of November 1957, the "Office for Customs and Control of Merchandise Traffic" took over the controls at the border crossing points, the DGP was able to devote itself exclusively to military border security and received further military equipment.

The DGP was finally incorporated into the NVA under the designation "NVA Border Troops" and put under the Ministry for National Defense by order of the National Defense Council on 15 September 1961. As of January 1974 the direct assignment of the border troops to the NVA was formally rescinded by their being renamed "Border Troops of the GDR," but subordination to the Ministry for National Defense was retained. It has to date been assumed in the West that this renaming was done with the intention of keeping the capability of the Border Troops out of the Vienna MBFR negotiations. The retention of subordination under the Ministry for National Defense and the openly admitted close ties to the NVA argue against this assumption. It is possible that this force, which is not very attractive because of its mission, service requirements and its comparatively simple armament, was supposed to merely experience a psychological uplift with the new designation.


Order of Battle of the "Border Troops of the GDR"

Border Troops Command	Paetz
Border Command NORTH ("Fritzsche Unit")	Stendal
Border Regiment 6 ("Heinz Kollwitz") (unknown)	Schoenberg
Border Regiment 8 ("Robert Abshagen") (28 Feb 1974)	Grabow
Border Regiment 20 ("Martin Schwantes" (16 Oct 1972)	Halberstadt
Border Regiment 23 ("Wilhelm Bahnick") (27 Feb 1973)	Kalbe
Border Regiment 24 ("Fritz Heckert") (unknown)	Salzwedel
Border Regiment 25 ("Neidhardt von Gneisenau") (29 Feb 1968)	Oschersleben
Border Training Regiment 5 ("Gustav Sobottka") (1 Mar 1975)	Gloewen
Border Training Regiment 7 ("Martin Hoop") (1 Mar 1972)	Halberstadt
Border Command SOUTH ("Janshen Unit")	Erfurt
Border Regiment 1 ("Eugen Lewin") (6 Oct 1978)	Muehlhausen
Border Regiment 3 ("Florian Geyer") (Feb 1966)	Dernbach
Border Regiment 4 ("Willy Gebhardt") (unknown)	Heiligenstadt
Border Regiment 9 ("Konrad Blenkle") (1 Dec 1978)	Meiningen
Border Regiment 10 ("Ernst Grube") (unknown)	Plauen
Border Regiment 15 ("Herbert Warnke") (1 Mar 1976)	Sonneberg
Border Training Regiment 11 ("Theodor Neubauer") (unknown)	Eisenach
Border Training Regiment 12 ("Rudi Arnstadt") (1 Dec 1978)	Rudolstadt
Border Command CENTER ("Woellner Unit")	Berlin-Karlshorst
Border Regiment 33 ("Heinrich Dorrenbach") (1 Mar 1981)	Berlin-Treptow
Border Regiment 34 (name unknown)	Gross Glienicke
Border Regiment 35 ("Nikolai Bersarin") (27 Sep 1969?)	Berlin-Rummelburg
Border Regiment 38 ("Clara Zetkin") (6 Oct 1978)	Henningsdorf
Border Regiment 42 ("Fritz Perlit") (27 Feb 1973)	Blankenfelde
Border Regiment 44 ("Walter Junker") (6 Oct 1969)	Potsdam-Babelsberg
GUeST [Border Crossing Points] Regiment 26 ("Walter Husemann" (6 Oct 1979)	Berlin- Niederschauenhausen

Border Training Regiment 39 ("Ho Chi Minh") (unknown)	Berlin-Wilhelmshagen
Border Training Regiment 40 ("Hans Coppi") (1 Mar 1976)	Oranienburg
Artillery Regiment 26 ("Otto Nelde") (1 Mar 1976)	Berlin-Johannisthal
Multiple Rocket Launcher Battalion 26 ("Bruno Kuehn") (1 Feb 1980)	Schildow
Border Brigade COAST ("Fiete Schulze") (1 Dec 1985)	Rostock
Border Section Command PR of Poland	Frankfurt/Oder
Border Section Command CSSR	Pirna

Remark: The dates in parentheses indicate when the honorary name was bestowed.

Figure 76: Disposition of the Border Troops of the GDR



Structure

The supreme command staff of the roughly 47,000-man Border Troops of the GDR is the "Border Troops Command" in Paetz near Berlin, which was formed as the command of the DGP back in 1957. Lieutenant General Klaus-Diter Baumgarten, born 1931, a graduate of the Soviet "Frunze" Military Academy, has been chief of the Command and deputy minister for national defense since 1979. Under the Command are (see Order of Battle and Disposition Map):

- Border Commands NORTH in Stendal and SOUTH in Erfurt, used for blocking off

the internal German border (IdG);

- Border Command CENTER, with headquarters in Berlin-Karlshorst, used for sealing off West Berlin;
- Border Brigade COAST in Rostock, responsible for securing the GDR's maritime border, as well as
- the Border Section Commands in Pirna and Frankfurt/Oder, in charge of monitoring the borders with the PR of Poland and the CSSR.

Also directly under the Command are a number of command, maintenance and support units, a helicopter squadron and a headquarters music corps.

Border Commands NORTH, SOUTH and CENTER each have from five to six border regiments under them for border security service. In the case of Border Command CENTER, an additional regiment takes care of check duty at the border crossing points on the border of the Berlin sectors.

Border Brigade COAST comprises three border vessel detachments for monitoring the border at sea, three border battalions for monitoring the coastal terrain, as well as several observation companies which operate land-supported radar stations for monitoring the sea area off the GDR coast. The amphibious units of Border Brigade COAST were operationally subordinate to the NVA-People's Navy Command until 1985, but have now been disengaged from this subordinate relationship.

The Border Section Commands on the GDR's eastern and southern borders have only weak border monitoring forces. Border Commands NORTH and SOUTH each have a headquarters, communications and engineer company under them as independent units. The regiments of these commands are organized into three battalions. Command CENTRAL, moreover, has its own artillery regiment and a multiple rocket launcher battalion. (Footnote 14)

Equipment

The border troop units employed on the internal German border are mobilized almost exclusively with unarmored wheeled vehicles and equipped with only light infantry weapons. For carrying out their official mission, "to secure the western state border, safeguard its inviolability and prevent border breakthroughs," they rely mainly on lavish barrier installations with metal lattice fences, alarm installations, dog-run layouts and observation towers. The formerly used mines and self-shooting setups have now been taken away, without impairing the permeability of the border installations.

The border troop units employed around West Berlin rely on similar installations, but are moreover not only equipped with light infantry weapons, but also with mortars, artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers and flamethrowers and have wheeled armored personnel carriers of older design. This equipment points to the possible missions of these units in the event of war.

The amphibious units of Border Brigade COAST have about 30 "border ships" and guard boats. They involve mainly minesweepers of the KONDOR-I Class and guard boats of the BREMSE and so-called KUTTER Class.

Personnel and Training

The Border Troops are recruited from volunteers who are especially faithful to the party line and from conscripts who are considered politically reliable and who do not have contacts in the West. There are two border training regiments under each of the three border commands, and one training regiment under Border Brigade COAST, for training the rank and file. Besides the preparation for border duty, the training also comprises infantry training according to the operational principles of the motorized rifle force. In Command CENTER the emphasis in military training is on combat in built-up areas. There are a number of smaller exercise areas near the border available to the Border Troops for carrying out and brushing up on this training.

The new leadership corps of the Border Troops is trained at separate schools: the noncommissioned officers at the "Egon Schultz" Noncommissioned Officers' School at Perleberg/Bezirk Schwerin, and the officers at the "Rosa Luxemburg" Officers' College at Suhl (until early 1985 at Plauen/Vogtland). The training facilities of the NVA's service components and the central training facilities of the Ministry for National Defense are also used for special careers and advanced training of the officers.

Paramilitarily organized, so-called "Volunteer Helpers of the Border Troops of the GDR," who are recruited from "class-conscious" inhabitants of the border area or persons working there, support and supplement the Border Troops in preventing escape from East to West.

Assessment

The equipment of the Border Troops and buildup of border security installations show that the immense expenditure in personnel and materiel serves exclusively to prevent flight from East to West. This "peace" mission is fulfilled almost perfectly by the Border Troops. Getting across this "antifascist protective wall" is, as a rule, possible only for persons who know their way around the area particularly well and members of the Border Troops themselves. The military value of the border security installations is the same as nil, and that of the Border Troops themselves--with the exception of the forces employed around West Berlin--relatively slight due to their light equipment. They can be used for missions of order and protection in the rear area and as security forces in the combat area. Furthermore, they represent an infantry-trained reserve of personnel. It comes down to the GDR having to muster up the second-largest group of its "armed organs," the potential in personnel for about four combat divisions, essentially so that large parts of its populace and army do not run away from it!

The Civil Defense of the GDR

Special staffs, establishments and units for disaster defense were formed in the GDR within the framework of the fire departments as early as the mid-1950's. They were later taken out of the fire departments and put under a special administration of the Ministry of the Interior (MdI). With the February 1958 "Law on Air Defense in the GDR," whose resolution is considered

the founding day of Civil Defense (ZV), the disaster defense forces were linked up with these [sic] and the buildup of a warning system, the construction of shelters in residential areas, enterprises and state facilities, as well as the buildup of air defense formations on a volunteer basis, were undertaken. Civil Defense was confirmed as a component of national defense and its tasks expanded by the September 1970 "Law on the Civil Defense of the GDR." Civil Defense operating forces were now built up in the enterprises; i.e. rescue, salvage, medical, decontamination and NBC information platoons and squads, and the construction of medical and decontamination facilities continued. At the resolution of the Defense Council, control of Civil Defense went over from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry for National Defense in June of 1976, which was only ratified publicly by the Defense Law of October 1978. Service in Civil Defense is now considered military service; an obligation to Civil Defense duty can be ordered.

Lieutenant General Fritz Peter has been director of Civil Defense since 1976. The Civil Defense staffs of the bezirks, kreises, cities and communities which are occupied by full-time Civil Defense Personnel, are subordinate to the Main Administration for Civil Defense, formed in June of 1978. This full-time personnel on active duty--including teaching personnel at training facilities--has a strength of about 3,000 men. They wear the NVA's uniform with violet service branch color and violet "Civil Defense" sleeve stripe. The Civil Defense members wear the NVA's military ranks with the addition of "ZV;" this addition is not in effect only in the case of generals' ranks. The training of Civil Defense officers and the higher part-time leadership personnel is done at the "Institute for Civil Defense" in Beeskow, which has the status of a college. Moreover, there are other Civil Defense schools at the bezirk level, at which the lower and mid-level part-time leadership personnel is trained.

The Civil Defense's "operating forces" are formed from part-time "volunteer" workers in the enterprises and state establishments. Women, for whom there are few possibilities of use in the personnel-competing "Combat Groups of the Working Class," (see p. 666) are also enlisted to a great extent. The cooperation of the enterprises and state establishments, such as, for example, the postal service, local administrations and the "Red Cross of the GDR" are guaranteed by the fact that the appropriate ministers, office and enterprise directors are "directors of Civil Defense" responsible for their area.

The number of Civil Defense workers active on a part-time basis in the operating forces is estimated at about 15,000. Since civil defense training already occurs in secondary and technical schools and at colleges, it can be assumed that about 700,000 GDR citizens have more or less intensive civil defense training.

The Other "Armed Organs" of the GDR

The National People's Army and the Border Troops of the GDR are only the portion of the so-called "armed organs" of the GDR which are under the Ministry for National Defense. Among them are also:

- the MfS Troops under the Ministry for State Security [MfS], in particular

the "Feliks Dzierzynski" Guard Regiment;

- the People's Police (VP) Alert Units under the Ministry of the Interior (MdI), as well as
- the paramilitary "Combat Groups of the Working Class," directly under the SED.

The nucleus of the of the MfS Troops is the "Feliks Dzierzynski [sic]" MfS Guard Regiment, named after the founder of the notorious Soviet "Cheka" (Footnote 15). It is the GDR's special regime protection force. The members of the regiment, as a rule professional or volunteer soldiers with a minimum commitment time of three years, wear the same uniform as the NVA, but with dark blue service branch color, like the Soviet KGB troops, and the "Feliks Dzierzynski Guard Regiment" sleeve stripe. The regiment's mission is, inter alia, to guard the building of the SED Central Committee, the official headquarters of the chairman of the Council of State, MfS premises and the residential enclaves of the state and party VIP's and to guarantee personal protection for the latter. It also takes care of representational tasks during state visits. The "Regiment," under the command of a major general, has a strength of about 7,000 men. It is organized into two operational groups, each with three motorized battalions, a heavy battalion with artillery, antitank and A.A. weapons, as well as a training battalion. The motorized battalions are equipped with the PSzH (NVA: SPW [=APC] PSH) armored personnel carrier of Hungarian production; the heavy battalion has 85-mm and 100-mm antitank guns, 120-mm mortars and ZU-23 23-mm A.A. guns. A commando unit of the type of the Soviet SPETSNAZ troops (see footnote [original] p. 624) is also said to be attached to the Regiment. This unit wears the uniform of the NVA's paratroopers, but with the Guard Regiment's service branch color and sleeve stripe. The Guard Regiment of the MfS is accommodated in complexes of barracks in the area of Adlershof and Erkner in the southeast of Berlin. There are other MfS guard units attached to the 14 bezirk administrations of the MfS.

The VP Alert Units [VP-Bereitschaften] have since 1957 been under the "VP Alert Units Command" in East Berlin, which is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. They go back to police units which were set up in 1950 by the Ministry for Security (MfS), temporarily called "Internal Troops" in 1955/56 and then renamed Alert Police. The VP Alert Units have officially formed a part of the Troops of Territorial Defense since 1970. In this capacity they took part in the "Comradeship-in-Arms 70" WP exercise the same year. The military service law of 1982 equates service in the Alert Units to military service. The total strength of the VP Alert Units amounts to about 12,000 men. At least one Alert Unit is stationed in each of the GDR's 14 bezirks; additionally a second one in the heavily populated bezirks of Halle, Leipzig, Magdeburg and Potsdam. Three further ones stand by in Basdorf, north of East Berlin's outskirts, for operations in the Berlin area. The overall 21 VP Alert Units each have battalion strength and are organized into two motorized companies, an APC company and a heavy [weapons] company. The APC company is equipped with the PSzH (SPW PSH) armored personnel carrier, the heavy company with 82-mm mortars, SPG-9 recoilless rifles and ZU-23 23-mm A.A. guns. They also have water cannons. The Alert Policemen wear green uniforms with military rank badges, and on operations combat fatigues like the NVA. The officers of the Alert Police are trained at the Ministry of the Interior's

"Arthur Becker" Officers' College in Dresden.

The "Combat Groups [also translatable as "Squads/Teams"] of the Working Class" have their origin in SED Enterprise Combat Groups activated from party members in the so-called "People's Own Enterprises" [VEB] starting in autumn of 1952. Its buildup was increasingly pushed forward after the popular uprising of 17 June 1953. The 29th of September 1953 is considered its official "birthday." According to an April 1955 resolution of the SED Central Committee, they were to be expanded into an "effective instrument of home defense and for protecting the people's property." The guidelines issued by the CC Politburo for their organization and training stipulate:

- the Combat Groups (KG) are directly subordinate to the party;
- their military training is done by instructors of the People's Police;
- men from age 25 to 60 are to perform service in the KG, women are to be employed as radio operators and medics;
- all "commanding officers" of the KG (platoon leaders, one-hundred-person team ["Hundertschaft"] leaders and battalion commanders) must be confirmed by the SED Kreis managements.

In mid-1956 a vow was introduced for the members of the KG. The "Comrade Fighters" (according to the official address) must promise:

"As a fighter of the working class, I am prepared to fulfill the party's instructions, to protect the German Democratic Republic, its social achievements at any time with weapon in hand and risk my life for it."

A "Central Command of the KG," which is responsible for the military training of the KG, was set up in the Ministry of the Interior in 1958. Its political education and operational control, however, continues to remain with the SED CC and subordinate SED bezirk and kreis managements.

While initially the platoons and hundred-person teams [v.s.] of the KG were organized only at the enterprise level and were limited to stationary deployment for protecting facilities, motorized Combat Group Battalions (KGB, mot) are being set up in addition. As so-called "KG Battalions of the Bezirk Reserve," these form the mobile operational forces of the SED bezirk and kreis managements. In August of 1961 the KG, which in the meantime received stone-gray uniforms, passed its "test"--about 8,000 "fighters" were employed along with the other "armed organs" for safeguarding the construction of the wall in Berlin. After that, pressure on the workers for "voluntary" service in the KG was increased and its size further enlarged. At the same time, the KG's role for defense against external enemies was now clearly stressed: as territorial forces, they are a solid component of national defense. Then at least one compact KG battalion (mot) took part in the big "Comradeship-in-Arms 70" WP exercise. It was used along with a VP Alert Unit for crushing an enemy airborne unit in the rear area.

The present strength of the KG is estimated at 500,000 men. The organizational forms are manifold and are determined by local conditions. Large enterprises as a rule set up their own, mostly motorized, battalions. Other battalions are composed of the work force members of several neighboring enterprises. Certain enterprises also set up independent motorized hundred-person teams (KGB, mot) or hundred-person teams or platoons employable only on a stationary basis. It is estimated that about 170 KGB (mot) [motorized

Combat Group Battalions] and around 50 KGH (mot) [motorized hundred-person teams] form a third to barely a half of the total size of the KG, while the rest involve only locally deployable battalions, hundred-person teams and platoons. The equipment includes weapons and gear which were released in the course of modernization in the NVA and not do not have to be stockpiled for reserve units. Older armored transporters and personnel carriers, light and medium antitank guns, mortars and A.A. weapons are included.

The training of the leadership personnel is done by VP officers at the "Central School for Combat Groups" ("Ernst Thaelmann") in Schmerwitz (Kreis Belzig). There are other schools at the bezirk level and "on the spot" the training is directed by the local VP duty stations, which are also responsible for supporting the KG in the event of operations. While the leadership personnel have to be released from the enterprises to attend courses, the simple "fighters" have to mainly complete their training, set at 132 hours a year, on work-free weekends. The additional yearly final exercises, examinations and "combat roll calls" are mostly at the expense of work time in the enterprises.

Overall, the Combat Groups represent a type of territorial army which requires a minimum of financial expenditure. At the same time they form a party army for preventing a coup by internal forces, and finally they are a further instrument for registering and disciplining the citizens.

The "Society for Sports and Technology"

Closely tied to the NVA is the "Society for Sports and Technology" (GST), founded by government resolution back in August of 1952. Its overriding task is the premilitary training of male youths. The GST is a counterpart of the Soviet DOSAAF, the "Volunteer Society for Cooperation with Army, Aviation and Navy," which was also imitated by all other WP countries. The "elected" chairman of the GST, who is under the duty supervision of the Ministry for National Defense, is always a high-ranking NVA officer, currently Vice Admiral Guenter Kutzschebauch, formerly chief of the Political Administration of the NVA People's Navy, as successor to deceased Lieutenant General Guenther Teller.

On the basis of the new training guidelines which took effect in September of 1982, the GST today concentrates on specific premilitary training of male youths for military service in the NVA. Since general premilitary basic training is already covered by legally prescribed military instruction in the schools, the GST now still carries out only "premilitary training for a career in the NVA," extending over two years (for ages 17 and 18). The program provides the training for the following "careers," i.e. branches of forces or field of application:

- motorized riflemen, with emphasis on firing training;
- military driver, with acquisition of drivers license for all wheeled vehicles used in the NVA;
- communications specialist (i.e. telecommunicator) with emphasis on radiotelephony and telephone operating service and sometimes advanced training as radiotelegraph and telex operator;

- military aviator, including practical training in group flight as well as acrobatic and instrumental flight training;
- seaman specialist (i.e. nautical career) including practical training on training boats and ships;
- paratrooper, with single and group jumping as well as acquisition of truck drivers license;
- diver, including reconnaissance and work under water.

The training program is coordinated with the NVA's training regulations and is supposed to assure that the youths are operational for simple use immediately after they are called up. NVA reservists are mainly used as trainers, sometimes also active NVA ranks on temporary detached duty. In addition to a multitude of local training facilities, the GST has at least five central training camps (Bezirk Training Centers), a motor vehicle school, a parachute jump school and two of its own flying schools (Footnote 16).

Summary

The rearmament of the Soviet occupation zone, which already commenced soon after the Second World war, and the GDR which emerged from it has led to a militarization of all of societal life there, which can only be compared with conditions in the "Third Reich." The component services of the NVA and the Border Troops of the GDR, which are under the Ministry for National Defense, are the most essential active military capability, with a total strength of about 228,000 men. In relation to the population figures, that is around 65 percent more than the corresponding forces in the Federal Republic of Germany (Footnote 17). Added to them are active forces of state protection and territorial defense in the form of troops of the MfS and the Ministry of the Interior at a strength of around 20,000 men, as well as over half a million people serving in paramilitary organizations such as the "Combat Groups," Civil Defense and others.

The militarization starts already in kindergarten, but especially in the schools, which have been instructed by law to carry out general premilitary training. It is continued in the GST's premilitary career training, which is oriented specifically toward the military service, and does not even end after actual military service. The "Combat Groups," Civil Defense, the GST and so-called "Reservists' Collectives" see to it that postmilitary training takes place and the populace remains firmly in the party's grip. Moreover, militarization of the populace finds expression in daily life: everywhere there is "fighting," "battles are won" and "victories achieved," whether in production, in collecting scrap or on the "snow front." The question in the end is still how far claim and reality of the "real-existing socialism," also in the military sphere, diverge; and the really big question is still about the reliability of the NVA and the GDR's other military organizations in an emergency.

Numerous more or less speculative considerations have been made regarding this. They mainly come to the conclusion that this would depend on the prevailing circumstances of the outbreak of a military conflict and the

initial results. As these cannot be assessed, NATO's planning staffs must assume that the GDR's military forces will remain faithful to their oath of allegiance on the side of the Soviet army.

[FOOTNOTES]

(1) "Dictionary of German Military History," Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1985, p. 286

(2) Ibid p. 362

(3) Ibid p. 363

(4) "Army for Peace and Socialism," Military Publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1985, p. 78

(5) Ibid p. 129. They were: Dresden Artillery School, Erfurt Artillery and Armor Technical School, Potsdam-Geltow A.A. Artillery School, Oranienburg Radar School, Plauen Infantry School, Stanhnsdorf Driving Technical School, Doebeln Signals School, Grossenhain Armor School, Dessau Engineer School, Erfurt School for Rear Services, Kamenz Flying School, Dessau Transport Flying School, Stralsund Naval Officers' School, Leipzig Medical Corpsmen's School, Military Medical Section at the Greifswald "Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University."

(6) Somewhere the GDR leadership must have "overstretched" itself in its activation plans, must either have overestimated its capabilities or not have coordinated correctly with the Soviets. In any case, the GDR Council of Ministers passed a resolution--while the "activation" was in full progress--to reduce the originally established NVA strength of 120,000 men to 90,000 men and thereby to follow a "peace initiative" of the USSR (see p. 622). Although the 120,000-man limit was exceeded long ago, the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, which was activated in late 1956, has not appeared since, while the other divisions continue to exist to date under the designations of that time. Incidentally, the concrete division designations have not been mentioned in the latest edition of the Time Table."

(7) A forerunner model of this helmet, which was apparently based on a GDR design, proved unsuitable and was soon exchanged for the Model B/II.

(8) The SED originated in 1946 by the merger--compulsorily carried out under Soviet pressure--of the SPD in the Soviet Occupation Zone and in East Berlin with the KPD, which was supported by the Soviets there. After the so-called "Unification Party Congress," the forces of the former SPD representing democratic socialism were eliminated. The "United Polish Workers' Party," which originated in a similar manner and is actually the CP of Poland, also carries an equivalent misleading designation.

(9) on 1 June 1986

(10) Colonel General Herbert Scheibe, born 1914, who was detained in Buchenwald Concentration Camp until 1945, is separated from the CC and released from his post as director of the CC Department for "Security Issues," probably for reasons of age.

(11) The current minister of the interior and "chief of the German People's Police," Army General Friedrich Dickel, still carried the designation of "First Deputy Minister for National Defense" in 1956.

(12) The "F" stands for "forsage" [sic] = afterburner, the "P" for "perekhvatchik" = interceptor.

(13) Frigates are termed "sentry vessels" ("storozhevoy korabl'") in the Soviet naval forces. Western warships of the same type are of course called frigates in the GDR and USSR.

(14) See further details on the structure of the Border Troops in "Security Policy News," special edition 86/III of 22 Feb 86, publisher and editor W. Dissmann, 5042 Erftstadt.

(15) "Cheka" is the Russian abbreviation for "Extraordinary Commission." Its mission, to track down and eliminate all opponents of the regime, later passed on to various successor organizations like the GPU, NKVD and MGB and finally to the current "Committee for State Security" (KGB).

(16) These are the GST Motor Vehicle School at Ballenstedt, the GST Flying Schools at Jahnsdorf and Schoenhagen, as well as the Bezirk Training Centers at Breege on Ruegen, Scheibe-Alsbach in Kreis Neuhaus am Rennweg [lit: "on the Raceway"], Tambach-Dietharz in Kreis Gotha, Prerow in Kreis Ribnitz-Damgarten and Schirgiswalde in Kreis Bautzen.

(17) The initial numbers for this calculation are a GDR population of 16.8 million people and 61.2 million people for the Federal Republic, as well as a Bundeswehr strength of 478,000 men and a Federal Border Guard strength of 20,000 men. There is no equivalent in the Federal Republic for the other forces, with the exception of the Alert Police forces of the Laender [roughly=states].

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DATA ON STEALING, OTHER CRIMES AGAINST STATE SECTOR

Budapest OTLET in Hungarian 6 Nov 86 pp 12-13

[Article by Eva Szenes: "Public Property Without Owners"]

[Text] "The company involved either does not know about the loss or denies it."

It would be nice to believe that no overall conclusions can be drawn from the previously discussed examples of problems that enterprises and economic branches face. Statistics, however, even if they do not offer a full picture of thefts damaging public property, show at least similar unfavorable tendencies. We interviewed Dr Ivan Houguet, police lieutenant colonel, head of the subdepartment of the Department for the Defense of Public and National Property of the National Police Headquarters at the Ministry of the Interior.

--It is useful to clarify right at the beginning of our conversation what the facts are that appear in our data and what we only assume. Damage of public property is a field where latent and hidden criminal activity is widespread. According to the provisions of the effective laws, thefts that do not reach the sum of 2,000 forints--whether committed against personal or public property and if there are no other aggravating circumstances--are classified as petty offenses and are not reflected in police statistics. The 13,000 to 14,000 thefts committed against the property of economic units belonging to different branches exceed 2,000 forints each; however, in the majority of cases these are classified as "smaller" damages, i.e., below 10,000 forints. Significant damage caused by criminal gangs are not rare either. The number of these has kept growing in the last years. This is the tendency we recognized from denunciations and the officially initiated investigation.

--How much would the number of registered thefts increase if companies denounced every case to the police?

--I think a factor of 3 or 4 could be used. It is another question that not even the economic units themselves get to know of each case of damage to their property. The majority of thieves damaging personal property are

"professional" criminals, while those committing crimes against public property mostly have clean police records and are often respected people with stable existences, who gain minimal financial advantage from what they steal. It is an extreme example but it happened that a security guard at a big national company caught a department head as he was thrusting dozens of toilet paper rolls into his bag.... The majority, of course, do not steal on such a "small scale," yet they take every opportunity regardless of how much the profit expected may be. Some not only take but look for opportunities. In their selection of a workplace, they survey not only wage potentials but other "supplemental" income sources as well. The shortage in the labor force prompts some companies to adopt a very liberal attitude even towards criminal cases. The gap between demand and supply is also a real problem and leads to abuses. Chasing an article in short supply for weeks without any result and suddenly finding an opportunity to simply pilfer it, someone will feel honest if at least he warns the workshop foreman ahead of time.

--Can the proportion of thieves within and outside companies be determined?

--Criminal investigation does not distinguish between the two categories. It is a different matter that companies sometimes take lighter measures against their own employees. In certain cases and at certain levels they don't like to wash their dirty linen in public or to expose an "otherwise" decent colleague to proceedings.

--Does it mean that it is not a clearcut interest and obligation of companies to reveal thieves whoever they may be? That they don't try to reduce their losses caused by thefts? The companies that I have visited complained just about the fact that often they turn to the police in vain, because the investigation is stopped soon without results.

--The protection of public property at a company is not the obligation of the police but of those who are assigned to use, handle and expand it. It is the interest of economic units to reveal thieves, nonetheless, objective and subjective reasons sometimes influence them against doing so. The old Penal Code contained a punishment that could be meted out to those who did not take the necessary measures for "failure to comply with the obligation of denunciation." The new Penal Code lacks this category and those who do not report a crime can only be disciplined, if it is noticed at all that something is missing from the company's stock and property. It is not rare that an arrested thief admits what he stole and from where, but the company involved either does not know about the loss or denies it.

--This is totally beyond my understanding.

--If it can be proved that the lack of supervision and accounting discipline without the company might have contributed to the theft then the police may proceed not only against the thief but may also investigate the responsibility of those in charge of handling the property.

--Has it ever happened that the person who by his position would have been responsible for protecting the valuables went to the dock along with the thieves?

--In case of repeated thefts of considerable value either disciplinary procedure under labor law or prosecution for negligent handling of public property may take place. But that seldom happens.

--Let's go back to opportunities at companies for a while. What kind of experience do the police have with the work of company security forces?

--Their work reflects exactly how much importance a company places on protecting public property. There are some security forces who perform excellently, but at some companies this work is not really honored. This is clear from the fact that several companies start personnel cutbacks by dismissing employees of the security forces and the internal supervisory network.... The situation is not much better if we review the technology used to protect company property. To understand this, it should be known that if a company installs an alarm system for less than 50,000 forints it can be accounted for as an expense. Everything more expensive--and the development of even a small company's alarm system costs more than 50,000 forints--is categorized as an investment.

--It is clear now what circumstances are favorable for theft. But where are the stolen goods?

--A part of them is used by the thieves themselves, the bulk, however, appear as goods in state retail trading, at private dealers and small entrepreneurs specialized in services, in second hand shop chains and, of course, in underpasses and on the black market. Without questioning the usefulness of state retail shops rented by private entrepreneurs that work with a new accounting system, I think it must be noticed that the possibility of free acquisition of goods strongly tempts these stores to accept stolen articles.

--A couple of years ago, for example, transport workers stole some 2 dozen color televisions and refrigerators, and sold them at cut rate prices to stores that were selling such articles. The customers, of course, bought them at the "normal" prices, while the thieves and the store's staff shared the profit. Such deals can be made with almost all kinds of goods since stores have to account only for their earnings and not for their stock....

--If I understand correctly, the MEH (Byproduct and Industrial Waste Collection Trust) and second hand shops may become receivers against their will. Does it mean that if I drop in the MEH office at the corner tomorrow with 20 car batteries and 20 kilometers of electric wire, they won't call the police?

--They accept even larger items without a word, since the possibility of verifying the source of the goods is limited. A few years ago we initiated

an agreement with the BAV (Pawnshop and Second Hand Retail Store) and similar stores, according to which they would not accept safety clothes since, in the majority of the cases, these are stolen. For truth's sake it has to be added that the stores in question were less than easy to convince due to the millions of forints they lost.

--Under such circumstances, is there a way to find stolen goods and thieves?

--More than half of the unknown perpetrators are found and, in these cases, usually the whereabouts of the stolen goods are revealed, too.

--Are sanctions employed against thieves effective enough to prevent further cases?

--Our judicial system considers its main task not to be deterrence but prevention and education in respect for the law. We do not see real preventive possibilities in the seriousness of punishment, but only the fact that every perpetrator has to count on being prosecuted. For this to be implemented, it is not enough to improve police work, but also society and the working communities should openly stand up against the perpetrators of smaller or larger abuses, since silence makes you an accomplice of the guilty....

Adults Sentenced to Imprisonment

Sentenced to Imprisonment		Duration of Imprisonment						
Crimes	Total	Misdemeanors	Not exceeding 6 months	6-12 months	1-2 years	2-5 years	Over 5 years	Life sentence
Total crimes against public property:	5,199	1,827	1,930	2,094	807	345	23	--
Theft	3,394	1,444	1,362	1,226	551	241	14	--
Embezzlement	934	174	285	476	137	35	1	--
Fraud	463	58	110	213	85	51	4	--
Robbery	16	--	--	1	--	11	4	--
Vandalism	74	40	41	29	3	1	--	--
Receiving	165	40	71	82	9	3	--	--
Vehicle theft	77	55	27	36	12	2	--	--

Prosecuted Crimes According to the Closing of
Police or Prosecuting Procedures

Crimes	Closing of Proceedings							
Crimes	Total	Misdemeanor	Charges	No charges	Reprimand	Cause excluding & eliminating punishment	Perpetrator not identified	Other
Total crimes against public property	28,233	16,555	14,797	71	1,266	1,631	11,540	76
Out of this:								
Theft	21,756	12,840	9,887	63	867	910	10,943	69
Embezzlement	1,921	768	1,662	--	81	163	36	--
Fraud	1,307	561	1,092	6	69	112	64	4
Robbery	36	--	28	--	--	--	9	1
Vandalism	1,223	958	597	2	78	202	374	2
Receiving	893	562	838	--	59	43	6	--
Vehicle Theft	418	356	319	--	13	9	86	--

UNDEREMPLOYMENT CONTRADICTS MANPOWER SHORTAGE

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 19 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Andras Szigethy: "Variations on Manpower"]

[Text] The Budapest Transportation Enterprise (BKV) wrote and sent a letter --although not a love letter, like Erzsebet Szilagyi's at one time--to 57 addressees. The 57 whom the the BKV would have liked to transfer to its own work force, upon learning that Raba was closing down one of its economic units in the capital. It was not difficult to learn of the planned closure, as the news of it had spread throughout the country.

Before we discuss the outcome or consequences of these letters, it will be worthwhile to take a brief glance into them and quote some of the passages. The first paragraph of the personalized letters reads: "We have learned that your enterprise subdivision is closing down. The Budapest Transportation Enterprise is pleased to offer you suitable employment at a workplace of your choice, close to where you are living." Next comes a list of the openings by crafts and trades, with detailed information appended. The emphasis, of course, is on the benefits. Then the BKV offer continues: "For any questions you may have (regarding pay, assignments, social services, etc.), please contact the manpower supply section" where, in addition to the staff of that section, also the managers of the plant units, and the traffic and technical managers awaited the applicants, from 0730 until 1600, on 16 and 17 December. All in vain. Not a single applicant showed up.

Contradictory Facts

Just what is the manpower situation? Is there too much manpower or not enough? While the introduction of aid for retraining and finding new employment is being regarded as a forerunner of actual unemployment, personnel managers at the enterprises are complaining of not getting enough workers.

According to the official surveys that the State Office of Wages and Labor Affairs conducted, in 1986 the proportion of persons gainfully employed in Hungary was 94 percent of the estimated 6.2 million people who make up the available manpower pool. This rate of employment can be termed very high even by international comparisons. In the past five years, due to unfavorable shifts in the population's age structure and to a decline in the number of persons continuing to work past retirement age, the number of workers in the labor pool dropped faster than expected, by 2.2 percent. Within this,

the attrition rate of persons gainfully employed was 3.0 percent. Accordingly, the economic units are able to compete in the labor market only for the acquisition or redistribution of a diminishing number of employable persons.

What characterizes this labor market? A situation, in itself seemingly contradictory, such that both a shortage and a surplus of workers exist simultaneously. This is due to the fact that the breakdowns of available workers by trades and skills, and their territorial distribution, do not match the demand stemming from the tasks in production and services. The shortage of workers for certain trades and jobs has become permanent nationwide. The shortage and oversupply do not and cannot mutually offset each other, for a number of reasons. Habits, attachment to one's place of residence, and --last but not least--the housing shortage, the complications of swapping housing units and moving, can be obstacles to finding employment. But another reason of at least equal importance is that more and more workers with higher skills are needed. In the first quarter of last year, for example, the enterprises, plants and various other economic units reported 60,000 unfilled vacancies, 20 percent of them concentrated in Budapest. During the same period, 70 percent of the jobseekers were looking for work as unskilled workers, but only 17 percent of the reported vacancies waiting to be filled called for unskilled labor.

In the second quarter of last year, according to placement-service statistics, the effective demand for labor was already 75,500; in other words, the number of unfilled vacancies increased. The following balances of supply and demand for a few of the districts will serve to illustrate the aforementioned contradiction: In that quarter, the Mateszalka office had only 76 jobs for its 166 jobseekers; the Fehergyarmat office, 70 jobs for its 107 jobseekers; the Vasarosnameny office, 38 jobs for its 132 jobseekers; and the Mezokovesd office, 57 jobs for its 74 jobseekers.

Labor-Market Trends

These figures are noteworthy because they not only show the great variety within the overall situation, but also warn that this variety offers no consolation whatever to the jobseeker in Mateszalka or Vasarosnameny, and it is even possible that the enterprises' aggregate demand for labor may be exceeding the supply. Although the enterprises' intentions to increase their work force declined steadily after 1980--from an increase of 80,000 workers at the beginning of the 1980's, to an increase of fewer than 20,000 workers in 1985, mostly as a result of changes in the conditions of pay regulation--last year the demand for labor has perked up again. The intended increases of the work force last year can be estimated at between 45,000 and 48,000 workers, nearly two-thirds of them at industrial or transportation enterprises. These figures remain typical to date as well.

Unfortunately, the labor market's trends are still not the most favorable. We should mention first of all that the shift from primary processing to other industries has continued, but the number of persons employed in health care, and in social and cultural services, has been declining; and this is the exact opposite of the trends in the employment statistics of developed countries. The intensity and trend of labor mobility are important indicators of changes in the structure of the economy and its product structure,

because the shifts can be decisive from the viewpoint of improving the structure of employment and effectiveness. They can be, when they are contributing to the economy's necessary modernization. Domestic experience indicates that two-thirds of the workers changing jobs do so on their own initiative. Every other job change among men employed in manual labor can be traced to material interests, and also 30 to 40 percent of the working women give the prospects of higher pay as their reason for changing jobs. This, of course, is understandable. But what is less understandable, especially under our conditions, is that barely more than 10 percent of the changes in employment take place on the initiative of the factory, plant or cooperative. And here we must bear in mind that the reason why the employer hardly ever fires by disciplinary action workers who are doing more harm--to morale and financially--than good is because he fears the chronic labor shortage, or perhaps for other tactical, speculative, wage-policy or reserve-concealing reasons. From this and other points of view, manpower mobility is much slower than what it should be.

Transfers of workers between enterprises, due to changes in the production and product structures, or for other sensible reasons of business policy, affected 15,000 persons in 1985. For the first ten months of 1986, however, the number of such persons involved only an estimated 5,000 persons.

Real Breakthrough

The key issue of our economy's survival and modernization--regrettably, these concepts have been recurring for very many years--is the change or transformation of our production structure, which of course is closely linked to the change or transformation of our product structure. Greater manpower mobility is a concomitant and consequence of this process. The labor turnover's index in the early 1970's was as high as 35 percent of the number of persons gainfully employed, moderating to 21 or 22 percent by 1980. Today, in strict statistical terms, every fifth or sixth worker changes employment. Naturally, it would be useless to boost manpower mobility merely for its own sake. But when it helps to revitalize the economy, and as a tool of modernization, higher labor mobility is unquestionably desirable. It is likewise true in this interdependence that overcautious, hesitant manpower management can be an obstacle to the unfolding of desirable processes. Said or unsaid, fear of unemployment is one of the sources of the nervousness, uncertainty and timidity. This is reflected also in the current debates on full and effective employment.

Without going into the details of these arguments, we merely wish to note that the strategy of lifting the economy out of its rut presupposes--nay, demands--also ideological clarification, so that we may avoid seeking ideological mistakes even where none exists.

What we need are not explanations and excuses, but a bold new approach also to manpower management. If rational and effective use of manpower does not diminish social security but is accompanied by a new type of social care, the signs of which are already evident, then we can only come closer to realizing our common objectives.